VFM FORERO GIVES AMBASSADOR READOUT ON UNASUR MEETING; AGREES TO LOWKEY DCA SIGNING

S E C R E T BOGOTA 002908





E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2029

TAGS: PREL, KJUS, MARR, PGOV, PHUM, KTIA, XM, VZ, HO, CO

SUBJECT: VFM FORERO GIVES AMBASSADOR READOUT ON UNASUR

MEETING; AGREES TO LOWKEY DCA SIGNING



REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 999

B. STATE 89408



Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield for reasons 1.4 (b)

and (d)



1. (C) Summary: Vice Foreign Minister Forero told the

Ambassador on September 7 that the GOC had achieved its goals

at the UNASUR Summit in Bariloche, defusing the issue of a

Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S., by opening all

regional security issues up to scrutiny. Colombia

interpreted Ecuadorian President Correa's remarks laying out

his efforts against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) as a positive shift. She said Colombia had

made progress toward renewing bilateral ties with Ecuador

under The Carter Center's mediation. Forero agreed to a low

key signing of the Agreement once both governments complete

their final reviews. Forero said that the State Council

would begin its review on September 8, and that she thought

it would finish quickly. In other issues, the Ambassador

stressed that the scandals surrounding the Administrative

Department of Security (DAS) made it difficult for U.S. law

enforcement to work with the agency. The Ambassador said he

would more publicly engage on human rights, offering that

though the Department would likely soon certify Colombia's

progress--the GOC would need to make greater progress in the

year ahead. Ambassadors Barco and Brownfield reviewed

proposals to add attaches from the Supreme Court and

Prosecutor General's Office to the Colombian embassy in

Washington to improve coordination on Justice and Peace and

extradition issues. End Summary.



UNASUR Summit a Success

--------------



2. (C) The Ambassador and DCM hosted Vice Foreign Minister

Clemencia Forero and Colombian Ambassador to the United

States Carolina Barco for lunch on September 7. Vice Foreign

Minister Forero said that Colombia viewed the outcome of the

UNASUR summit in Bariloche, Argentina as a success (Ref A),

but noted she had been briefly quarantined and tested for

AH1N1 flu after President Uribe became ill. Forero recalled

that at the end of the UNASUR summit in Quito, Bolivia had

pressed for a special session to look exclusively at Colombia

and Argentina's President Fernandez de Kirchner had offered

to host it. However, Colombia's strategy of expanding the

debate from an exclusive discussion of the U.S.-Colombia

Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) to a broader discussion

of all military assistance, security, and transnational crime

issues had neutralized the issue. Senior military officials

in the region would not want to discuss their own mil-mil

relationships nor allow inspections of bases and that would

be the end of it, she said.



3. (C) President Uribe's focus on seeking concrete assistance

in Colombia's fight against narco-terrorism, underscoring

that only the United States had provided anything more than

hortatory rhetoric had shifted the debate. It prompted

President Correa to detail and defend Ecuador's actions

against the FARC. His acceptance of the need to help

Colombia fight the FARC changed the debate. Forero said that

the GOC welcomed Ecuador's comments. In response to the

Ambassador's query, VFM Forero said that relations with

Ecuador had improved as a result of The Carter Center's

mediation efforts and a series of meetings at the Foreign

Ministerial level to hammer out a memorandum on

re-establishing bilateral relations. The Ambassador said

engagement with Ecuador would likely throw Venezuelan

President Chavez off balance, and prevents him from drawing

Correa more closely into his camp. Forero agreed that was an

additional benefit to improving the Ecuador relationship.



Chile Helpful, Peru Grandstanding, Venezuela Paranoid

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4. (C) Forero lamented that televising the UNASUR proceedings

live (at President Uribe's request) had caused some of the

Presidents to grandstand. She expressed particular surprise

at Peruvian President Garcia's critical remarks. Colombia

had expected more support from Peru at the summit. Forero

offered that Chile had played a helpful role at the summit,

despite President Bachelet's concerns about the agreement.

While most of the UNASUR members appeared to accept Colombian

and USG arguments about the DCA, Venezuela's view of the DCA

could only be described as "paranoid," she said.



Colombia Briefed Brazil Beforehand

--------------



5. (C) The Secretary's letter to UNASUR foreign ministers on

the eve of the summit (Ref B) had done much to ease many of

the countries concerns, Forero stressed. Forero continued

that she had provided the Brazilian ambassador to Colombia

with the text of DCA Article III, Paragraph Four which

explicitly calls upon the parties to comply with the DCA in a

manner consistent with principles of territorial integrity

and non-intervention in the affairs of other sovereign

states. The Ambassador said he had also briefed the

Brazilian ambassador on that point. He suggested that

Brasilia has clearly received the assurances that it had

sought on the DCA in the form of the Secretary's letter and

the letter from Colombian Foreign Minister Bermudez and has

seen the relevant part of the text. The Ambassador said that

the GOC should encourage Brazil to "take yes for answer" on

the assurances. On the issue of the Air Mobility Command

Global En Route Strategy White Paper, the Ambassador said

that the USG might be able to provide a letter to the GOC

stating that the White Paper was not decisional and not a

policy document. VFM Forero said that such a letter would

be valuable for the GOC to defuse the remaining issues

surrounding the DCA, if the GOC could share it with other

UNASUR members.



GOC Supports Quiet Signing Ceremony

--------------



6. (C) The Ambassador laid out the remaining steps for USG

approval of DCA: 1) final revision of the English and Spanish

texts; 2) the Secretary's approval of Circular 175 Authority;

3) instructions to a USG official to sign the

agreement--likely the Ambassador. In response to Ambassador

Barco's query, the Ambassador said the Department would

continue to brief and engage interested Members of Congress

on the DCA. He reiterated that the USG preferred a very low

profile signing with whomever the GOC designated--presumably

FM Bermudez or VFM Forero. The Vice Foreign Minister asked

if the USG would agree to Defense Minister Gabriel Silva

signing the agreement. The Ambassador replied that while

the GOC could decide who should sign on its behalf, having

MOD Silva do so might send an unintended message to others in

the region. Forero took the point.



7. (C) VFM Forero explained that the GOC would formally

provide the DCA text to the State Council on September 8,

though it has already carried out informal consultations on

the Agreement. Because the DCA is a "non-binding" agreement

under the Colombian constitution neither the State Council,

nor the Congress need give their consent. She continued that

the GOC must seek the opinion of the State Council, but is

not obliged to follow that opinion. She hoped that the GOC

could sign the DCA by the week of September 14. VFM Forero

said that she had briefed National Customs and Taxes (DIAN)

Director Nestor Diaz Saavedra on the provisions of the DCA,

which had assuaged his concerns on tax, toll, and duty issues.



8. (C) Regarding the Track II basket of issues

(implementation agreement, stockpile access agreement, and

air defense study),the Ambassador said that he had provided

three letters to MOD Silva that addressed the issues

(septel). Forero agreed that the GOC and USG should proceed

slowly and quietly on Track II.



Additional Attaches to U.S. to Work on Extradition

-------------- --------------



9. (C) Turning to extradition matters, Ambassador Barco

reviewed joint efforts to address the Colombian Supreme

Court's concerns regarding access to extradited former

paramilitary leaders. Ambassador Brownfield told Forero that

the USG would welcome a GOC decision to assign an auxiliary

magistrate of the Court at the Colombian Embassy in

Washington. The auxiliary magistrate would serve as the

Supreme Court's representative, particularly in sensitive

Justice and Peace process cases. Supreme Court President

Augusto Ibanez had expressed initial support for the idea.

Acting Prosecutor General Guillermo Mendoza had reacted more

cautiously to the idea of assigning a Justice and Peace unit

prosecutor to Washington, but the Ambassador judged that

Mendoza had been surprised by the issue and would agree to at

least a trial period to see if it resolved the issue of

access and improved cooperation by former paramilitary

leaders. (Note: In a follow-up conversation on September 8,

Mendoza maintained his caution, but

agreed to consider assigning a prosecutor to Washington on a

trial basis.) The Ambassador also offered that the USG might

devote greater resources to justice and peace coordination

through increased staffing in DOJ's Office of International

Affairs.



DAS Wiretap Scandal Unacceptable

--------------



10. (C) More broadly on the issue of human rights, the

Ambassador underscored his deep concern about public reports

of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS)

wiretapping of various political figures as well as Supreme

Court magistrates. The week before local media aired the

Embassy Judicial Attache's conversation with a magistrate,

which had leaked to the press. The continued problems with

the DAS made it very difficult for the Embassy to deal with

GOC's lead agency on immigration, transnational crime, and

intelligence matters. Recognizing that DAS Director Felipe

Munoz has tried to reform the agency, the Ambassador warned

that, if confirmed, further illegal behavior by the DAS would

make it impossible for U.S. law enforcement agencies to

cooperate with the organization. The Ambassador added that

he would more forcefully deliver the message of the

importance of human rights in his public remarks, echoing his

long-standing private comments to the GOC.



11. (C) VFM Forero said that Vice President Santos and DAS

Director Munoz planned to travel to Washington on September

14 for meetings with the OAS. (Note: Both have since

cancelled their trip.) The Ambassador replied that ordinarily

the USG would take advantage of such a trip to meet with

Munoz, but now such a meeting would not be appropriate.

Ambassador Barco offered that the issue had become very

sensitive in Washington for her and that she would meet with

Munoz later that day to get the details on his efforts to

reform the organization. She also noted that former

president and Liberal party leader Cesar Gaviria had harshly

criticized the DAS earlier that morning.



12. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the Department would

likely certify Colombia on human rights in the coming days,

allowing 30 percent of FMF and INCLE assistance to go

forward. The certification did not mean that human rights in

Colombia were perfect but rather that improvements continued.

In order to certify in the future, the Colombian government

must make further improvements. In the future, certification

would be more complicated, not less.



GOC Worries about BRV Activities in Colombia

--------------



13. (S) VFM Forero lamented that the DAS had failed to

provide her with adequate intelligence on Venezuelan official

activities in Colombia. Venezuelan officials had become

increasingly aggressive in their activities and appeared to

be coordinating more closely with the Cubans. A Venezuelan

diplomat named "Lugo" had ceased his normal duties and

dedicated himself entirely to meddling in Colombian politics.

Forero feared that the Venezuelans had gotten out of control

and the GOC did not have a handle on their activities. The

Ambassador observed that the scandals at DAS had damaged the

key agency to deal with such problems and coordinate

intelligence sharing. Forero asked for U.S. help in

assessing Venezuelan activities in Colombia. (Note: Embassy

will arrange for an appropriate briefing in the near future.)



Colombia Unlikely to Engage on Honduras

--------------



13. (C) The Ambassador said that the USG would welcome

Colombian encouragement to the de facto government in

Honduras to sign the San Jose Accords, or at minimum move

toward President Arias' proposed solution. The Ambassador

conceded that, so far, President Uribe had not wanted to

engage with de facto President Micheletti on the matter. VFM

Forero said that de facto Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez

Contreras had worked closely in the mid-1980s with then

Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramirez Ocampo to resolve

the maritime border dispute between the two countries. Many

of Colombia's best contacts in Honduras had ended up in the

de facto regime, she said, making it difficult to engage on

the issue. The Ambassador said that the USG had revoked the

visas of key members of the de facto regime and would

continue to raise the pressure systematically on the regime

to press them to accept the San Jose Accords. At some point,

he opined, the de facto regime would calculate that the risk

to them of ousted President Zelaya returning was lower than

the cost of keeping him out. VFM Forero agreed but said that

Colombia was unlikely to actively press for Zelaya's return.

The Ambassador cautioned that engagement that did not

advocate for the San Jose Accords would not be welcomed in

Washington.



GOC Still Seeks MCC Compact, but Chances Slim

--------------



14. (SBU) Ambassador Barco said that she had met with

Millennium Challenge Corporation officials on September 2 and

hoped to find a way to deal with Colombia's graduation from

lower-middle income to upper-middle income status. She said

that the various accounting factors contributed to the jump

and did not reflect the reality of Colombia. Barco hoped

that an MCC compact directed at the Pacific region would

target the poorest part of the country. Ambassador

Brownfield replied that the MCC could not pursue a compact

under current law, but had sought a legislative fix to allow

for a more gradual, sliding scale assessment of income growth

among threshold countries. The MCC would look at Colombia's

statistical concerns, but cautioned that either fix was a

long shot.





Brownfield