VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE JARAMILLO RESIGNS OVER THIRD TERM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003593 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER CO SUBJECT: VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE JARAMILLO RESIGNS OVER THIRD TERM, DEMOCRATIC SECURITY REF: BOGOTA 3375 CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo resigned on December 17. He told the Charge d'Affaires on December 18 that despite his poor relationship with Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva Lujan, the real reason for his departure was his disagreement with President Alvaro Uribe's intention to stand for a third term. Jaramillo laid out these concerns in a December 20 editorial in which he concluded that Uribe's intention to remain in office would undercut gains achieved under his own "Democratic Security Policy." Nevertheless, Jaramillo relayed to the Charge his dissatisfaction with Silva's management of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Jaramillo's departure, while not a complete surprise, represents the loss of the MOD's (and perhaps the GOC's) best strategic thinker and nearly eight years of institutional memory. End summary. Reasons for Resignation -------------- ¶2. (C) Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo called on the Charge December 18 to personally convey the news of his resignation. He thanked the USG for its support during his tenure. VMOD Jaramillo explained that news of his resignation was already out along with rumors as to why. He said that despite rumors of his contentious relations with MOD Silva, he had been considering resigning for over six months due to his profound concerns over President Uribe's third term re-election push. ¶3. (C) Jaramillo said that the December 2008 jamming through of the referendum legislation and Uribe's subsequent political posturing had made it clear that Uribe was serious about reelection to a third term and not simply posturing to avoid lame-duck status. Jaramillo continued that democratic security represented, at its essence, an exercise in institution building. Uribe's drive for re-election undercut the next stage of democratic security by weakening Colombia's institutions. Furthermore, Uribe's focus on politics has prompted him to avoid dealing with tough issues such as corruption (he cited the ArangoBacci case, ref a),while instead seeking to solidify his political base around the country through patronage. ¶4. (C) Jaramillo said that a new president, like former Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos (and Jaramillo's mentor),could aggressively address the next stage of state building and democratic security and demonstrate that Colombia was far bigger than one man. Despite his close links to Santos, Jaramillo did not tell the former minister of his resignation beforehand. MOD Silva's Management -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to Charge's question, Jaramillo said that rumors of Silva's brusque, rude, and detached management style were true. He recalled that Silva had recently insulted him over a perceived failure to inform him on a policy issue. Jaramillo said that Silva often ignored briefing memos and still has not read the "Strategic Leap" comprehensive strategy. Silva has "no relationship" with Chief of Defense Freddy Padilla and is largely ignorant of military operations, he added. Jaramillo opined that Silva does not understand his role, having skipped meetings with SOUTHCOM Commander Douglas Fraser and Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang to meet with Colombian miners expelled from Venezuela -- a waste of time in Jaramillo's view. Jaramillo called Silva smart with good instincts on human rights, but arrogant and ill informed; a "very dangerous combination." He credited Colombian National Police Commander General Oscar Naranjo as one of the few people able to manage him. Loose Ends -------------- ¶6. (C) The Vice Minister will serve until January 4 and remains focused on resolving outstanding International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights issues before him. Jaramillo worried that without GOC progress on the Soacha extrajudicial executions case, the government would be open to action by the International Criminal Court, for example. He was most proud of his work in completing an operational law manual to help commanders navigate the complex IHL/HR issues inherent in the Colombian conflict with both criminal and insurgent actors. Jaramillo said he was physically tired and wanted to rest after nearly eight years in government. He mentioned that he had some concerns about his personal security given his years of pushing the military on human rights issues but was confident the GOC would provide him appropriate protection. He was also worried that the Inspector General (Procuraduria) might revive a slander case lodged against him by an army coronel who was dismissed for alleged human rights abuses. He had no plans for the future beyond occasionally writing on events in Colombia and the region. He lamented the paucity of good analysis in the Colombian press and felt he could add to the debate. Publicly Disagreeing with Reelection -------------- ¶7. (C) Jaramillo followed up his resignation with an op-ed piece in leading news daily El Tiempo on December 20 in which he indirectly linked his decision to resign to Uribe's attempts to stay in office. Democratic Security, he posited, sought to spread the State's authority and legitimacy to all of Colombia. Extending a presidential term to continue the policy, he asserted, constituted a change in the "rules of the game" that would jeopardize the legitimacy of the State and undermine the principles inherent in Democratic Security. While paying deference to President Uribe, he argued that anyone who believes in Colombia's tradition of democracy cannot be in favor of changing the proposed constitutional reform to permit a third term. Comment: Losing a Valued Partner -------------- ¶8. (C) Jaramillo told President Uribe after the departure of Minister Santos last May that he would stay through the end of the Administration. We do not doubt his decision to leave sooner is based on his objections to reelection. However, his distant relationship with Silva was likely a catalyst. Jaramillo's departure robs the MOD (and perhaps the GOC as a whole) of its most strategic thinker. A scholarly technocrat with little talent for operations, Jaramillo had focused on global policy issues such as human rights, public diplomacy against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the exterior, and the National Consolidation Plan. Jaramillo was also a key USG interlocutor, having played key roles in the negotiation of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and the pending Colombian military deployment to Afghanistan. BROWNFIELD =======================CABLE ENDS============================