WORRIED GOC ACTS TO SAVE "MEDELLIN MIRACLE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000519 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRM CO SNAR SUBJECT: WORRIED GOC ACTS TO SAVE "MEDELLIN MIRACLE" REF: A. 09BOGOTA145 ¶B. 08BOGOTA3077 ¶C. 08BOGOTA4442 Classified By: Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOC in late January launched a major push in Medellin to combat the rising rate of violent crime in the city and nearby areas. Medellin has enjoyed the most dramatic drop in homicide rates of any major city or region in Colombia under President Uribe's Democratic Security policy, making 2008's 35 percent increase in homicides worrying to local and national officials. The Colombian National Police (CNP) is surging personnel to Medellin and targeting the narcotrafficking organizations behind the violence. Still, organized crime linked to the drug trade, problems with Medellin's paramilitary reintegration program and local corruption will hamper the new efforts. NARANJO INITIATES 'SURGE' AGAINST DRUG-LINKED VIOLENCE -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) Colombian National Police (CNP) Commander General Oscar Naranjo temporarily moved his headquarters to Medellin in late January to spearhead a new effort to counter the rising rates of violence there and in nearby regions. At a time when homicides in the rest of Colombia continue to trend downward, Medellin, surrounding Antioquia, and nearby Cordoba saw significant upticks in their rates in 2008 (reftel A). Colombian media also speculated that the GOC's move may have been motivated by (as yet unconfirmed) reports that narco kingpin Daniel Rendon (alias "Don Mario") has offered a reward of 2 million pesos (about $800 USD) to any of his men who killed a police officer. ¶3. (U) CNP officials said Naranjo is targeting the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) behind the spike in homicides, Rendon's in particular. The effort will involve bringing an additional 1000 police officers and police intelligence agents to Medellin, where they will conduct raids, investigations, and roadblocks aimed at disrupting the drug trade and its attendant violence. Naranjo also told leading daily El Tiempo that he aimed to capture Rendon and other leading narcotrafficking chiefs, tightly control firearms and motorcycles (which are frequently used by assassins),and shut down DTO drug distribution centers in Medellin. The increased operational tempo in the first few days of the new effort netted over 1500 arrests in Medellin, according to Colombian press reporting, including 350 arrests in the dangerous Comuna 13 neighborhood alone. CRIMINALS, DEMOBILIZATION, AND CORRUPTION BEHIND THE SPIKE -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Medellin has seen a 76 percent decline in homicides (and a significant drop in other types of violent crime) since 2002, but the 2008 jump has many concerned. Most GOC sources blame the spike in killings on a combination of fighting among drug gangs, the large numbers of demobilized fighters in the city, and corruption in local governments and security forces. Most of the killings result from infighting among criminal groups seeking to fill the vacuum left by the May 2008 extradition of Diego Murillo (alias Don Berna), whose organization controlled crime in Medellin for years, according to Medellin Mayor Alonso Salazar and Medellin Police Commander Dagoberto Garcia (reftel B). Medellin Secretary of Government Jesus Ramirez also told us that 70% of those murdered in the city had prior criminal records. ¶5. (C) Salazar told us that many of the nearly 4300 former paramilitary fighters (along with 800 ex-guerrillas) in Medellin's once-highly-touted reintegration program have joined drug gangs or been killed for refusing to do so. According to El Tiempo, at least 350 demobilized paramilitary fighters in Medellin have been arrested, about 200 have been murdered, and at least 130 have been expelled from the program and/or rejoined criminal groups. The reinsertion program itself has struggled to serve its clients amid political infighting and competition for the program's lucrative contracts, which for years were controlled by Murillo's organization through a front NGO, says a recent study by Corporacion para la Paz y el Desarrollo. Medellin officials had accepted the arrangement to keep the peace until it became clear that Murillo's lieutenants--one of whom was a brother of a Medellin prosecutor--were using the NGO to continue their criminal activities. The result has made a return to the lucrative world of crime more tempting for the demobilized. In addition, according to Salazar and other officials, corruption and penetration of Medellin's security forces by DTOs remains a serious problem that has reduced their ability to fight crime WILL IT BE ENOUGH? -------------- ¶6. (C) Medellin CNP Commander Garcia told us the overall crime rate in Medellin and Antioquia continues to drop, and Salazar told us that polls show security is less important to Medellin residents than economic issues--which they say further shows the violence is largely restricted to the criminal underworld. Still, GOC and Medellin officials worry the trend will spread, and it is unclear whether the new surge addresses the problems underlying the homicide spike. Naranjo himself suggested in interviews that the problem will continue until one crime organization consolidates its power in the city. Salazar in August told us that national needs have left Medellin with fewer police officers than in 2004, and that CNP plans to add 500 police officers to the city would merely cover attrition--not represent a net gain. BROWNFIELD