OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES HIGHLIGHT WEAKNESS IN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003097 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/29 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER CO SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES HIGHLIGHT WEAKNESS IN THE LEFT REF: A) BOGOTA 3004; B) BOGOTA 2772 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo of the Liberal Party and Senator Gustavo Petro of the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA) won their parties' presidential primaries on September 27. These two opposition parties viewed the elections as a test of strength but voter turnout was much lower than expected. Petro's PDA victory sets up an internal party struggle, as it was a surprise rejection of the party's far-left trajectory and an upset of Carlos Gaviria, the voice and face of the party. The victories of Pardo and Petro open the door for a possible interparty election to select a unified opposition candidate. The pro-Uribe Conservative Party postponed its primary, as it will support the President's reelection if the referendum is approved. End Summary. Opposition Fails Test of Strength -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Liberal and PDA parties, the largest opposition parties, held internal elections September 27 to select presidential candidates. Former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo won for the Liberals while Senator Gustavo Petro upset Carlos Gaviria to win the PDA nod. The opposition viewed the elections as an important test of ability to mobilize and energize their base heading into next year's congressional and presidential elections (see ref B for election calendar). However, from the beginning it was apparent that turnout would be low as media reported vacant polling stations across Colombia. With 98% of polling stations reporting, the National Registrar counted only 1,015,910 valid votes for the Liberals and 450,589 for the PDA -- representing 5% of 29 million registered voters. The Liberal Party was expecting a turnout of at least 1.5 million and hoped for as many as 2 million. The Liberals thought that including the selection of party delegates on the ballot would create an incentive for the local machinery to get people to the polls (see ref A). ¶3. (U) The low turnout and absence of an election atmosphere was evident across regions and municipalities in Colombia. Carlos Ariel Sanchez, head of the National Registrar's Office in charge of administering elections, said one reason was that Colombians still do not view internal party elections with the same weight that other nations view their primaries. (Note: Party elections have only just become binding with a July 14 political reform. End Note.) Other observers said that there was no incentive for regional politicians and members of Congress to activate their political machinery to turn out the vote, and no institutional campaign to explain the significance and consequences of the elections. Antonio Jose Lizarazo, former magistrate of the Electoral Council, stated that people still feel that the presidential campaign has not really begun because the reelection referendum and new electoral rules are still unresolved and could completely change the political landscape. PDA Surprisingly Rejects Far Left -------------- ¶4. (C) Gustavo Petro, representing the moderate wing of the PDA, defeated far-left Carlos Gaviria to win the PDA's presidential candidacy. Petro's victory was an upset as polls and party insiders predicted a Gaviria victory heading into the elections. Carlos Bula, Secretary General of the PDA, told us before the election that there was not much support in the party for Petro's pragmatic approach and that the PDA needed to stay far-left to keep its identity and differentiate itself from the murky middle of Colombian politics. Bula said one of the key dividing issues in the party was the armed conflict -- most of the PDA supported a negotiated settlement while Petro was open to a military solution. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) openly backed Gaviria and Petro's victory has been rejected on Anncol, a FARC propaganda website based in Sweden. ¶5. (C) Another dividing issue was election strategy and Petro, who waged a grassroots campaign using Facebook, Twitter and cell phone text messages (even Poloffs received some of these "vote for Petro" ads, and no ads for any other candidates). Petro campaigned on the promise to form an opposition coalition to oppose an Uribe third term. In contrast, the PDA establishment, led by Gaviria, has consistently stated that the PDA would go it alone. Then-PDA President Jaime Dussan (see para 6) told us last week that there would not be an interparty coalition primary before the first round of presidential elections -- except possibly for the Radical Change party joining with the Liberals -- because the opposition was too divided. Dussan said supporters of the various anti-reelection candidates would not vote for particular candidates from other parties, citing the example that PDA supporters would never vote for Radical Change's German Vargas Lleras. Dussan reasoned that separate candidates would collectively win more votes than a single coalition candidate and have a better chance to force a second round if President Uribe is allowed to run. ¶6. (C) Petro's victory sets up an internal power struggle within the PDA. He announced last week that if he won the PDA election, he would take control of the party and change its leaders including ousting Dussan as party president. Dussan, a firm Gaviria ally, led a PDA delegation to Caracas in August to speak with President Hugo Chavez about bilateral relations. Petro heavily criticized that trip, calling Chavez "a threat to President Uribe and a threat to all the Colombian people." Dussan told us that he advised Chavez that the pending Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States was not a threat to Venezuela, and he was critical of Chavez's ever increasing concentration of power. Dussan's moderate private statements contrast with his often leftist public persona. Petro has already begun to change PDA election strategy by inviting Liberal candidate Rafael Pardo and several independents to construct a "democratic accord that Colombia needs." Dussan, preempting Petro, resigned shortly after the election and said that Gaviria should resume the PDA presidency based on his election at the last PDA party congress. Gaviria supporters within the party have stated that Petro cannot "do whatever he wants" and have called for a special party congress to decide contentious issues. Pardo Seeks "Grand Liberal Team" -------------- ¶7. (U) As expected, centrist and party insider Rafael Pardo won the Liberal Party with 37% of the vote, beating out six others including former governor of Antioquia Anibal Gaviria Correa (22%) and former Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez (20%). Pardo was Defense Minister and National Security Advisor under former President and current Liberal Party boss Cesar Gaviria. The Liberal Party's left, led by former president Ernesto Samper, have accused Cesar Gaviria of using his formidable political machinery to support Pardo. Gaviria rejected the charges and reaffirmed his desire for a stronger and united Liberal party moving forward. Pardo has been conciliatory after victory, suggesting the assembly of an inclusive "grand liberal team" with other anti-reelection elements. Complete Results -------------- ¶8. (U) Results reported by the National Registrar's Office with 98% of polling stations reporting: --LIBERAL PARTY Rafael Pardo Rueda 376,739 37.1% Anibal Gaviria Correa 226,161 22.3% Alfonso Gomez Mendez 203,922 20.1% Cecilia Lopez Montano 78,857 7.8% Alfonso Lopez Caballero 51,109 5.0% Blank Votes 51,022 5.0% Luis Ivan Marulanda 28,100 2.8% -------------- Total 1,015,910 --ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRATIC POLE (PDA) Gustavo Petro 223,627 49.6% Carlos Gaviria 203,443 45.2% Blank Votes 17,225 3.8% Edison Lucio Torres 6,294 1.4% -------------- -- Total 450,589 BROWNFIELD