Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BISHKEK97
2009-02-03 10:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZ EX-FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS RUSSIA IS KEY TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000097 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ EX-FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS RUSSIA IS KEY TO
MANAS

REF: A. BISHKEK 96

B. STATE 9012

C. BISHKEK 89

BISHKEK 00000097 001.6 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000097 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ EX-FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS RUSSIA IS KEY TO MANAS REF: A. BISHKEK 96 ¶B. STATE 9012 ¶C. BISHKEK 89 BISHKEK 00000097 001.6 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Foreign Minister Karabayev confirmed to the Ambassador that he lost his job because of his opposition to closing Manas Air Base. Karabayev said that at this point, the only possibility to keep the Base open would be for the U.S. to negotiate directly with Russia, or "pray that Moscow's financial assistance package falls apart." End Summary. Fired over the Base Issue -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met February 3 with former Foreign Minister Ednan Karabayev. Karabayev confirmed that he lost his job in January largely over his opposition to closing Manas Air Base. Karabayev said he supported keeping the Base because of his "principled view" that there were "three legs to Kyrgyzstan's security stool." The robust presence of the United States and the Base balanced Russia and China. Karabayev said he had argued strenuously to President Bakiyev not to close the Base, but Bakiyev did not accept his arguments. "The U.S. Has Itself to Blame" -------------- ¶3. (C) Karabayev said that U.S. behavior led to the current situation, and the United States "has itself to blame." He said that for two years he had given "many warnings" that the Base was in danger, and he, the President, and the Government had signaled "every passing visitor" that there were problems and the U.S. could not take the Base for granted. Karabayev criticized the U.S. side for being cheap over the Base, both during the 2006 Base negotiations and after negative incidents at the Base. "You approached the Base's survival day to day, when what you needed was a comprehensive approach to secure the Base's presence," he charged. Karabayev said that the Base had been able to survive for a while this way, but by failing to resolve the long-standing issues or adjust payments, the U.S. brought on the current situation. "You ignored (the problems) and hoped for the best." ¶4. (C) Karabayev said that he still believes it is a mistake to close the Base. Karabayev said that he had proposed to Bakiyev that the Kyrgyz side give notice to the U.S. in private, with a two-year deadli
ne for the U.S. to come up with a "robust package" that would resolve outstanding issues and increase payments for the Base (at which time we would be renegotiating the agreement anyway). One advantage of this approach, he said, is that the negotiations would not have been public. But now the notice to close the Base will be made in public, with great embarrassment to the U.S. side, and possible retaliation against Kyrgyzstan. Losing the Base Will Hurt Kyrgyzstan -------------- ¶5. (C) Karabayev continued that it will be a "tragedy for Kyrgyzstan" when the U.S. leaves, because Kyrgyzstan will be left "totally at the mercy" of Russia. Karabayev said that Russia had "beat up" Georgia, and now it was "buying" Kyrgyzstan -- either to "reincorporate Kyrgyzstan or to extract what it wants and then leave." Another possible scenario he outlined is that Kyrgyzstan would become a battleground for China and Russia. Karabayev noted that it was ironic that Bakiyev had spoken of "reasonable balance" during his January 27 address to the nation when he was now destroying that balance. BISHKEK 00000097 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that Bakiyev was likely to announce the six-month notice for closing of the Base following his trip to Moscow, where he is expected to sign an agreement with Russia for $2.5 billion in economic assistance. She asked what would happen if, after six months had passed and the U.S. has closed the Base, Russia did not come up with the money. Karabayev said he had explained this risk to Bakiyev. Karabayev said that Russia had failed to follow through on previous pledges. For example, he said, Russia had promised to forgive Kyrgyzstan's bilateral debt if Kyrgyzstan would agree to forgo the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, but when Kyrgyzstan refused HIPC assistance, Russia did nothing. Karabayev feared a repeat of this scenario. However, Bakiyev had said he would not sign the agreement with Russia without "serious guarantees." ¶7. (C) Unlike Presidential Administration Chief Usenov (Ref A),Karabayev said he was not aware of any pressure from China to close Manas. He said that China opposed any expansion of the Base or effort to make it permanent, but he understood that China was prepared to tolerate the status quo for the present. "Negotiate with the Russians" -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked Karabayev if he saw any way to save the Base. Karabayev said that it was possible that Bakiyev would not get the guarantees he wants and will not sign the agreement with Moscow, but Karabayev thought this scenario was unlikely. Karabayev advised that to save Manas, the United States should negotiate directly with Russia, and the U.S. should start by offering something that Russia wants, such as a promise of silence regarding Russian bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or dropping the missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Karabayev added that it would help if the Base operated as a UN base. Next for Karabayev -------------- ¶9. (C) Karabayev, who came to the meeting in a government car, claimed he was no longer drawing a government salary and his family was in a difficult economic position. Karabayev said he remains friends with Bakiyev, in part because his brother went to school with the President, and he still supports re-electing Bakiyev "because there is no one else out there." However, he said he does not want to draw a salary from Bakiyev, because he wants to spend time rebuilding his political party. (Note: Karabayev is the founder of the Sanjira Party, a small party that was more of a think tank than a political organization. End Note.) Karabayev said he was looking for a grant from an international organization, such as Soros, Eurasia, or the UN, to fund academic research and writing. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) We believe that Karabayev gave his honest analysis of the situation. We agree with his assessment that, at this point, the key to saving Manas is in Russia. GFOELLER

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