Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA1248
2009-04-15 22:43:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:
U.S. GOVERNMENT AIDS IN THE CAPTURE OF COLOMBIAN NUMBER ONE
VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #1248 1052243 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 152243Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8383 INFO RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5// RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 001248
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM
DEPT FOR WHA/AND
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER CO
SUBJECT: U.S. GOVERNMENT AIDS IN THE CAPTURE OF COLOMBIAN NUMBER ONE
NARCOTERRORIST "DON MARIO"
UNCLAS BOGOTA 001248
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM
DEPT FOR WHA/AND
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER CO
SUBJECT: U.S. GOVERNMENT AIDS IN THE CAPTURE OF COLOMBIAN NUMBER ONE
NARCOTERRORIST "DON MARIO"
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At approximately 8:40 a.m. on April 15, Colombian
National Police (CNP) captured paramilitary head and narcotrafficker
Daniel Rendon Herrera, alias "Don Mario." "Don Mario" led a large
criminal organization that engaged in drug trafficking, weapons
trafficking, and other narcoterrorist activities that harmed
security in Colombia, the United States, and the region. The
capture was the result of an exhaustive year-and-a-half effort led
by the CNP DIJIN (Judicial Directorate in its Spanish acronym) and
supported extensively by the U.S. Government with aviation and
interdiction resources. Colombian authorities carried out the
operation against him with great skill and professionalism. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) In a mission personally commanded by the CNP Director
General Oscar Naranjo, a force of 500 CNP personnel captured alias
"Don Mario" at 8:40 a.m. on April 15, in the eastern part of the
Uraba zone (Antioquia Department, Northwestern Colombia). For seven
days, using signal and human intelligence, USG aircraft assets
worked day and night to reposition continuously 250 Junglas
(U.S.-trained and equipped airborne commandos),to confine the
area, and effect the capture.
3. (SBU) A year-long bilateral investigation led by the CNP's DIJIN
and USG entities led to this helicopter assault of "Don Mario's"
hideout. Approximately five bodyguards were in the immediate
vicinity of "Don Mario" at the time of his capture by the CNP
officers. In the final phase of the operation on the night of April
14, the CNP thwarted his last ditch efforts to flee to the coast.
4. (SBU) In a prolonged joint effort, numerous USG elements provided
technical support to the GOC in the pursuit of this number one
priority narcotics trafficking. The wide-ranging U.S. support
involved information sharing, logistical support for CNP personnel
in the field, and aviation asset support. For example, one USG
program spent more than half a million dollars to capture the
narcoterrorist, while another used nearly all of its assets to
support the mission. Since April 6, 2009 alone, one USG agency's
personnel flew over 60 flight hours against "Don Mario," and
provided information that directly contributed to his apprehension.
Aviation played its crucial role over the length of the CNP's
pursuit, and during the actual operation, the U.S.-supported CNP
airfleet scrambled three UH-60s, two Bell 212s, one UH-2, and one
C-26 ISRAP (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Aerial
Platforms).
5. (SBU) "Don Mario" arrived at the Bogota Antinarcotics base late
in the afternoon before his transport to the DIJIN. General Oscar
Naranjo publicly blamed him for more than 3,000 assassinations in
the last 18 months. "Don Mario" allegedly told Naranjo that he was
ready to cooperate, but did not stipulate terms. Defense Minister
Juan Manuel Santos said that "Don Mario" would not receive any
benefits for cooperation and that he would be excluded from the
Peace and Justice process for having committed crimes after his
initial demobilization in 2007. No extradition request has been
submitted yet.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The capture of the preeminent narcoterrorist "Don
Mario" was a result of ever-increasing collaboration and cooperation
between the United States and Colombian Governments, and the
ever-improving operational capabilities of the Colombian security
forces. Much of the success of this mission was due to the robost
training and logistical support provided by the United States in
recent years, with air mobility support proving a key area. The
helicopters and aircraft working on these High Value Target,
interdiction, and eradication missions help the GOC to reduce the
threat of naroctrafficking in Colombia, the United States, and the
region. END COMMENT.
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM
DEPT FOR WHA/AND
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER CO
SUBJECT: U.S. GOVERNMENT AIDS IN THE CAPTURE OF COLOMBIAN NUMBER ONE
NARCOTERRORIST "DON MARIO"
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At approximately 8:40 a.m. on April 15, Colombian
National Police (CNP) captured paramilitary head and narcotrafficker
Daniel Rendon Herrera, alias "Don Mario." "Don Mario" led a large
criminal organization that engaged in drug trafficking, weapons
trafficking, and other narcoterrorist activities that harmed
security in Colombia, the United States, and the region. The
capture was the result of an exhaustive year-and-a-half effort led
by the CNP DIJIN (Judicial Directorate in its Spanish acronym) and
supported extensively by the U.S. Government with aviation and
interdiction resources. Colombian authorities carried out the
operation against him with great skill and professionalism. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) In a mission personally commanded by the CNP Director
General Oscar Naranjo, a force of 500 CNP personnel captured alias
"Don Mario" at 8:40 a.m. on April 15, in the eastern part of the
Uraba zone (Antioquia Department, Northwestern Colombia). For seven
days, using signal and human intelligence, USG aircraft assets
worked day and night to reposition continuously 250 Junglas
(U.S.-trained and equipped airborne commandos),to confine the
area, and effect the capture.
3. (SBU) A year-long bilateral investigation led by the CNP's DIJIN
and USG entities led to this helicopter assault of "Don Mario's"
hideout. Approximately five bodyguards were in the immediate
vicinity of "Don Mario" at the time of his capture by the CNP
officers. In the final phase of the operation on the night of April
14, the CNP thwarted his last ditch efforts to flee to the coast.
4. (SBU) In a prolonged joint effort, numerous USG elements provided
technical support to the GOC in the pursuit of this number one
priority narcotics trafficking. The wide-ranging U.S. support
involved information sharing, logistical support for CNP personnel
in the field, and aviation asset support. For example, one USG
program spent more than half a million dollars to capture the
narcoterrorist, while another used nearly all of its assets to
support the mission. Since April 6, 2009 alone, one USG agency's
personnel flew over 60 flight hours against "Don Mario," and
provided information that directly contributed to his apprehension.
Aviation played its crucial role over the length of the CNP's
pursuit, and during the actual operation, the U.S.-supported CNP
airfleet scrambled three UH-60s, two Bell 212s, one UH-2, and one
C-26 ISRAP (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Aerial
Platforms).
5. (SBU) "Don Mario" arrived at the Bogota Antinarcotics base late
in the afternoon before his transport to the DIJIN. General Oscar
Naranjo publicly blamed him for more than 3,000 assassinations in
the last 18 months. "Don Mario" allegedly told Naranjo that he was
ready to cooperate, but did not stipulate terms. Defense Minister
Juan Manuel Santos said that "Don Mario" would not receive any
benefits for cooperation and that he would be excluded from the
Peace and Justice process for having committed crimes after his
initial demobilization in 2007. No extradition request has been
submitted yet.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The capture of the preeminent narcoterrorist "Don
Mario" was a result of ever-increasing collaboration and cooperation
between the United States and Colombian Governments, and the
ever-improving operational capabilities of the Colombian security
forces. Much of the success of this mission was due to the robost
training and logistical support provided by the United States in
recent years, with air mobility support proving a key area. The
helicopters and aircraft working on these High Value Target,
interdiction, and eradication missions help the GOC to reduce the
threat of naroctrafficking in Colombia, the United States, and the
region. END COMMENT.
BROWNFIELD