2009 STALEMATE CONTINUES: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR

S E C R E T BOGOTA 003389 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/16 TAGS: PTER MOPS MCAP ASEC PREL PGOV PREF CO SUBJECT: 2009 STALEMATE CONTINUES: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR JULY-SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: A) BOGOTA 2787; B) BOGOTA 2961; C) BOGOTA 0776; D) BOGOTA 3956 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor, United States Department of State, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Colombian military's momentum remained slower in the third quarter of 2009, with demobilizations, captures and kills of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members below 2008 levels. The Colombian military believes the FARC may be planning to concentrate on Cundinamarca department to disrupt the 2010 elections and discredit President Uribe's democratic security policy. The FARC announced it considered Colombia's consolidation projects to constitute legitimate military targets, and was blamed for an August 19 attack on a USAID-funded civilian justice center in Cauca department. The terrorist organization continued a campaign of assassination, kidnapping and intimidation of local political leaders. Although FARC Secretariat members continued to elude government security forces, the military enjoyed success against a string of mid-level FARC commanders this quarter. The FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging criminal groups continued to cooperate in some areas of the country while openly fighting in others. End Summary. FARC TARGETS GOC CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August communique released in Narino department, the FARC announced it would treat all projects developed under Colombia's National Consolidation Plan (PNC) and the "Strategic Leap" as legitimate military targets. The Colombian National Police (CNP) blamed the FARC for an August 19 attack that destroyed a U.S.-funded justice center in Cauca department. USAID had invested $150,000 in the new justice house, which was designed to provide basic legal and social services to the community. Security at the site was minimal. There are 50 other U.S.-funded justice houses throughout Colombia (see reftel A). AND LOCAL LEADERS -------------- ¶3. (C) Fabio Estrada, President of the Colombian Councilman Federation, warned that the FARC intended to destabilize Colombia through a campaign of targeted assassination and intimidation of local leaders. Estrada noted that as of November 2009, 12 council members had been murdered, two others had been taken hostage, more than 30 had been attacked, and more than 2,000 had received threats. FARC attacks on council members this quarter included: -- On July 8, the FARC killed Ruben Dario Pena, a community leader in Neiva, Huila for cooperating with the Colombian military. -- On September 7, the FARC killed council-woman Mariela Narvaez Lizcano in Hobo, Huila. Armando Acuna, a councilman for the nearby town of Garzon, Huila, has been held hostage by the FARC since May ¶2009. -- On September 29, German Herrera, the president of the town council in El Castillo, Meta was gunned down by a FARC member on horseback. CUNDINAMARCA IN FARC SIGHTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Colombian military officials are concerned that the FARC plans to concentrate forces in Cundinamarca department in an effort to disrupt the 2010 elections and discredit President Uribe's democratic security policy. Nearly 30 FARC militia members have been arrested in or near Bogota in 2009, and the FARC is blamed for six attacks in Bogota this year (including the January 2009 Blockbuster bomb that killed two). The FARC was routed from Cundinamarca in 2003-2004 under Plan Patriota, and failed in its efforts early in 2009 to try to regain a toehold in Sumapaz, Cundinamarca (see reftel C). A Colombian intelligence official told us that the FARC would almost certainly retry its approach under "Black March" -- increasing asymmetrical attacks in major urban areas during a given time frame in an effort to demonstrate that the terrorist organization is not defeated and still relevant. (Comment: No large-scale redeployments of FARC forces have been observed near Cundinamarca to date. End Comment) FARC DEMOBS: BELOW 2008 LEVELS -------------- ¶5. (C) A total of 630 FARC members demobilized in the third quarter -- down more than 20% from the same period in 2008, but up slightly (630 versus 512) compared to the second quarter of 2009. Reasons for the slight quarterly uptick include: 1) the strategic communications budget for the GOC that had been frozen due to budget constraints was restored; 2) a group of 24 indigenous members of the 6th Front and the Jacobo Arenas Mobile Column in Cauca demobilized; and 3) there was an increase in prisoners who demobilized from prison under Colombian decree number 1059 of 2008. FEWER DEMOBS CITE MILITARY PRESSURE -------------- ¶6. (C) Demonstrating the slowdown in military operations in 2009, the number of FARC members who cited military pressure as the reason for their demobilization dropped by 20% in the third quarter -- accounting for only 6% of all demobilizations. Still, the quality of demobilized members remained relatively high -- demobilizations of FARC members with more than 5 years of experience accounted for more than half of all demobilizations in ¶2009. There was also a 9% increase in demobilizations of FARC militia members this quarter. 8,500 FARC FIGHTERS REMAIN -------------- ¶7. (C) Colombian security officials estimate that the FARC has 8,500 fighters at the present time, down by around 3% from 2008 levels. In addition, GOC officials believe the FARC has between 3,000-4,000 militia members spread throughout the country, although many have been pulled in to replace demobilized or killed fighters. Colombian officials continue to complain that significant numbers of FARC fighters have sought refuge in Venezuela and Ecuador -- and that without these refuges, the FARC's strength would be further reduced. INCREASED RECRUITMENT OF MINORS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) As its overall numbers have decreased, the FARC has turned to forced recruitment to strengthen its ranks. Colombian weekly "Cambio" reported in July that more than 500 minors have been recruited by force in rural areas of Meta, Guaviare, Putumayo, Caqueta, Arauca, and Vaupes departments in the past year. Christian Salazar, director of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, observed that the average recruiting age is dropping to below 12 years of age. Salazar noted many rural families are leaving their home towns in an effort to keep the FARC or other criminal organizations from forcibly recruiting their children -- increasing the total number of displaced. ELN DEMOBS: ABOVE 2008 LEVELS -------------- ¶9. (C) A total of 116 ELN members demobilized in the third quarter of 2009, representing a more than 50% increase over the same time frame in 2008. ELN demobilizations remained highest in the southwest area of the country due to military pressure and fighting with the FARC and other criminal groups. However, the pace of demobilizations in the southwest slowed by more than 10% in the third quarter, due in part to non-aggression pacts between criminal groups in the region. ELN demobilizations attributed to military pressure were down by 20% this quarter compared to the second quarter. CAPTURES AND KILLS OF FARC DOWN -------------- ¶10. (C) The military's momentum continued to slow during this quarter, leading some analysts to conclude that the conflict has effectively reached a stalemate in 2009 -- although others argued that the GOC was slowly grinding the FARC down in a war of attrition. The operations tempo is expected to slow further into the fourth quarter due to scheduled military changes of command that occur at the end of the year. FARC captures by the Colombian military decreased by 15% in the first nine months of 2009 compared with the same time frame in 2008, while FARC kills by the military were down by 54% and ELN kills were down by 82% during this time frame. Conversely, killings of public forces by the FARC and ELN have increased by around 20% in 2009 (from 293 to 353). (Comment: One factor in the decreased operational tempo is that commanders are acting more cautiously in the wake of the "false positive" scandals. Colombian military officials are also reportedly wary about exploiting tactical intelligence from recently captured enemy combatants due to legal concerns. Another reason for the lower levels of success against the FARC is that the overall number of FARC members have declined, and the remaining fighters are under orders to avoid direct engagement with Colombian forces. Despite having implemented a "balanced scorecard" approach designed to de-emphasize body counts, the Colombian military leadership reportedly continue to react very negatively to lower numbers reported by subordinates. End comment.) JOINT TASK FORCE OMEGA UPDATE -------------- ¶11. (S) The Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) and the Rapid Deployment Force (FUDRA) were still co-located in the JTF-Omega area during this quarter to pursue FARC Secretariat member alias Mono Jojoy. However, a component of the FUCAD (the 18th Mobile Brigade) was relocated to the Nudo de Paramillo region of Antioquia. The operations tempo in JTF-Omega remained relatively high during this quarter, although units remained reliant on U.S. helicopter and fixed wing flight hour support for logistics resupply operations. CONTINUED MID-LEVEL SUCCESSES -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Several FARC high value targets (HVTs),including FARC leader Alfonso Cano, are believed to be located in the "Canon de las Hermosas" region of Tolima department -- a mountainous, 2000 square-kilometer area with access to Huila, Valle de Cauca and Cauca. The FARC Secretariat members reportedly operate at high altitude where Colombian airlift is limited, avoid radios and instead use human messengers, and are constantly on the move in rugged terrain. (Note: The Colombian military do not currently have any helicopters that can operate effectively at high altitudes and low temperatures. End note). Although FARC Secretariat members continued to elude Colombian forces, the Colombian military and police continued to kill and capture a string of mid-level commanders. Successes this quarter include: -- On July 19, police captured Luis Rojas Maldonado, a leader of the FARC's 33rd Front in Sardinata, Norte de Santander. -- On July 23, the army attacked a FARC camp in Puerto Rico, Meta and killed 16th FARC members (including Mono Jojoy confidantes alias "Negro Alberto," alias "Nacho" and alias "Arnoldo"). -- On August 23, Bogota national police reported the capture of Jose Armando Cadena Caberera (alias "Bronco") in Cundinamarca. Alias Bronco was believed to have participated in the murder of U.S. citizen Thomas John Jannis and Luis Alcides Cruz after their aircraft crashed in Caqueta, Colombia on February 13, 2003. He was a member of the FARC's Teofilo Forero Castro Mobile Column. --On August 31, police in Santander arrested Jose Javier Hernandez Castillo (alias "Nixon"),the deputy commander of the FARC's 10th Front in Arauca. -- On August 27, FARC captured Fidel Camilo Villarraga (alias "David"),second in command of the FARC's Antonio Narino Urban Front in Bogota. He is accused of perpetrating numerous attacks in Bogota over the past decade. --On September 3, the Colombian Air Force confirmed the killing of Luis Baron Sanchez (alias "Nacho"),commander of the FARC's 43rd Front. The second in command, Luis Antonio Mosquera Ruiz was also killed. -- On September 2, Bogota police apprehended Alberto Chaparro (alias "the Butcher of Landazuri"),leader of the FARC's 23rd Front. He reportedly specialized in landmines and was believed to be responsible for the deaths or injuries of more than 150 Colombians in Landazuri municipality, Santander. -- On September 13, Colombian police captured eight members of the FARC's Southern Bloc, including Nubia Cabrera, sister of the FARC Southern Bloc deputy commander Fabian Ramirez. The individuals were believed to be managing more than three million dollars in assets for the FARC Southern Bloc. -- On September 25, Marco Leon Jimenez (alias "Morocco"),nephew of senior FARC commander Jorge Briceno Suarez (alias "Mono Jojoy") was found buried following a Colombian air strike in Meta department. He was killed along with 15 other FARC members in operation "Jupiter" by the Omega Joint Task Force in July 2009. -- On September 30, a major Colombian air raid in central-western Tolima killed approximately 15 FARC members. Arquimedes Munoz Villamil (alias "Jeronimo Galeano") -- a 30-year veteran of the FARC, a member of the joint central command and a confidante of Alfonso Cano -- reportedly survived the attack but his son was killed. The FARC's 66th Front Commander was also killed in this operation. ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS CONTINUE -------------- ¶13. (C) The FARC continued to utilize improvised explosive devices (IEDs),ambushes and land mines to inflict casualties -- the majority of casualties suffered by Colombian forces are the result of land mines. The FARC are operating in smaller teams of three to five men, making them much harder to detect and defend against. There were more than 100 security force deaths in 2009, and more than 400 injuries attributable to IEDs and land mines. Manual eradication deaths from bombs and snipers during manual coca eradication operations and attacks per hectare eradicated have increased over last year's rates (from 26 deaths in 2008 to a reported 40 deaths in 2009 -- see reftel D). Other FARC attacks this year included: -- On July 19, FARC members from the 6th Front attacked a Colombian police station in Corinto, Cauca, killing two officers and injuring fifteen civilians. -- On July 27, the FARC ambushed manual eradicators with rifle fire and fragmentation grenades, killing five in Medio San Juan Municipality, Choco. -- On July 30, FARC members of the 16th Front attacked army units in Vichada, wounding several officials. -- On August 9, FARC members of the Teofilo Forero Castro mobile column killed two police officers in Caqueta with small arms fire. -- On August 12, FARC members attacked police officers and prosecutors in Tumaco, Narino, wounding two. -- On August 25, a FARC bomb in San Vicente del Caguan killed two and wounded 19 civilians in the middle of a local market place. -- On September 16, FARC members killed the commander of Solita Police station in Caqueta. -- On September 17, FARC militia members threw hand grenades into a police checkpoint, injuring one civilian and two police officers near the Buenaventura port in Valle del Cauca. -- On September 30, the FARC ambushed security forces in Antioquia, injuring three. RELATIONS AMONG FARC, ELN AND BACRIM -------------- ¶14. (C) The FARC, ELN and emerging criminal groups (BACRIM) continued to fight each other in some areas while cooperating in others. Groups under the "Rastrojos" banner worked in conjunction with the FARC in southern Narino and northern Ecuador to traffic cocaine to the Pacific for export, while other Rastrojos groups fought with elements of the FARC in northern Narino. Fighting between groups affiliated with the "Rastrojos" and "Aguilas Negras" criminal groups in Narino was blamed for more than 40 deaths in Narino in the month of August alone. Colombian National Police (CNP) chief General Oscar Naranjo recently said that the drug trade accounts for around 80% of the FARC's finances, but observed that they do not have the capacity to control international drug routes. ¶15. (C) Colombian security analyst Alfredo Rangel told us the violence is growing fiercer as there are fewer drug profits to go around among criminal elements. Rangel dismissed the notion that the emerging criminal groups could be even more dangerous than the FARC, noting that unlike the FARC, they do not have designs on national political and territorial control and are only concerned with profit (although they are responsible for corrupting local officials). He acknowledged that the homicide rates in some areas of the country are worrying -- but argued they are well below previous levels and mostly reflect violence within and between drug traffickers and other illegal armed actors. Organization of American States/Mission for the Accompaniment of the Peace Process (OAS/MAPP) Country Director Marcelo Alvarez argued, however, that even the murders of criminal elements have long-term detrimental effects on communities. Alvarez said that relatives of victims suffer social, psychological, and financial impacts that can often perpetuate violence and other social ills in the community. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Following the GOC's landmark successes against the FARC leadership in 2008, the conflict in 2009 has effectively turned into a stalemate -- with the FARC carrying out asymmetrical attacks on selective soft targets as the Colombian military tries to grind them down in a slow war of attrition. Several analysts have argued that to regain momentum, the Colombian military apparatus needs to undertake a tactical shift -- with smaller, more flexible units and increased reconnaissance missions. Still, many agree that the killing or capture of Secretariat members Mono Jojoy or Alfonso Cano could represent a watershed event that may greatly increase the pace of FARC demobilizations. End comment. BROWNFIELD