MONTES DE MARIA: RIPE FOR CONSOLIDATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000614 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR CO SUBJECT: MONTES DE MARIA: RIPE FOR CONSOLIDATION Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b and d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) GOC security efforts--coupled with the paramilitary demobilization process--have transformed the Montes de Maria region on Colombia's Caribbean Coast from the FARC's major stronghold in the north and an important paramilitary zone into an area ripe for consolidation and post-conflict assistance. The GOC is now looking to build on this security success by strengthening civilian institutions and promoting a viable legal economy. The joint European-GOC Peace Laboratory III recently approved 30 new projects in the region aimed at strengthening civil society, human rights and economic development. Similarly, the GOC recently started new initiatives--led by the GOC's Center for Coordination and Integrated Action (CCAI)--aimed at enhancing roads and infrastructure. Still, communities in the area remain vulnerable to armed groups, with high unemployment, narcotrafficking and other criminal activities, weak or corrupt local institutions, and the need to absorb a large displaced population posing major challenges. End Summary Successes Lay Groundwork for Consolidation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Security has improved dramatically in Montes de Maria--consisting of fifteen municipalities in the departments of Sucre and Bolivar--which has traditionally been a strategic corridor for both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and narcotraffickers. The area also has one of the highest rates of displacement and suffered two notorious massacres in Chengue in 2002 and El Salado in 2000. However, after the 2006 demobilization of the roughly 600 fighters of the Heroes de Montes de Maria bloc of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the death of 35th and 37th FARC Front leader Martin Caballero in the fall of 2007--which led to record desertions and a collapse of the FARC in the area--Colombian security forces have retaken much of the territory. In a December 2008 visit to the community, President Uribe stated that he wants Montes de Maria to be the first fully "consolidated" region. ¶3. (C) The FARC's 35th Front has collapsed entirely in the wake of record numbers of desertions and captures in 2008, explained Colonel Klaus Gutierrez, Commander of the Army's 1st Brigade in Corozal, Sucre. On January 28, Gutierrez told ;us that only fourteen 37th Front members remained, but on January 29 the Colombian National Police (CNP) captured three additional FARC members in the municipality of Carmen de Bolivar, bringing their total number down to eleven. Despite this, Gutierrez admitted there could be 50-60 (or more) FARC militia in the area. ¶4. (C) Admiral Roberto Garcia Marquez, Commander of the Caribbean Navy, explained that the military's main focus is what remains of the 37th Front in the region. He explained that there is some concern about the FARC trying to retake the area in the future. He believes the insurgents will probably pull back to southern Bolivar and Antioquia--maybe as far as Norte de Santander and southern Choco--to strategize on how best (hLA(h occurred in the municipality of Carmen de Bolivar alone. The problem now, explained Colonel Colon, former director of the Fusion Center for Montes de Maria, is that many want to return but cannot due to lack of access or ongoing obstacles, like lack of potable water, electricity and other public services. Garcia said much of the problem is due to the conditions of roads, which will no longer be an obstacle once the GOC completes current road projects. That said, the Bolivar Governor Joaco Hernando Berrio Villarreal opined that the number of those wanting to return is small, while human rights organization CODHES reports that only 2-5 percent of IDPs in Colombia want to return. Social/Economic Factors: Development, Justice and Land -------------- ¶13. (C) The people of Montes de Maria are ready for solutions, stated Sucre Private Secretary Fadul, and local government is ready to help, but he argued they need sustainable solutions. 1st Brigade Commander Colonel Gutierrez explained that the people of Montes de Maria turned to the FARC and narcotrafficking due to the lack of available opportunities in the region. In many parts of Montes de Maria there have been little or no government services, water, electricity or jobs. Civil society leader Gonsalez told us that Montes de Maria needs economic development--such as employment possibilities, roads, infrastructure and cooperatives--as well as justice in the region. ¶14. (C) Land appears to be the single most contentious issue in the area, according to several experts. Oscar Herrera argues that the lack of land reform in the region is an obstacle to resolving the problems for the people of Montes de Maria. Professor Amaranto Daniels, Director of the Montes de Maria Observatory at the University of Cartagena, claims that land conflicts could trigger the next round of conflict in the region. Garcia and Colon concurred with this assessment. Colon told us that GOC land institutions are not flexible in responding quickly to solve problems over land. Finally, speculation over the possibility of petroleum in the region combined with large agricultural projects in the region are inflating prices of land and pressuring some land owners to sell without viable alternatives. BROWNFIELD Fusion Center is that the community views them purely as extensions of the military. Castillo explains that CCAI not only needs to build roads, but also to mend the social fabric of the community, restore inhabitants' faith in government, and consult more with the community. ¶6. (C) The EU-funded Peace Laboratory III began funding small community programs in late 2008 and early 2009: six focused on human rights, five on good governance and nineteen on sustainable economic development. The Peace Laboratory itself was initiated and began consulting with the community in 2006, and in 2007 and 2008 began supporting community leaders and building social networks focused on women, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities. The Peace Laboratory, whose main implementer is the Peace and Development Foundation for Montes de Maria, works closely with UNDP, Accion Social and private sector programs to coordinate their assistance. Moreover, many of the projects are overseen by community leaders and organizations. They also have contracted with local university students to undertake studies on human rights, strengthening local institutions and enhancing private investment. ¶7. (C) The USG through the Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID) is working with CCAI and the Fusion Center to support their initiatives in the Montes de Maria region, in particular with the construction of roads and a program to assist in the return of IDPs to the region. They plan to set up regional offices in Cartagena and Sincelejo. USAID's demobilization program in Montes de Maria assists some 8,000 beneficiaries with resettlement projects, provides assistance to victims of the conflict, and is implementing a child soldier prevention program. USAID's governance program is planning to establish Justice Houses in Sincelejo, San Onofre and Carmen de Bolivar in 2009. Security Challenges Remain -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite the improvements, security forces, the community, and Defensoria del Pueblo (Ombudsman) Oscar Herrera Revollo remain concerned over the emergence of new criminal groups. Admiral Garcia told us that defeating new criminal groups, especially Los Paisas (active in Sucre and Bolivar),was the military's top priority after the FARC. Colonel Gutierrez explained that his key concern is the battle between Los Paisas and Daniel Rendon (Don Mario) for control of the strategic narcotrafficking corridors in the Montes area and extending to the Gulf of Morrosquillo. ¶9. (C) Sucre Governor Jorge Carlos Barraza explained that he believes new criminal group Los Paisas are causing much of the unrest in the department and are responsible for some of the reported homicides. He explained that the governor's office is working with mayors throughout the department to counter the growing criminal group problem despite MOD Juan Manuel Santos's recent claim that such groups have been reduced to 90 percent of their prior presence in the region. Sucre CNP Commander Colonel Hugo Javier Agudelo told us that in January 2009 there were reportedly 21 homicides in the department, up from 9 in January 2008. Agudelo explained that only five are associated with new criminal groups, but others are still being investigated. Still, Governor Barraza's ties to former paramilitary groups--as well as many local mayors' links to former paramilitaries--raise questions about their commitment to solving the problem. ¶10. (C) Jose Gonsalez, a civil society leader in Carmen de Bolivar, told us that the community also fears the FARC will regenerate in the region. While he admitted these fears are mostly based on rumors, he believes they could paralyze the community and make people more vulnerable to recruiment until the problems are resolved and opportunities arise. In addition, there are still active alerts by the Ombudsman's office for San Onofre and Sincelejo/Toluviejo, as well as elevated warnings for San Marco and La Union, where recent homicides have occurred. Local Corruption Persists -------------- ¶11. (C) Local corruption continues to plague many of the municipalities in Montes de Maria. UNDP representative Aldo Morales explained that there are serious problems with local officials in Carmen de Bolivar, leading to difficulties with implementation in the region. The municipality of Carmen de Bolivar has been the most affected by this problem: recently elected mayor Galo Torres Serra is suspended due to rumors of FARC ties and "personality" problems, and acting Mayor Raul Eduardo Jacome Espinosa is rumored to have paramilitary ties. Sucre Private Secretary Enrique Fadul explained that San Onofre and Ovejas have been the two regions most affected by local corruption with many past government officials charged or rumored to have paramilitary connections. The current mayor of Ovejas is also suspended for three months pending an investigation of paramilitary ties. IDPs/Retornos Also A Challenge -------------- ¶12. (C) Sucre and Bolivar Departments, especially the area of Montes de Maria, are particularly high displacement areas, with approximately 344,000 people displaced since 1995, most of them between 2003-2006. Accion Social reports 49,937 people were displaced in Montes de Maria between 2003-2007, 30 percent of which occurred in the municipality of Carmen de Bolivar alone. The problem now, explained Colonel Colon, former director of the Fusion Center for Montes de Maria, is that many want to return but cannot due to lack of access or ongoing obstacles, like lack of potable water, electricity and other public services. Garcia said much of the problem is due to the conditions of roads, which will no longer be an obstacle once the GOC completes current road projects. That said, the Bolivar Governor Joaco Hernando Berrio Villarreal opined that the number of those wanting to return is small, while human rights organization CODHES reports that only 2-5 percent of IDPs in Colombia want to return. Social/Economic Factors: Development, Justice and Land -------------- ¶13. (C) The people of Montes de Maria are ready for solutions, stated Sucre Private Secretary Fadul, and local government is ready to help, but he argued they need sustainable solutions. 1st Brigade Commander Colonel Gutierrez explained that the people of Montes de Maria turned to the FARC and narcotrafficking due to the lack of available opportunities in the region. In many parts of Montes de Maria there have been little or no government services, water, electricity or jobs. Civil society leader Gonsalez told us that Montes de Maria needs economic development--such as employment possibilities, roads, infrastructure and cooperatives--as well as justice in the region. ¶14. (C) Land appears to be the single most contentious issue in the area, according to several experts. Oscar Herrera argues that the lack of land reform in the region is an obstacle to resolving the problems for the people of Montes de Maria. Professor Amaranto Daniels, Director of the Montes de Maria Observatory at the University of Cartagena, claims that land conflicts could trigger the next round of conflict in the region. Garcia and Colon concurred with this assessment. Colon told us that GOC land institutions are not flexible in responding quickly to solve problems over land. Finally, speculation over the possibility of petroleum in the region combined with large agricultural projects in the region are inflating prices of land and pressuring some land owners to sell without viable alternatives. BROWNFIELD