COLOMBIA SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

UNCLAS BOGOTA 002925 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS MCAP MASS ASEC PREF ECON CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL STOCKTON (SEPTEMBER 20-23) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) We welcome the visit of Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere. Your visit comes as a regional debate over a U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) has heated up and amidst significant political developments. The Government of Colombia (GOC) and the U.S. Embassy are working together to consolidate the successes of Plan Colombia through a new Embassy follow-on strategy called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI),which complements the GOC's recently completed National Consolidation Plan (PCN). ¶2. (SBU) In ten years, Colombia has progressed from a near failed state and terrorist haven to an economic, political and social leader in Latin America. Colombia has made major progress in its fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the eradication and interdiction of drugs. Murder and kidnapping rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law has strengthened through major judicial reforms. Improved security and economic reform has grown the economy, reduced poverty and attracted record levels of investment. The GOC has looked to leverage these successes beyond its borders by offering troops in Afghanistan and providing counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican, Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region. ¶3. (SBU) Significant challenges remain--especially related to human rights abuses within the military. Drug trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups continue to operate in large parts of the country, including border areas. Colombia has over three million internally displaced persons, and deep social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially in rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and economic gains. Despite progress on human rights, some elements of the security forces continue to violate human rights, and the military has been accused of numerous extrajudicial killings of innocents. We hope you will be able to reiterate to the military leadership the importance of human rights and the need for continued and significant progress on these cases. Violence against trade unionists continues even as the GOC has stepped up prosecutions and boosted its protection programs for unionists, human rights activists and other vulnerable individuals. USG support is critical to help the GOC confront these persistent challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on how best to transfer key security tasks from the USG to the GOC. End Summary. Democratic Security Advances -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging criminal groups. The rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages in July 2008, including three Americans, and the deaths of key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in security. Colombian security forces have captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which terrorists can operate freely. A record number of FARC members deserted in 2008--including mid- and high-level commanders. Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups reached 3,461 in 2008--primarily from the FARC-- making it the highest level of demobilizations in Colombia's history. In the first 6 months of 2009, there were a total of 1,371 demobilizations of illegal armed group members. ¶5. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records in eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further reducing murder and kidnapping rates. Colombia extradited a record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary leaders. Colombia has already extradited more than 132 suspected criminals in 2009. The number of homicides fell for the sixth consecutive year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for every 100,000 habitants),45% lower than 2002 levels. Serious Challenges Ahead -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking, displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups remain. We estimate the FARC has some 9,000 fighters in the field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue to cause violence. Internal displacement due to the armed conflict remains serious, with more than three million displaced by violence since 1995. Deep historical social divides make it difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations to benefit fully from security and economic gains. These minority groups suffer from limited education, health care, employment opportunities, and disproportionate forced displacement in the mostly isolated rural areas where they reside. ¶7. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its human rights performance, and we hope you will be able to reinforce the human rights message with the GOC leadership. Fifty-one members of the Colombian military were dismissed in 2008 due to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings, but impunity for such abuses remains a serious problem. We are working with the Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, and make sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are investigated by civilian prosecutors. Labor unionists and homicides declined 76% between 2001-2008, yet in 2008 the number of labor homicides (for all causes) increased from 39 to 46. Still, the murder rate for unionists is well below the national homicide rate. As of August 2009, 24 murders of unionists have been reported this year by union sources. In 2008, the GOC reestablished a government presence in all 1,098 municipalities and all the country's mayors once again resided within their municipalities. ¶8. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated Action (CCAI),the GOC is recovering a key stronghold previously held by the FARC --La Macarena, in Meta Department. During your visit there, you will witness GOC efforts to establish a permanent military, police and civilian presence in an area that has never seen a viable GOC presence. Challenges remain, as resource, security and staffing shortfalls continue to limit the initiative. The United States, through USAID, MILGRP and NAS, provides assistance to CCAI and is working to expand this concept via the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) (see paragraphs 18 and 19). Regional Tensions Flare -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The rifts between Colombia and neighboring Venezuela and Ecuador have widened over a March 1, 2008, Colombian airstrike in Ecuadorian territory that killed the second in command of the FARC, alias "Raul Reyes." After the raid, Colombian forces recovered several hard drives that suggested the terrorist group had received varying levels of assistance from the Governments of Venezuela and Ecuador. The ensuing diplomatic imbroglio resulted in a break in relations with Ecuador, which persists to this day, and a temporary break in relations with Venezuela. President Chavez again temporarily recalled his ambassador to Colombia following press revelations in July that Swedish-made anti-tank missiles--originally sold to the Venezuelan military--were discovered in FARC hands. The GOC has remained calm in the face of Chavez's provocative rhetoric, which included threats to deploy forces to the border, suspend trade ties and nationalize Colombian owned businesses in Venezuela. ¶10. (SBU) A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that is almost ready for signature with Colombia would provide U.S. access to seven Colombian military installations to facilitate cooperation to combat narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime within Colombia. The DCA updates existing agreements that date back to 1952, and would not increase the U.S. military footprint in Colombia. Nevertheless, Venezuelan President Chavez, joined by leaders from Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, reacted to news of the negotiations with harsh complaints over an increased U.S. military presence in the region. Chavez expressed fears of an American invasion of Venezuela and said he felt the "winds of war blowing in the continent." Even moderate governments, like Brazil and Chile, demanded an explanation. ¶11. (SBU) A special summit of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in Argentina on August 28--convened to address the controversy--yielded mixed results. While President Uribe was able to prevent the group from condemning the DCA, many South American Presidents expressed reservations about the regional implications of the agreement, and the final UNASUR declaration included language that foreign military forces cannot "threaten the sovereignty or integrity of any South American nation and the peace and security of the region." President Chavez also described the "White Paper Air Mobility Command Global En Route Strategy" as proof of the USG's hegemonic plans for the region. The UNASUR leaders also directed their ministers of defense and foreign affairs to study the impact of the agreement on the region; that meeting is scheduled to take place on September 15 in Quito. Uribe Third Term -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Your visit comes as the Constitutional Court analyzes a law that would authorize a referendum on whether the Constitution should be amended to allow President Uribe to run for a third term in the May 2010 elections. His possible re-election has become the touchstone of all Colombian politics this year. Indeed, you will find that your interlocutors are focused on the short timeframe remaining in the second term given the uncertainty over the third. If the referendum goes forward, at least 25% of registered voters, or 7.3 million Colombians, must participate and a majority of them must vote favorably. President Obama told President Uribe on June 29 that, in the United States' experience, two terms is enough for any leader, though he emphasized that the final decision belongs to the Colombian people. Economic Limitations -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Reacting to the economic slowdown in 2009, the GOC cut the national budget by $1.4 billion, including a $190 million reduction to the defense budget. The proposal would likely reduce future expenditures on ammunition, rifles, communications equipment, infrastructure projects, fuel, food, and uniforms. The cuts would not directly affect defense expenditures funded by the wealth tax, which is expected to raise approximately $3.7 billion between 2007-2011. Still, the GOC's ability to sustain current levels of defense spending after 2011 could be in jeopardy if the wealth tax is left to expire at the end of 2010. The Colombian Congress is presently deliberating on a bill to extend the wealth tax through 2013. Funding for social programs, critical to addressing many of the catalysts for the conflict, will be sustained, according to President Uribe. Proposed increases for social programs, however, will be put on hold until government revenues increase. Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing -------------- ¶14. (U) The USG and GOC made real strides in battling narcoterrorism in Colombia in 2008. The most recent U.S. figures for cocaine production in Colombia show a 24% reduction in production since the peak year 2001. In 2008, Colombian security forces seized 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca paste, eradicated 230,000 hectares of coca and destroyed 3,667 drug labs. We kept hundreds of metric tons out of the United States. We have reduced the funds available to the FARC and other criminal groups for the purchase of weapons and explosives, corruption of public officials and coercion of local populations. ¶15. (U) The USG (through the Narcotics Affairs Section) and GOC have made progress in eradication, as evidenced by a 25% decrease in potential cocaine productivity since the peak in ¶2001. Increased coordination between manual and aerial eradication improves our ability to deal with replanting. Much of the success in battling narcotrafficking and terrorism is due to air mobility capabilities provided by the United States. Without helicopters, the GOC could not project force or provide government presence in a country the size of Texas and California combined. Colombia is nationalizing our aviation assets, but still needs some U.S. support. In the last two years, more than 50 aircraft have been turned over to the GOC to fund, maintain and control. Colombia's ability to confront narcotics and terrorism depends in large part on its air mobility. Aiming for Irreversibility -------------- ¶16. (U) Our support to the Colombian military is based upon a three-phased approach. The first phase focused on building Colombian military forces, projecting those forces into ungoverned spaces and securing those spaces. It also supported offensive operations against illegal armed groups on an unprecedented scale. The second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing, consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing offensive operations against illegal armed groups, and ensuring the irreversibility of those gains. The third phase, to be initiated in 2011, will promote a strategic partnership to sustain key Colombian military capabilities. ¶17. (SBU) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives. Support to these programs is vital in both the short and long-terms. In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule of law to the Colombian population. In the long-term, we will focus on building a strategic partnership with Colombia and developing key Colombian military capabilities that can support U.S. national security objectives worldwide. Post-Plan Colombia Initiatives -------------- ¶18. (U) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI),which meshes with Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC). Our efforts initially focus on three priority areas of on-going conflict, drug trafficking and social marginalization. PNC/CSDI has prioritized addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca production and illegally armed groups, and seeks to establish state presence in strategic, under-governed parts of the country. The plan is centered on increasing territorial control in these areas to provide security for communities; to achieve permanent eradication; to transfer security responsibility to the police; and to provide a wide range of socio-economic services. CSDI's core assumption is that security is the precondition for development, which gives communities a stake in the long term future of their region, which is in turn the surest way to long-term security in traditionally marginalized rural and vulnerable populations. ¶19. (SBU) The civilian lead of the PNC has yet to take full charge of consolidation efforts, leaving the Ministry of Defense organizationally in front. This leadership vacuum means that the USG is both partner and catalyst in this effort, supplying planning and flexible funding to get consolidation from concept to implementation. Other obstacles include the need for a comprehensive GOC security strategy to transition from military to police in "consolidated" territories; more clarity on a post-eradication strategy; stronger presence of the justice sector in CSDI areas; and increased funding support for PNC ministries in the GOC budget. Nichols