COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002376 SIPDIS FOR USSOUTHCOM GEN FRASER AND ASD/HDASA PAUL STOCKTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019 TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV MCAP KTIA PTER CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR TRACK II REF: BOGOTA 1334 Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Reasons 1.4 (b and d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOC expects positive signals soon on Track II issues as DCA negotiations wrap up. They have repeatedly stated that satisfaction on Track II is a precondition for closing out the DCA. Embassy recommends positive responses without additional commitments, specifically a U.S. Air Force-to-Colombian Air Force letter offering an air defense assessment team, an OSD-to-MOD letter offering working level discussions on stockpile agreement process, and upgrade for the operating arrangement to the level of SOUTHCOM Commander-CHOD. END SUMMARY. SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS TIED TO DCA -------------- ¶2. (C) From the inception of negotiations on a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Colombia, the Government of Colombia (GOC) has asked for several additional security assistance-related issues to be addressed in the same process. They accepted our argument that these issues would be covered in a parallel, but separate (so-called Track II) process, and that we would not move forward on them until we saw light at the end of the tunnel on the DCA negotiations. With recent high level GOC public support for the DCA, and considerable progress in the last negotiating round, we now see that light. Following are Embassy ideas on how to address Track II. These are suggestions; we acknowledge that the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) are the ultimate decision-makers on these issues. But we also note that the GOC has said repeatedly they will not sign the DCA until they have satisfaction on Track II issues. ¶3. (C) GOC concerns on Track II have focused on three areas. First, they are interested in an air defense system tied into the Cooperative Security Location (CSL) structure. Second, they want assurances of access to U.S. arms, systems, or technology in case of a national security emergency in the region, whether by stockpile agreement or some other process. Third, they want access to all aspects of the CSL once operational--including space, intelligence product, and infrastructure. In each case, the GOC is interested in the substantive issue itself, but also in being able to transmit to their public that they obtained benefits connected somehow to the DCA. Along those lines, Embassy suggests responses that do not offer everything the GOC has requested, but enough to allow them to point to progress. AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM -------------- ¶4. (C) As the GOC looks to Venezuela's acquisition of sophisticated Russian Sukhoi aircraft, they would love to have an equally sophisticated air defense system. The Colombian military views the Sukhoi in Venezuelan hands as a legitimate threat to national security. This may well be the case. It is our judgment, however, that the GOC has not even begun the necessary assessment, analysis, and planning for an air defense system. We suggest an offer that responds without making a long term commitment. Specifically, a mil-to-mil letter--we recommend U.S. Air Force South (AFSOUTH) Commander to Colombian Air Force (COLAF) Commander--offering to send an assessment team to Colombia at an early opportunity. The team would assess current Colombian capabilities, potential air defense needs, realistic budget considerations, and options. We would be clear from the beginning that the team has no authority to make commitments. STOCKPILE AGREEMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) It is our judgment that the GOC has not even decided if they wish to pursue a stockpile agreement with us. But since they have raised it in side conversations, we recommend that we open a dialogue. The device could be a letter from an appropriate official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to an appropriate official in Ministry of Defense (MOD) (we recommend DASD/HD&ASA/WHA to new Vice MOD Arbelaez) offering to initiate working level dialogue on the process to reach a stockpile agreement. As with the air defense assessment offer, the letter would make no commitments other than information on the process by which a stockpile agreement is concluded. ACCESS TO CSL FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE -------------- ¶6. (C) In some ways, this is the easiest of the three. Since the CSL will be on an operational COLAF base, the GOC will have de facto access anyway. They realize that. But they want to have something they can show to their public suggesting they got more than Ecuador ten years ago. The solution, we suggest, is the mil-to-mil operating arrangement that is signed following the DCA. Under the Manta agreement, this document was signed by SOUTHCOM J5 Director and host Air Force Commander. It lays out operational understandings and procedures for the CSL. It is not a political or policy document. We suggest that the operating arrangement be upgraded to SOUTHCOM Commander-Chief of Defense (CHOD). It says the same thing. It is still a non-political document. But it allows them to say they got something more than Ecuador. ¶7. (C) GOC negotiators in the next DCA round will realize we are approaching the endgame in the negotiations. President Uribe again directed his negotiators on July 23 to conclude an agreement as soon as possible. They will ratchet up the pressure and will note that they cannot sign the DCA until they have understanding on Track II. Embassy recommends that we have something concrete to say on the subject by the August 11 negotiating round. Brownfield =======================CABLE ENDS============================