COLOMBIA IN THE POLITICAL DOLDRUMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003405 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/17 TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA IN THE POLITICAL DOLDRUMS REF: REF: A) BOGOTA 3373; B) BOGOTA 3347; C) BOGOTA 3271 D) BOGOTA 3335; E) BOGOTA 3043; F) BOGOTA 3145; G) BOGOTA 1506 H) BOGOTA 1975 CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Colombian politics have entered a holding pattern while President Uribe awaits the next step of his quest for a third term. Scandals over agricultural subsidies and illegal surveillance have slightly tarnished Uribe's popularity but public concern over Venezuela's saber-ratting may bump him back up. Arrayed against Uribe's formidable popular support are the weak but not irrelevant political opposition, the media and intelligentsia, and the politicized Supreme Court. This stifled political debate on succession will continue until it is clear that Uribe can and will seek reelection. End Summary. Elections, Interrupted -------------- ¶2. (C) As Colombia waits for the Constitutional Court to rule on legislation for a referendum to permit a third term for Uribe, the May 2010 presidential election campaign lacks a clear picture of candidates and platforms. Since the Constitutional Court may take until March 2010 to decide on the legality of a referendum (REF A), pro-Uribe candidates cannot develop their constituencies or flesh out their platforms (REF B) without being seen as disloyal to the president. Public support for Uribe's ideology means that opposition candidates' messaging receives little attention or support. With Uribe as the presumptive frontrunner, no challengers can break away from the pack. ¶3. (C) The timing of the Constitutional Court's opinion is critical for Uribe's strategy. Most consider the Court's approval an inevitability, but a minority opinion holds that the Court may rule too late to permit a referendum. The anti-reelection crowd will continue to raise legal and procedural objections in hopes of running out the clock on the referendum. Some Chinks, But Uribe's Armor Still Shines -------------- ¶4. (C) Looming over this political twilight is Uribe's high popularity, which tends to vary between 65 and 70% depending on current events. The clear majority of Colombians prefer Uribe for his focus on security and his steady hand at the helm. Uribe equals certainty for most Colombians. However, scandals continue to plague the President and may continue to shave some points off his approval ratings. The most immediate scandal concerns rich Colombians receiving subsidies from a Ministry of Agriculture program, though former agriculture minister and current presidential candidate Andres Felipe Arias seems fated to bare the brunt. The revelation of illegal surveillance and wiretaps of political opposition by Uribe's intelligence service, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS),continues to unfold, albeit more quietly in recent weeks (REF C). Nevertheless, the ongoing crisis with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez will likely cause Uribe's poll numbers to rebound. A Loose Anti-Uribe Alliance -------------- ¶5. (C) In Uribe's worldview, he is a political outsider from Medellin whose hard-line security policies are coming under attack from Bogota's elite, who, lacking popular support, have resorted to lobbing potshots from the media, the courts, and other state institutions. For some in the opposition, Uribe represents the tyranny of the "Paisas" (as the Texan-like inhabitants of Antioquia are called). For an even smaller and more extreme group, Uribe is surreptitiously legalizing the remnants of the Medellin drug cartel (REF E). These are gross simplifications, but there is a noticeable disconnect between Uribe's popularity and the media's increasingly critical handling of the referendum (REF F). Undeterred, Uribe circumvents the Fourth Estate by holding weekly town hall meetings throughout Colombia. And, Uribe's critics charge that the GOC is pushing pork barrel spending behind the scenes to support his reelection efforts. The Supreme Court: Opposition Redoubt -------------- ¶6. (C) While not identified with any opposition political party, the Supreme Court has emerged as an ally of those who oppose reelection. The Court is wary of Uribe's influence increasing the longer he remains in office. They are also bitter over years of public sparring with Uribe, made worse by allegations that Uribe advisors were pushing DAS to investigate certain magistrates for ties to narco-trafficking (REF G). The Supreme Court has no role in the referendum process but can and is aggressively investigating criminal acts allegedly carried out by Uribe allies in the Congress (REF H). ¶7. (C) Additionally, the magistrates have effectively co-opted the supposedly independent Prosecutor General's Office by refusing to select an Uribe candidate from a three-name list. Keeping the Prosecutor General in an interim state, and filling his organization with officials from the court system, has allowed the Court to focus the Prosecutor General on key investigations against Uribe and the government. For example, the Prosecutor General's Office is pressing ahead on the DAS scandal investigation, may bring indictments related to Uribe's first reelection bid, and has even revived a 1990s case against Vice President Francisco Santos for alleged meetings with paramilitaries. Comment: Waiting for the Cloudburst -------------- ¶8. (C) The ambiguity of the current political landscape will continue until it becomes clear whether Uribe is able to and will seek a third term, a determination that may not come until March ¶2010. We cannot discount that legal objections to the referendum process will cause enough delay to derail the process. Once determined, however, Colombia will either have to rush through a referendum/election process with Uribe or an abbreviated presidential campaign among the remaining contenders. End Comment. BROWNFIELD