HOW TO KEEP MANAS AIR BASE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000067 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS KG SUBJECT: HOW TO KEEP MANAS AIR BASE REF: BISHKEK 62 BISHKEK 00000067 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. General Petraeus's timely and successful visit has bought us a month's time to put together a package of incentives to secure Kyrgyz support for Manas Air Base. The package needs to be significant, given Russia's strategy of applying political pressure while offering a $2 billion plus economic package. We judge that Kyrgyz frustration over U.S. unresponsiveness to a longstanding list of Base-related grievances has reached the level that, in Kyrgyz eyes, the Base no longer has any strategic value. Its worth is measured solely by how much money the Base brings to Kyrgyzstan and, by this standard, the Kyrgyz have increasingly concluded that Manas Air Base costs much more -- in political pressure and lost economic help from Moscow -- than it is worth. Unless we reverse this assessment -- and it will cost money to do so -- we judge it likely that the Kyrgyz will close Manas Air Base in 2009. Losing Manas Air Base would immediately devalue U.S. standing in the region and could deal a crippling blow to our ability to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) As reported Ref A, General Petraeus successfully and artfully persuaded the Kyrgyz to back down from earlier statements to the Ambassador that Bishkek was negotiating with Moscow the terms of a much-needed economic assistance package in return for Bishkek's commitment to close Manas Air Base. General Petraeus's pledge to send a team in February to explore ways to enhance the economic benefit to Kyrgyzstan for hosting Manas Air Base provides us a vital window during which we must determine whether it is in our interest to increase compensation for the Base and, if so, by how much. This cable explains the Embassy's reasoning behind our judgment that only a significant increase in compensation will secure access to Manas Air Base through 2009. The Clock Runs Out in February -------------- ¶3. (S) President Bakiyev plans to travel to Moscow on February 3. Kyrgyz media is already speculating that he will take with him a commitment to serve the six-month notice to close Manas Air Base. In return, Moscow will grant a $2.5 billion assistance package -- including $150 million in grant aid. Notwithstanding the claims of Prime Minister Chudinov to General Petraeus that no negotiations with Moscow are under way to close the Base, we suspect they are and that is one reason Bakiyev declined to meet with the General. Bakiyev's upcoming trip to Moscow raises the stakes for the team General Petraeus will send out later that month. The offer of the team may be sufficient to persuade Bakiyev not to make a commitment to Moscow, but if so, Bakiyev will be expecting a concrete offer from us in February. ¶4. (S) We understand that as currently planned, the February team is to look at ways to increase local purchases from Manas Air Base and/or the possibility of sourcing local goods for transport to Afghanistan in support of U.S. forces there. If these purchases are limited, then such proposals will fall far short of Kyrgyz expectations. Indeed, they will only confirm in Bakiyev's mind that he has little to lose by closing the Base and taking Russian assistance. In the Embassy's estimation, the February team needs to bring an offer to provide additional compensation of $50 plus million per annum in payment for the Base, or we will risk seeing the closure of the Base in 2009. Why February May Be Our Last Chance -------------- ¶5. (S) There are three key factors that have brought us to BISHKEK 00000067 002.2 OF 003 this showdown. First is that for the first time Russia has coupled its persistent use of the political pressure stick to close Manas Air Base with the carrot of economic assistance. Second, the assistance offered -- according to Kyrgyz Presidency Chief of Staff Usenov, $150 million in grant aid, $300 million in extremely low interest loans, and some $1.7 billion in commercial loans -- is particularly appealing to the Kyrgyz. Due largely to their mismanagement of the energy sector and the greed of those who control it, Kyrgyzstan faces a $300 million budget shortfall and the need for cash to pay for higher-priced gas from Uzbekistan and coal from Kazakhstan. The Russian package is thus a timely bailout. Underlying these proximate causes is a third factor: the steady corrosion of Kyrgyz hope that hosting the Base would bring increased economic investment and compensation to Kyrgyzstan. As Kyrgyz hope faded, it has been replaced by frustration and anger -- particularly on the part of President Bakiyev, who has convinced himself that the U.S. has not kept its end of the bargain. The Disputed $150 Million -------------- ¶6. (C) The root cause of Bakiyev's anger is the public pledge the U.S. made in 2006, at the conclusion of the Base renegotiations that led to the protocol by which we provide to a Kyrgyz treasury account $17.4 million per year in direct compensation for Manas Air Base. The U.S., in a joint press statement, committed to seeking funding from Congress to provide approximately $150 million in total bilateral assistance in the coming year. By our accounting, we kept that pledge in FY07, and provided approximately that same level of assistance in FY08 and are on track to do so in FY09. Bakiyev, however, sees it quite differently. He has maintained since late 2006 that USAID assistance and the Peace Corps budget do not count, and by his reckoning, we did not keep our word. The Embassy's countless meetings with Kyrgyz Security Council staff to set the record straight have failed to budge Bakiyev. 2006 Incidents -------------- ¶7. (C) Adding insult to injury, in Kyrgyz eyes, the September 2006 collision that damaged what turned out to be Bakiyev's long-haul airplane, and the December 2006 incident in which a Kyrgyz truck driver was shot and killed by a U.S. airman who claimed self-defense raised the "cost" of the Air Base. When the Base agreement was renegotiated in July 2006, the Kyrgyz did not bargain for these extraordinary incidents, and believed they warranted additional compensation. The Kyrgyz were bitterly disappointed with the $250,000 grace payment we provided for the airplane collision (they demanded $2 million). The shooting incident sparked widespread and deep government and public outrage when the Kyrgyz realized the U.S. airman could not be tried in a Kyrygz court; this was increased when, after six months of bureaucratic delay, the U.S. gratis payment to the widow of $55,000 was viewed as a paltry sum compared to what an American life would be worth. Finally, the Kyrgyz have taken the 21-month delay in completing the U.S. investigation as an insult and as proof that we have simply swept the incident under a rug. What the Kyrgyz Expect -------------- ¶8. (S) The Kyrgyz believed that hosting Manas Air Base would bring in significant U.S. investment and direct compensation. The lack of U.S. investment, in Kyrgyz eyes, must be a result of an intentional U.S. policy decision, as they assume we must operate like Russia does and, if we wanted to, could simply direct U.S. companies to invest. Now, faced with a significant budget shortfall and a looming energy crisis, their sense of desperation and entitlement has BISHKEK 00000067 003.2 OF 003 ballooned, and they wish to cut a better deal -- with us if we increase compensation, or with Russia if we do not. ¶9. (S) Arguments about the strategic importance of the Base, and of Kyrgyzstan's role in hosting it, hold but little water for the Kyrgyz. The one fuels a belief we should pay more for the Base than we do, and the latter rings hollow unless that importance is translated into concrete economic terms. Focused as they are on the need for compensation, the Kyrgyz leadership does not spare much thought for the strategic value of the Base. In their cost-benefit analysis, the economic benefit of the Base has remained fixed (and below their expectations) while the political costs have risen. By political cost they mean the steady Russian pressure to close the Base, and by economic cost the potential economic assistance from Moscow they have supposedly lost due to the Base. It is perhaps no coincidence that the package Moscow is dangling before the Kyrgyz includes precisely $150 million in grant aid. The message is clear: Moscow will provide what Washington will not, at least for one year. Checkbook Diplomacy -------------- ¶10. (S) Our judgment is that to keep Manas Air Base through 2009 will require a substantial increase in direct compensation to around $50 plus million a year. Our proposed $35 million ramp/cargo pad project will not do the trick -- the Kyrgyz never asked for it and it is not direct compensation. Even the $30 million request in the supplemental for an air traffic control system, responding to a request the Kyrgyz made two and one half years ago, will probably be seen locally as too little, too late. This does not necessarily mean reopening the Base agreement; a supplemental request tied to operations in Afghanistan for $50 plus million in Economic Support Funds, for example, could work to maintain access to Manas. ¶11. (S) Our understanding is that Manas plays a critical logistical role, that over 90% of Coalition troops rotate in and out of Afghanistan through Manas, and the Base provides over a third of all refueling over Afghanistan. Losing Manas would not just cost us in terms of OEF, it would also be viewed in the region and beyond as a slap in our face and would devalue further U.S. standing in the region. Moscow would encourage the zero-sum logic that it was the immediate beneficiary of the Base closure, and few in the region would see it otherwise. Seen from Bishkek, closure of Manas could also lead others in the region to re-think their security cooperation with the U.S. and reconsider their willingness to participate in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), thereby threatening much of the progress recently made on the NDN issue. The ball is in our court, and the Kyrgyz have put us on notice that they have alternatives. On the other hand, we can strengthen our now precarious hold on Manas dramatically, to the great benefit of our operations in Afghanistan, if we are ready to negotiate seriously about compensation. Embassy Bishkek stands ready to support the CENTCOM team's February visit. GFOELLER