GOC STRUGGLES TO COUNTER ILLEGAL MINING

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001690 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EMIN SENV EIND ENRG ELAB CO SUBJECT: GOC STRUGGLES TO COUNTER ILLEGAL MINING ¶1. SUMMARY: Illegal mining is on the increase in Colombia, fueled by growing global markets, improved security in rural areas, and the difficulty of Colombia's law enforcement apparatus to effectively counter the well-heeled miners. Gold, platinum, and mercury extraction is most prevalent in the northwestern department of Choco, where the combination of vast resources, local corruption, and limited state presence provides the ideal conditions for uncontrolled exploitation. The GOC is aware of the problem and in April carried out its first wide-scale law enforcement operation to counter illegal mining, seizing 24 gold dredges in Choco. They hope to accelerate such operations, but will need the support of local communities and the promise of economic alternatives to make their efforts stick. GOC plans to convert illegal mines to legal operations have been hampered by bureaucratic delays. END SUMMARY Illegal Mining of Growing Concern to GOC -------------- ¶2. The mining sector accounted for five percent of GDP in ¶2008. In attempts to diversify its mining beyond coal and natural gas, the GOC has increased efforts to promote legal mining of precious metals -- specifically gold. In 2008 Colombia produced 34 tons of gold and the GOC expects that figure to increase to 105 tons by 2019, with production centered in the departments of Antioquia, Choco and Caldas. As with coal, however, illegal mining plagues Colombia's gold industry and the GOC is struggling to find the correct tools to counter the growing problem. ¶3. According to Beatriz Duque, Director of Mines at the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME),the GOC currently has no official statistics on illegal mining. They hope to have figures by the end of 2009 following a nationwide census that will provide estimates about the quantity of illegal mines, principally coal and gold. She added that in 2008 the GOC created a working group -- comprised of the MME, Ministry of Environment (MOE),Fiscalia (Prosecutor's Office), Procuraduria (Attorney General),National Police and the military -- to promote collaboration on legal cases and assets seizures against illegal miners. Following the Choco operation, the GOC is planning additional operations in Cundinamarca (coal),Boyaca (coal) and the Amazon (gold). ¶4. The department of Choco contains the most illegal mining activities, estimated by Duque to constitute 98 percent of all mining (gold, platinum and mercury). Illegal gold mining is done using two methods, either by dredges or heavy machinery excavators. Dario Cujar, the sub-director of the departmental environmental authority CODECHO, said in 2007, Choco had 105 illegal mines and 227 excavator operations in nine municipalities. He added that only three companies in Choco have mining concessions, with only one also having the requisite MOE permit. (NOTE: According to the 2001 Mining Code, companies must obtain a mining concession from the MME and an environmental permit from the MOE, after 3-5 years of exploration, before drilling can commence. END NOTE.) Duque said the situation in Choco is the most severe, but is also typical of the reality in several other departments with weak state presence. First GOC Illegal Mining Operation -------------- ¶5. In April 2009 the GOC executed its first major operation against illegal mining, seizing 24 gold dredges functioning on the Quito River. Ayala said the GOC illegal mining working group began planning the operation in June 2008, and it cost the GOC USD 30,000 since the majority of participating police and military had to be brought in from outside Choco. The operation was highly publicized in local media, and the seized dredges now sit in Choco's capital Quibdo, as property of the Fiscalia. The owners of the dredges, the vast majority from Brazil or Antioquia, await Fiscalia criminal proceedings but are not incarcerated. ¶6. Catholic Priest Remo Segalla from Choco's Lloro municipality praised the operation, but criticized how long it took the GOC to act. He said some of the dredges had been operating for over two decades without any GOC action, and that both the local and national GOC authorities knew where they were located. Helcias Ayala from Pacific Environmental Institute (IIAP) contends that the local GOC does not have the will nor logistical capability to counter illegal mining in a significant way. Segalla noted that the number of excavators in his municipality had increased from four to sixty in the last two years, even though the machines are clearly visible to all. Segalla said the April operation has made miners in his town a "little more fearful," but not enough to make them suspend or hide their operations. All local experts involved said the operation would not have occurred without the involvement and support of the local populations affected by the mining. No Economic Benefit to Local Community -------------- ¶7. The role of three Afro-Colombian "Consejo Comunitarios" from towns adjoining the Quito River were key to the April operation. Representatives from the Consejos traveled to Bogota in June and July of 2008, meeting with the primary GOC stakeholders. Senator Piedad Cordoba also met with the MME and MOE on their behalf. Quibdo's Secretary of Government, Martha Salazar, said that the Consejos were fundamental in spurring federal action against the dredges. Ayala said normally, illegal miners pay-off the local authorities, but the persistence of the Consejo leaders brought the situation to the attention of the GOC. Segalla agreed that corruption is rampant, adding that the illegal dredge owners refueled their dredges in a station in Quibdo that is adjacent to a police outpost. ¶8. Benedesmo Palacios, president of one of the Consejos, said they opposed the mining because their towns did not receive the royalties due them, and because the activity generated no local employment even though Colombian law requires 80 percent local employment for any economic activity on Afro-Colombian land. Presidential Envoy to Choco Juan Guillermo Angel told us that illegal miners in Choco do pay royalties, so that they can sell their minerals, but the royalties do not reach Choco. They pay their royalties to authorities in Antioquia or Brazil (where the owners are from) who "doctor their books" and change the originating area of the minerals. ¶9. Given no local ownership of the machinery and detoured royalties, very few financial benefits of illegal mining touch the local community. Salazar, said illegal miners rarely interact with the local communities, but rather construct temporary homes next to their operations and even bring their own non-local cooks. She said local populations can economically benefit by sifting through the waste from the illegal machines, but it is dangerous work and provides finances sufficient only for day-to-day needs. (NOTE: Local press widely publicized the death of eight miners in April 2009 in Choco, who were sifting when a structure collapsed upon them. END NOTE.) Salazar said that if illegal mining does provide income for the local population, it is not enough to move to enable them to satisfy their basic needs. ¶10. Palacios said the lack of prior consultation also prompted the Consejos to act. Afro-Colombian leadership must be consulted before the implementation of any economic activity on their land, a requirement ignored by the illegal miners. The MME has created specific Afro-Colombian mining zones (zonas minerales de comunidades negras),limiting the MME's authority in those areas, with the hope that increased local control by Afro-Colombians would help stem the illegal mining. Palacios, said, however, none of those legal changes have resulted in practical change. Rather, illegal miners either completely ignore the community, or bribe and acquire permission from one member of the community to mine on his/her portion of the collective land -- never complying with legal obligations. Environmental Effects Far-Reaching -------------- ¶11. Palacios said in addition to income disputes, the other impetus for the Consejo's actions was the environmental impact of the dredging. Both illegal dredging and excavating generate deforestation, river bank deterioration, oil and mercury contamination in the rivers, and species endangerment. Cujar said the environmental effects are comprehensive because illegal miners are not "true miners," (i.e. no exploration, studies, structured activity) but are simply "diggers" at random locations. Cujar said that isolated desertification has already occurred in Choco, and it will spread if the GOC does not increase activities against illegal mining and develop a comprehensive reforestation program. Legalization Process Long and Tedious -------------- ¶12. To counter the environmental effects, Duque said the GOC must provide incentives for the illegal miners to convert their operations to legal ones. She added that the MME and MOE developed a special legalization program in 2001 and to date have received 3600 applications, approving 136. To participate in the program illegal operators must acquire both the mining concession and environmental permit, as is the normal GOC process, but they are not held responsible for past royalties nor face legal repercussions from their illegal activities. ¶13. Despite the program's intentions, Salazar observed that many miners remain illegal specifically because of the time-consuming nature of the legalization process. At a minimum companies have to undergo 3-5 years of exploration before receiving an environmental permit. She said that while the MME and the MOE employ strict procedures for granting a concession or permit, they do not have sufficient personnel to even check and determine if companies have implemented those standards. She noted that 144 companies from Choco applied for the MME legalization program in 2001, but when progress stalled, other companies decided it was not worth the effort. Only one company in Choco has acquired both a mining concession and the environmental permit, spending eight years in the process. Additional Impediments: Paras and Economic Alternatives -------------- -------------- ¶14. All stakeholders said the presence of guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN) and paramilitaries (Aguilas Negras and the Rastrojos) is a principal impediment to controlling illegal mining. Salazar said the illegal miners collaborate with the paramilitary groups, strengthening their presence in the area. While coca remains the groups' principal economic activity, in the last five years they have begun to turn to illegal mining as an additional income source. Duque said there is a direct correlation between illegal mining activity, the presence of para groups, and limited state presence. Duque added that the GOC has difficulty distinguishing between subsistence miners and those who are part of a larger, more sophisticated organization. Given socio-economic conditions in the zone, they are more limited politically in their efforts to eradicate subsistence miners until they are able to provide alternative economic opportunities. Comment: GOC Must Join Forces with Local Communities -------------- -------------- ¶15. To fully counter illegal mining, the GOC must simultaneously increase enforcement operations while providing more efficient procedures for those willing to legalize. In departments such as Choco, where there is little state presence and rampant corruption, the local authorities have limited political will and capacity to address the situation. The national government must take the lead, with the backing of local communities. To be effective, they will need to harness the political support of disaffected local populations, and back it with the security and economic opportunities to guarantee that such efforts are more than a mere temporary fix. Brownfield