DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE IN BRAZIL: WAITING ON OBAMA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001104 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC, EEB/IFD/ODF, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA NSC FOR ROSSELLO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KPAO PGOV SCUL ECON PREL BR SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE IN BRAZIL: WAITING ON OBAMA SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED REF: (A) 7/28/09 WHA/PDA EMAIL ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a broad off-the-record discussion of U.S.-Brazil foreign policy issues hosted by the CDA as part of U/S McHale's Diplomatic Dialogue Initiative (ref A),the select group of invited Brazilian opinion leaders were unanimous in stressing that, although they have been pleased with the Obama Administration's more active interest in and collaborative approach to Latin America, they are beginning to fear that this will not be matched by actions. Contacts observed that the USG should be prepared for tension in the relationship as the Obama administration seeks to "re-occupy" the diplomatic space in South America ceded almost entirely to Brazil during the Bush administration. To mitigate potential tension it is critical that the USG understand Brazilian interests and insecurities, expand dialogue and conversation with Brazil across the political, economic and military spectrum, and focus on concrete initiatives to encourage further cooperation. Joint development projects in third countries in Latin America and Africa, drug trafficking, and mil-mil collaboration were cited as examples. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In response to U/S McHale's request (ref A) that Brazil participate in the launch of the Diplomatic Dialogue Initiative, PAS Brasilia organized a small gathering of notable Brazilian opinion leaders to discuss the Secretary's foreign policy speech at the Council of Foreign Relations. POL, ECON and PA Counselors joined the CDA, who hosted the meeting. Brazilian participants: -- Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha: a Fulbrighter, professor of International Relations at the University of Brasilia (UnB) and an adviser at the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic. -- Juliano Cortinhas: professor of International Relations at UnB and Catholic University; frequently called on to give interviews about U.S. foreign policy. -- Paulo Roberto Almeida: former Brazilian DCM in Washington, DC. He is Professor of Sociology and Law at UniCEUB, writer, and political analyst. A diplomat, he is currently on leave from Itamaraty, so able to comment more freely on foreign policy matters. -- Marcelo Barroso Lacombe: A Legislative Analyst in the area of political science, he follows U.S. foreign policy very closely. -- Bernardo Estelita Lins: A Legislative Analyst in the area of economics, and member of a study group on the current economic crisis. -- Joco Paulo Machado Peixoto: A Professor in the departments of Political Science and Business Administration at UnB. A former Woodrow Wilson visiting scholar respected for his expertise on reform of the state and public policies. -- Srgio Leo: Columnist and senior reporter with business daily Valor Econtmico with extensive experience covering foreign affairs, including presidential trips abroad and international events such as UN, WTO and Mercosul summits. -------------- - CHALLENGES IN RE-OCCUPYING THE POLITICAL SPACE -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) Brazilian participants were quick to stress that the Obama Administration should expect points of tension in the U.S.-Brazil relationship as it puts in place a new policy and re-engages in South America. While acknowledging Bush Administration initiatives in the region, the group noted that the diplomatic space had been largely ceded to Brazil. Brazil now thinks of itself as the leader in the region, one whose opinions and views should be respected and closely consulted by the Obama Administration as it re-engages on issues in the hemisphere. As one participant observed, "the challenge [for the U.S.] is how to re-occupy the diplomatic space without conflicting with the Brazilian government, which thinks of itself as the leader in the region." ¶4. (SBU) Participants observed that the Obama Administration will have to manage this transition carefully lest it run the risk of being viewed as imperialistic. As one person noted: "you can lead as long as you don't isolate us." All recommended the Obama Administration share much more information with Brazil than before, and consult more frequently across the spectrum of the relationship. When challenged on why Brazil does not contact the United States when an issue or question arises, the response was clear: "Brazil BRASILIA 00001104 002 OF 003 is waiting for a call from the United States." ¶5. (SBU) Colombia was cited as an example where the absence of prior USG consultation with Brazil can increase tensions and create the perception that the United States is acting in an imperialistic manner within the region. One observer noted, "as soon as the base issue came up everyone immediately forgot about the issue of the FARC in Venezuela." When asked why, he responded that "Maybe one [issue] is not so important as the other. Is it relevant to Brazil that Venezuela is selling weapons to the FARC when the FARC is so weakened or is it relevant that the U.S. has bases?" ¶6. (SBU) The group also stressed the need to distinguish between Brazil and the current Brazilian government, and that the United States should focus on the long-term with Brazil and not just on the current Brazilian government: "You need to distinguish between the petty issues and the areas for cooperation." -------------- -- KEEP COOPERATION CONCENTRATED ON CONCRETE AREAS -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) Participants warned of the "dilemma" the U.S. faces in re-engaging the region stemming from the recent diplomatic isolationism: "too broad a dialogue too quickly runs the risk of being perceived as interventionist." Instead they recommended focusing cooperation with Brazil on joint projects in concrete areas. One promising area mentioned in connection to the Secretary's speech was science and technology, particularly as related to technology transfer. Another suggestion was development, specifically on joint development projects as a means to reduce security threats or in third countries such as Bolivia, which would be perceived as a gesture of goodwill. Africa was described as a new frontier for Brazil, one that offered potential areas of cooperation with the United States to revitalize African economies and promote technical development. The United States should also engage not only the GOB, but the private sector as well. ¶8. (SBU) Others suggested U.S.-Brazil military cooperation in keeping the Southern Hemisphere stable and peaceful as a promising avenue to explore. They noted the Brazilian military is generally less anti-American in outlook than the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) and shares many of the same interests with the USG; for example, "objectively Brazil has the same interest in containing Chavez as the United States." According to one participant, though, while the military believes this, the government "mixes it up" by pursuing political support for Chavez but military containment. ¶9. (SBU) Participants noted an opportunity to engage the region to address drug trafficking challenges -- and that Brazil could be helpful in setting up a regional drug strategy approach -- but stressed it must be based on a different approach, "one open to dialogue and not open to confrontation by Bolivia." It was mentioned that one of the opportunities lost by the United States in "ceding the space in Latin America during the Bush Administration" was taking part in civilian-military cooperation in the region, and cooperation to address drug trafficking. -------------- FX2: USG ENTERED THE GAME LATE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Mention of technology transfer led to discussion of the FX2 sale, and highlighted a continuing lack of trust in USG motives, despite CDA assurances that both the Secretaries of State and Defense had signed letters assuring the transfer. Many cited the need to take into account the U.S. historical record, with one noting that "this could be one more attempt to avoid technology transfer." Another warned that "the United States lost a good opportunity" by not backing Boeing's bid in a serious way until very late in the game, noting that it may be too late to roll back the process as decision making was already well advanced. -------------- AMAZON MYTH REVISITED -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Guaranteeing Brazilian sovereignty of the Amazon remains an underlying concern which emerged during discussions. The CDA's reassurance that the United States has absolutely no interest in taking over the Amazon prompted further elaboration from the group as to the true source of this concern. As one participant explained, its origin lies more in historic European attempts to challenge Brazilian sovereignty of the region than specific USG actions, though as the United States gained power the focus shifted to U.S. intentions. As one person stressed, "the problem is not Americans but other countries, and what the United States does to BRASILIA 00001104 003 OF 003 empower [Brazil's] neighbors." However, the group also admitted that this insecurity was often exploited by the military as a means to gain more resources. They explained that the real concern over "internationalization of the Amazon" stems from the fact that there are 11 indigenous tribes amalgamated across the borders of the Amazon and the GOB's fear (based in part on independence movements elsewhere and NGO/international activities in the Amazon) that outside elements will encourage these groups to declare their independence or autonomy from Brazil. -------------- ENGAGE, ENGAGE, ENGAGE -- BUT RESPECT DIFFERENT APROACHES -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Participants repeatedly stressed the need for more conversation now. As one pointed out, "consultation on the [Colombia] bases is mandatory if you think Brazil is an important leader." Several expressed the perception that the United States only looks to Brazil if there is a threat or interest where Brazil can be helpful. Others noted the need to work as well with other actors outside government, particularly in the business community. ¶13. (SBU) The group sought to explain the difference between the U.S. and Brazilian perspective, noting that Brazil is acting globally on economic issues in particular, but does not have the same global military presence or projection as the United States and so will not think in the same terms regarding global military security issues. As one person stressed, "we are strongly defensive when we look at military issues, so the way we think and act is very different from you." ¶14. (SBU) Others underscored that the U.S. needs to understand Brazil is unique from other Latin American countries and other BRICs -- with different interests -- and thus the U.S. needs to take care not to mix Brazil's interests with others like China or Venezuela. Lingering insecurities over a historic imbalance --now outgrown -- remain. "We have a different vision of the United States than other Latin American countries. Our economic relationship is much different. We still have a view of the United States as an economic hegemonist selling junk." While Brazil has for the most part grown out of a subservient relationship, these sentiments still linger, and insecurities will manifest themselves most in areas where balance in the relationship is more lopsided in favor of the United States. -------------- COMMENT: NEED FOR MORE ENGAGEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE RESPECT FOR BRAZIL'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SOUTH AMERICA -------------- ¶15. (SBU) COMMENT: These Brazilian opinion leaders plainly favor increased engagement with the United States, though cautiously, specifically targeted on concrete areas, and on Brazil's terms as well as ours. The message is clear, however, that the Obama Administration should recognize -- and respect -- Brazil as an equal actor in South America, one deserving of the consideration due a regional leader whose interests are not always in lockstep with ours. As we re-engage diplomatically in South America, we should be prepared for sometimes contentious, tense relations with a Brazil that sees itself as a regional leader. We need to understand that Brazilians do not fully trust U.S. intentions in the region. And we will need to be sensitive to, avoid being dismissive of, and seek to work around the continuing insecurities that affect Brazil's approach to our bilateral relationship. The best way to mitigate tension and engage Brazil as a cooperative partner lies in increased and expanded dialogue across all spectrums of the relationship, and a focus on joint projects in defined areas. END COMMENT. KUBISKE