DESERTIONS RISING, OPS SLOWING?: COLOMBIA CONFLICT

S E C R E T BOGOTA 000401 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO SUBJECT: DESERTIONS RISING, OPS SLOWING?: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2008 Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b and d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Colombian military did not score any high-profile tactical wins over the FARC in the fourth quarter of 2008, leading to a public perception that the GOC lost momentum following earlier successes. Some officers claimed commanders had become too cautious after the dismissal of 27 military personnel for their involvement in the Soacha extrajudicial killings, but our analysis shows the fall in operations appears to have been a normal, seasonal phenomenon due to end-of-year command changes and the holiday lull. Kills and captures continued to drop, but 2008 ended with a record number of 3,500 demobilized terrorists, mostly from the FARC. There was an up-tick in FARC attacks towards the end of the quarter, and extortion bombings in Bogota continued. The FARC continued to rely on land mines, snipers, and improvised explosive devices. Estimates vary widely, but local analysts believe the FARC still has around 9,000 fighters perhaps as many as 18,000 militia. The GOC said it would target the ELN in 2009, despite charges that the Colombian military colluded with the ELN to fight the FARC in Arauca. End Summary. 2008 DEMOBS BREAK RECORD -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOC reported that a record number of 3461 individuals demobilized in 2008--including 3,027 from the FARC--an increase of 30 percent over 2007. There was a 31 percent increase in FARC desertions among FARC combatants with three to five years of experience. Demobilizations were highest among FARC fronts that lost their commanders or faced constant military pressure, with more than one third of the demobilizations this quarter coming from the Eastern Bloc. The lowest level of demobilizations occurred along the porous Venezuelan border. The highest profile demobilization was Wilson Bueno Largo (alias Isaza),who deserted with "political" hostage and former Congressman Oscar Tulio Lizcano on October 23 after 12 years in the FARC. Isaza cited military pressure, exhaustion and supply shortages as factors in his desertion. The GOC publicized Isaza's demobilization and his subsequent receipt of political asylum in France, hoping to attract other FARC members to desert with hostages. COLMIL OPS SLOWING? -------------- ¶3. (S) Some military officers told us that military operations slowed during the fourth quarter as commanders became less aggressive following President Uribe's dismissal of 27 military personnel, including two generals, for their roles in the extrajudicial killing of unemployed men from Soacha. A military commission investigating the murders found that the dismissed personnel failed to follow basic intelligence, operational and logistical practices that could have prevented the murders. The scandal tarnished the military's image, and also led to the November 4 resignation of Army Commander General Mario Montoya Uribe. Concerns over alleged previous human rights abuses continue to hang over the new Army Chief, General Oscar Gonzales Pena, who is widely considered a Montoya protege. ¶4. (S) Our analysis does not support some military officers' assertions that humans rights concerns led to fall in military operations in the last quarter. Operations in the fourth quarter were less than in earlier quarters of 2008, but the drop appears to be a normal, seasonal phenomenon due to the traditional holiday lull, end-of-year command changes, and looming budget cuts and fuel shortfalls. Defense Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo told us a reduction in the types of operations that led to the Soacha killings was positive, noting that there was no drop in actions against the FARC in key areas such as Meta. However, a planned defense budget cut of approximately $190 million in 2009 could affect future military operations, since there will be reduced expenditures on rifles, ammunition, fuel, rations, uniforms, communications equipment and infrastructure projects. ¶5. (S) The Colombian military failed to kill or capture any high value targets (HVTs) in the fourth quarter, with several factors likely to blame. After Operation Jaque, the FARC Secretariat ordered personnel to stop using signal communications, opting instead for hand-delivery of encrypted messages. This has reduced the number of actionable SIGINT hits, but has also further disrupted the FARC's internal communications. Another factor limiting HVT successes is the GOC's reliance on precision guided munitions that require the target's precise coordinates. In the absence of SIGINT hits, obtaining this information requires human informants to infiltrate FARC camps. ¶6. (S) There are unconfirmed reports that FARC military commander Jorge Briceno ("Mono Jojoy") may be operating in the border area between Tolima and Meta, and that FARC leader Guillermo Saenz ("Alfonso Cano") may be operating in the Tolima/Cauca regions. Both are reportedly constantly on the move in high altitude areas with rugged terrain, where helicopters find it difficult to operate and mobility is limited. The Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) may be relocated in the near future to pursue Mono Jojoy. ¶7. (S) MOD Santos is pressing the COLMIL for results ahead of his planned departure from the Ministry--in addition to helping his political aspirations, another HVT kill or capture would help the military regain some of the momentum lost since Jaque and other Secretariat kills earlier in 2008. Despite the lack of HVTs, the following mid-level commanders were captured or killed this quarter: -- Alvaro Serpa Diaz ("Felipe Rincon") was killed on October 30 in a Colombian air strike along the Caqueta/Meta border. He had 33 years of experience with the FARC, and was reputedly a leader of the FARC militia in Bogota. -- Jose Marvel Zamora Antonio Narino ("Chucho," or "El Profe") was captured by the Colombian Army on October 30 in Coyaima Municipality, Tolima. He allegedly coordinated terrorist attacks on Bogota, and had been sentenced to a 25-year prison term for terrorism. -- Rolando Antonio Pelaez Velez ("La Muerte") was arrested in Cali on December 18. He was implicated in the kidnapping of 12 Cauca Assemblymen, eleven of whom were later executed, and in 11 other terrorist attacks, including the August 31 attack on the Cali Palace of Justice building. -- Englio Gaona Ospina ("Bertil"),commander of the FARC's 25th Front and a FARC fighter for over 25 years, was killed on December 2P}Q/QLertil's girlfriend was arrested in Bogota on November 27 for extortion. NUMBERS, A TRICKY BUSINESS -------------- ¶8. (C) Current estimates of active FARC fighters range from 5,000 to more than 10,000. FARC militia estimates vary widely, but assuming 9,000 fighters and using a fairly conservative two-to-one fighter/militia ratio, the FARC could have as many as 18,000 militia members, including both "popular" (untrained) and Boliviariano (trained). This would give the FARC more than 25,000 potential fighters. This could explain how the FARC has been able to replenish their forces despite the toll taken by combat deaths, captures and record demobilizations--the FARC is reportedly drawing on militia members to replace losses in the field. ¶9. (C) In a December 2008 report titled "Where is the war going?," local analyst Leon Valencia claimed that the FARC was regaining strength, pointed to "alarming" data such as in Bajo Cauca, where the FARC had allegedly gone from only 100 to close to 600 fighters. Other prominent analysts (including Jorge Restrepo, Roman Ortiz and Alfredo Rangel) disagree with these figures, and maintain that counting fighters is unreliable guesswork. These analysts argue that the only empirically accurate way to track the conflict is to measure acts of violence. Under this approach, they say Colombia has become significantly more secure by nearly all indicators, particularly decreasing homicide numbers. UP-TICK IN FARC ATTACKS -------------- ¶10. (C) FARC attacks increased in the last part of the fourth quarter and into the first quarter of 2009, likely to demonstrate continued resilience in the face of devastating losses earlier in the year: -- On December 7, the FARC attacked a humanitarian caravan led by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute in Caqueta Department with a roadside bomb, killing two health care workers. The FARC later apologized for this "accident" in a December 26 communique, wherein they advised civilians to avoid contact with the Colombian military for their own safety. -- On December 8 the FARC blew up a bridge near San Jose de Guaviare. -- On December 22, the FARC took 10 hostages in Cubarral municipality, Meta but released them several weeks later. Military intelligence sources later suggested that they were used as cover to halt military operations while the FARC moved one of its leaders from the zone. -- On December 3Q the FARC detonated a roadside bomb in Caqueta, injuring three civilians and three soldiers, and damaging power lines. -- On January 14, the FARC attacked a police station in Narino using gas cylinders filled with explosives, killing four children and one adult. -- On January 16, the FARC detonated a car bomb in Neiva, damaging some 400 nearby businesses. -- On January 27, the FARC militia was blamed for a Blockbuster video store bombing in the heart of Bogota that killed two people. ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS -------------- ¶11. (C) Colombian analysts generally agree that the FARC is becoming more regionalized (due to difficulties with command and contro2:$%ourth quarter, Colombian military and police recovered several hundred mortar tubes reportedly destined for the FARC. Still, GOC sources speculated that the source responsible for the intelligence leading to the recovery was likely fabricating and planting the tubes to collect the reward money. Police deactivated more than 40 explosive devices in Bogota in 2008, as well as seven car bombs that were reportedly destined for Neiva and Florencia. BOGOTA EXTORTION -------------- ¶12. (C) Leading daily "El Tiempo" reported on January 29 that there were 102 cases of extortion in Bogota in 2008, compared to 166 reported cases in 2007. GOC officials attributed most of the bombings in Bogota during this quarter to FARC extortion attempts, including a December 30 explosion in Bogota which used approximately one and a half kilos of pentonite in a shopping center near a bus station. The FARC was also blamed for a larger attack on a Blockbuster video store in North Bogota on January 27, 2009 that killed two and injured twenty -- the bomb appears to be extortion-related, although it attracted additional attention due to its force and location in the heart of the city's wealthiest district. BORDER AREAS -------------- ¶13. (S) The GOC continues to complain about the lack of will the Panamanian border to avoid military operations. The GOC has been cooperating with Panamanian military forces and has offered to provide cross-border military assistance if requested. ELN IN COLMIL SIGHTS -------------- ¶14. (C) The ELN was estimated to have between 2,000 and 3,000 men organized in 6 fronts, down from more than 4,500 in the year 2000. The group continued to maintain a low profile, aside from a much publicized ambush on December 6 in Arauca that killed 9 policemen, and its leadership (COCE) remains intact. Senior GOC officials have stated that they have the ELN in their sights for 2009. Colombian National Police Chief General Oscar Naranjo praised a recent U.S. request to extradite ELN commander Carlos tated intention to go after the ELN in 2009 and the Arauca attack, there are public reports that some military commanders have colluded with the ELN in Arauca to fight the FARC, allegedly sharing both intelligence and operational details. UNHOLY ALLIANCES -------------- ¶15. (C) The ELN, FARC and criminal groups continued to jockey for control of territory and lucrative drug trafficking routes. Some FARC fronts cooperated with criminal groups headed by Daniel Rendon ("Don Mario") in northwest Colombia and Pedro Guerro ("Cuchillo") in Colombia's eastern plains. The FARC has reportedly been relegated to providing coca base to these drug groups. In other areas, the groups were in open conflict, as evidenced by continued clashes between the FARC and the ELN in Narino department. Combat between the FARC and the ELN in Arauca reportedly left 60 civilians dead in 2008. There were also reports that the FARC may be using criminal gangs to help it carry out bombings in urban areas. BROWNFIELD