AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000543 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KG SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR LUNCH WITH KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER REF: A. STATE 55334 ¶B. BISHKEK 521 ¶C. BISHKEK 516 ¶D. TASHKENT 823 BISHKEK 00000543 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a wide-ranging June 1 lunch conversation, the Ambassador previewed for Foreign Minister Sarbayev the message that President Obama will be delivering to Muslims worldwide in his upcoming speech in Cairo (Ref A). Sarbayev reacted positively to the fact that the President would be addressing relations with the Muslim world. Sarbayev said he thought that Kyrgyzstan would reach an accommodation with the OSCE over the number of monitors for the July 23 Presidential election (Ref B),but he said Kyrgyzstan would support Russian efforts to "reform" the OSCE to focus more on security and economic development and less on democracy. As he has done frequently in the past, Sarbayev also complained about Uzbekistan's actions with regard to water and border issues. End Summary. Previewing the President's Speech -------------- ¶2. (C) Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev invited the Ambassador to lunch at a local restaurant on June 1. The Ambassador used the occasion to preview for Sarbayev that President Obama will make a major speech in Cairo on June 4 to deliver a message about U.S. relations with the Muslim world. Sarbayev reacted positively, stating that it was a very good step for the President to address relations with the broader Muslim world. Complaining about the OSCE -------------- ¶3. (C) Sarbayev said that the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should be focused on security issues and economic development, not on "internal politics." Sarbayev, who had earlier complained to the Ambassador that the report of the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission report had (negatively) "pre-judged" the conduct of the July 23 Presidential election, claimed that the Kyrgyz government was not unduly limiting the number of international observers. ¶4. (C) Sarbayev noted that the government had invited the OSCE to send 150 observers as the ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission and another 150 for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly monitoring effort; he added that the OSCE could work out the division between the two groups. (Note: The OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment report had recommended the deployment of a standard Election Observation Mission, with 24 long-term observers and 300 short-term observes. The ODIHR mission is separate from any OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation. End Note.) In general, Sarbayev said that between Embassies and other international organizations, such as the SCO, Kyrgyzstan has already issued invitations to more than 1,000 election observers: "this is too much for a small country as ours -- we risk being overwhelmed!" ¶5. (C) Sarbayev lamented that there were OSCE funds available to support election monitoring, but "no money" for economic development and security -- "even though 'security' is even in the name of the organization!". He said he appreciated the work of OSCE Ambassador Tesoriere in Bishkek, but the "problem" with OSCE priorities came from Vienna. Sarbayev said Kyrgyzstan would support Russia's initiatives to "reform" the OSCE to get the organization to focus more on security and economic issues. Sarbayev said he believed that the Kazakh OSCE Presidency would be supportive of Russia's efforts in this direction. He also claimed that there were "good indications" that Kazakhstan would focus more on "water BISHKEK 00000543 002.2 OF 002 and security issues" and "bring Central Asian concerns -- which have been woefully neglected -- to the fore in general." Complaining about Uzbekistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to a familiar theme, Sarbayev complained about relations with Uzbekistan and warned that "the situation in Central Asia could explode." Sarbayev claimed that Uzbekistan was becoming "dictatorial" with regard to water issues, and he criticized alleged Uzbek intransigence at the recent meeting in Dushanbe between the EU Troika and the Central Asian states (a meeting he otherwise dismissed as a "useless . . . pro-forma talking shop."). The Ambassador pointed out that following the apparent terrorist attacks in Khanabad near the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border (Ref D),Uzbek officials, including the Uzbek Ambassador in Kyrgyzstan, were saying that Kyrgyzstan cannot control its borders (Ref C). Sarbayev disputed that weak Kyrgyz border controls were to blame for allowing terrorists to launch attacks in Khanabad, saying that the perpetrators were "all Uzbeks." Sarbayev worried that Uzbekistan would use the attacks as a pretext for "taking control" -- first of Kyrgyz borders and eventually of its water resources, claiming that the Kyrgyz were unable to protect them. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Sarbayev apparently sees little value for Kyrgyzstan in having robust international monitoring efforts for the July 23 Presidential election. In addition to limiting the number of OSCE monitors, the MFA has limited the number of observers that embassies and other organizations can deploy -- the Embassy received a Diplomatic Note inviting us to register ten observers. GFOELLER