GOC OFFERS TO SEND TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN UNDER ISAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000198 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2010 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR NATO SP AF CO SUBJECT: GOC OFFERS TO SEND TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN UNDER ISAF Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David M. Zimov Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The GOC has offered an initial contribution of up to 126 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with more possibly to follow. The Colombians are set to work alongside Spanish forces, although no formal agreement yet exists between the GOC and the Spanish and the Spanish may look to the USG for logistical support. The GOC would first send a small planning team, followed by demining and engineering units, with special forces possibly to follow. The offer is the first of several steps prior to deployment to Afghanistan, which would probably not occur until the second half of 2009. The GOC remains eager to contribute, but recognizes that iT cannot divert resources needed to face the FARC and other threats inside Colombia. End summary. GOC OFFERS SMALL, GRADUAL DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶2. (U) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos sent a letter on December 17 to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer offering to contribute up to 126 troops initially to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The GOC also requested recognition as a Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nation (NNTCN). Santos emphasized that the troop contribution was part of the GOC's aspiration to contribute to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations. ¶3. (SBU) Santos' letter outlined a gradual deployment of Colombian troops, beginning with a four-person liaison and planning team working through ISAF. Assuming a positive assessment by this team, actual deployments would begin with a demining platoon, expand to an engineering company, and possibly later include a special forces detachment under either ISAF or OEF command. Vice Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzon told us the relatively small size of the troop contribution reflects the GOC's desire to keep a low political profile for the issue while still making a valuable contribution. He added that the GOC also did not want to divert resources needed to face threats inside Colombia. STEPS REMAIN BEFORE BOOTS ARE ON THE GROUND -------------- ¶4. (U) Several steps remain before GOC forces can deploy. NATO must accept the contribution pending an assessment of the GOC's capabilities, carry out a certification, formally approve the contribution, then issue a formal invitation to the GOC to contribute. Colombia must then sign four agreements to finalize its ISAF involvement: 1) terms of participation; 2) financial arrangements; 3) information security; 4) code of conduct. The GOC would then develop a tentative deployment plan timeframe and submit it for review. Once NATO approves that plan, Colombian forces could deploy to Afghanistan. Given these timelines, it remains unlikely that GOC troops will deploy with Spanish forces in April, as had been hoped, since the Spanish troops in late January will begin training for that deployment. Although Spain is envisioned as Colombia's initial "sponsor" into the ISAF deployment, the two countries cannot sign a formal agreement until final NATO approval of Colombian participation. ¶5. (C) Colonel Jose Maria Arraco Montoya, Spanish military attache to Colombia, told us on January 16 that Spain backs the Colombian contribution in principle. Still, he cautioned that his government could offer little material or logistical support apart from communications equipment, training, and support to the Colombian contingent. He added that the GOC would most likely look to the USG for other support for the deployment, to include ground transportation once Colombian troops arrive in Afghanistan. BROWNFIELD