PRESIDENT URIBE APPROVES THE "STRATEGIC LEAP"

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000715 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER MOPS MCAP MASS MARR CO SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE APPROVES THE "STRATEGIC LEAP" Classified By: DCM Brian A. Nichols for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 19, President Uribe approved a comprehensive plan known as the "Strategic Leap," designed to achieve irreversibility in the GOC's fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other criminal groups before his term ends in 2010. The plan calls for the decisive dismantling of terrorist organizations, stabilizing key border areas, and the consolidation of GOC control over key geographic areas through integrated GOC action. The Strategic Leap identifies 17 strategic focus areas, and proposes to stand up six new inter-agency fusion centers in these regions. The centers will be modeled on the successful approach taken in La Macarena. Still, serious obstacles to implementation remain, including budget shortfalls and continued inter-agency wrangling. End summary. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) In August 2007, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) engaged an Israeli company, Global Comprehensive Security Transformation (Global CST),to help the GOC conduct a strategic assessment of the internal conflict. Global CST is a security company run by Israeli Defense Forces Reserve Major General Yisrael Ziv, former Director of Operations for the IDF and a personal acquaintance of Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos. The Israeli contractors had been in preliminary discussions with the MOD about such a strategic review since 2007, when GOC officials were frustrated over their lack of success against high value FARC targets (HVTs). The assessment became known as the "Salto Estrategico" (Strategic Leap). The MOD spearheaded the initiative, but the idea was to adopt an integrated GOC approach. GOC LIMITATIONS, WEAKNESSES -------------- ¶3. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo, one of the intellectual authors of the assessment, told us in a February 26 briefing that several factors prompted the GOC to undertake the review. The principal driver was the desire to achieve "irreversible" progress in the war against the FARC and other criminal groups before President Uribe's term ended in 2010. There was a perception that the Uribe's Democratic Security Policy had stalled, with new criminal groups arising after the demobilization of the United Self-Defene Forces of Colombia (AUC),continued widespread illegal coca cultivation, and a resilient FARC remaining in the field. Jaramillo noted that Uribe feared that the GOC lacked the strategic framework needed to win this conflict. ¶4. (C) Jaramillo added that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's growing influence in the region was also alarming, and said that terrorist and criminal groups were exploiting border areas with Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela to develop sophisticated narcotics supply chains. Colombian military forces were too dispersed, lacked operational flexibility, and suffered from limited--and likely shrinking--resources to effectively confront these external and internal threats. The Strategic Leap exercise provided a framework that would ensure more strategic use of these limited military resources as well as greater coordination with civilian agencies. Vice Minister of Defense Juan Pinzon described the assessment to us as a "time out," to make sure that the GOC was doing everything possible to move towards the victory line by 2010. GOAL IS IRREVERSIBILITY -------------- ¶5. (C) Jaramillo said the GOC did not think that the Strategic Leap would solve all of Colombia's problems by ¶2010. Still, he explained that the GOC hoped to lock in place systems that would achieve "irreversibility" in the fight against illegal armed groups--regardless of who may be president after 2010. Jaramillo said that instead of using statistics like hectares of coca eradicated or arms caches seized to measure progress, the GOC needed a more comprehensive, territorial vision that would focus on consolidating control of critical geographic areas. ¶6. (C) MOD officials concluded that relatively few regions accounted for most criminal violence and narcotics activity, and that a clear-and-hold approach was needed in these areas. GOC officials were heartened by their successes in La Macarena, where coordinated inter-agency efforts through the fusion center in Vista Hermosa had largely dissuaded drug traffickers from moving in after the Colombian military had driven the FARC out. There was almost no coca re-planting in this area, and increased citizen cooperation with state entities. The idea was to replicate this successful approach in other key regions. STRATEGIC LEAP MISSION STATEMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Jaramillo said the Strategic Leap exercise evolved over time, eventually producing the following mission statement: "A national integrated, harmonized and synchronized plan of state institutions against narco-terrorist and criminal aggression in Colombia, consisting of a coordinated, progressive and irreversible process, designed to guarantee in a sustainable manner and within the framework of the Democratic Security Policy, an environment of security and peace, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and the social consolidation of territory and state institutions, in order to benefit the free exercise of societal rights and the social and productive development of Colombia." KEY RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Jaramillo explained that while the MOD spearheaded the Strategic Leap review process, the idea was to integrate all relevant government agencies and to adopt a coordinated and sequenced approach. From September to December 2007, officials from various agencies, including the MOD and the Ministries of Social Protection, Interior, Finance and Communication, met to review the situation. They concluded that the government needed to focus on the following tasks: a) Decisive dismantling of principal terrorist structures and organizations in order to achieve irreversibility; b) Containment efforts, to block enemy supply and support lines and to keep problem areas from spreading; c) Sustainable consolidation, to guarantee an environment of security and peace to permit the strengthening of democratic institutions; and d) External dissuasion, to block the influence of countries that provide material support to illegal groups. The following supporting areas were also identified: e) Legal efforts, to attack terrorist organizations and to ensure that all military operations comply with applicable legal norms; f) Perception, to convert achievements into messages both nationally and internationally to generate a positive impact; and g) Finances, to attack terrorist's abilities to finance, invest and spend their resources. ¶9. (C) Working groups met regularly in 2007-2008 to develop policies in these areas. The MOD considered USG participation critical to this effort and included Embassy officials in the meetings--despite initial resistance by GLOBAL CST to the USG presence. Differences emerged between Colombian operational commanders and policy makers on issues such as whether all consolidation and development efforts would have to wait for security to be completely established--in Narino, for example. Still, officials from diverse ministries were working side by side on a strategic plan, which represented a significant advance. GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS AREAS -------------- ¶10. (C) In determining territorial focus areas, Jaramillo said that officials overlaid maps with the following indicators: centers of narcotics production, FARC and armed group mobility corridors, militia presence, presence of criminal bands, terrorist acts, kidnappings and extortion, and displacements. What emerged were two key swathes of territory going from east to west across the country. One zone starts in Meta and runs across Tolima and Huila, ending in Cauca, Valle de Cauca and Narino. The other zone starts in Northern Colombia, running from Cesar and Norte de Santander across Bolivar and southern Cordoba, and ending in Choco and the Uraba region of Antioquia. ¶11. (C) The 17 areas identified under the Strategic Leap, in priority order, are: 1) the Meta-Caqueta border; 2) Southern Tolima; 3) Valle - Cauca - Narino; 4) the Nudo de Paramillo region in Antioquia; 5) the Catatumbo region in the border of Norte de Santander and Cesar; 6) the Cundinamarca border with Tolima-Huila-Meta; 7) Southern Bolivar; 8) Arauca; 9) Eastern Antioquia; 10) Guaviare; 11) the Putumayo - Bota Caucana region in Cauca; 12) the Serrania del Perija region where Norte de Santander borders Cesar; 13) the Atrato region of Choco and the Uraba region in Antioquia/Cordoba; 14) the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in Magdalena; 15) the Cumaribo region in Vichada; 16) Bajo Cauca; and 17) the Montes de Maria region in Bolivar and Sucre. URIBE APPROVES THE PLAN -------------- ¶12. (C) On February 19, President Uribe was briefed for four hours on the Strategic Leap recommendations and formally approved the plan, which is now moving into the execution phase. Execution is scheduled to take place in three phases: emergency attention, transition, and stabilization. The plan calls for six new fusion centers to be stood up throughout the country, modeled on the approach in La Macarena. In one of the first concrete actions under the plan to focus military resources on priority geographic regions, the Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) has been relocated to the Meta-Huila border to pursue FARC Secretariat member Mono Jojoy. BUT RESOURCES ARE LIMITED -------------- ¶13. (C) Jaramillo acknowledged that resources are limited to fund the Strategic Leap, and that the GOC was looking to various funding sources, including the private sector. He said that some new hires were already being made for the fusion centers, but agreed that the GOC needed to ensure that more resources continue to flow in. Jaramillo underscored that USG funding and expertise would be a key to success--as it was in La Macarena--and noted the Dutch have provided some two million euros with another five million euros under consideration. Jaramillo said when Uribe was briefed, officials did not dwell on recent GOC budget cuts due to falling economic growth and its possible impact on the Strategic Leap. AND STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES LOOM -------------- ¶14. (C) The largest impediment to implementing the plan remains the lack of commitment of some government agencies and ministries to make the structural changes needed to implement an integrated consolidation plan--and reprogramming resources within existing budgets. Jaramillo mentioned that there is some support for the creation of a new reconstruction ministry, since the current development agency (CCAI) does not have its own funding and relies on other ministries. He noted that there was a dispute about which ministry should take the lead in the various focus areas, and insisted that proper sequencing would be critical. He also observed that the issue of how to measure success would be difficult, commenting that the GOC had set up a complicated structure to try to measure success in territorial terms. ¶15. (C) Jaramillo said the Strategic Leap will need to tackle complicated issues involved in consolidation, such as land tenure and titling, promotion of legal economic development, and lack of infrastructure. He also conceded there could be a balloon effect, where narcotics activity could simply move from one sector to another in Colombia. Still, he said the idea was to move the conflict and coca entirely away from population zones. Jaramillo noted that impending changes in the MOD leadership could also hinder implementation. Defense Minister Santos is expected to resign in the coming month to launch his presidential campaign, and Vice Ministers Jaramillo and Pinzon will likely depart with him. BROWNFIELD