HELSINKI COMMISSION STAFFDEL MEETS KYRGYZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000501 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR KG SUBJECT: HELSINKI COMMISSION STAFFDEL MEETS KYRGYZ PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SARIYEV REF: A. BISHKEK 484 ¶B. BISHKEK 471 ¶C. BISHKEK 458 ¶D. 08 BISHKEK 1017 ¶E. BISHKEK 206 BISHKEK 00000501 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ak Shumkar Presidential candidate Temir Sariyev told a visiting U.S. Helsinki Commission staffdel that the July 23 Kyrgyz Presidential election would be marred by government manipulation of election results, and complained of government pressure on the media and the general public. He raised the "political murder" of former Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov, and claimed that "fear" had prevented others from protesting after Sadyrkulov's death. While coy about his election strategy, he blamed not only his countrymen for the state of Kyrgyzstan's democracy, but the actions of former foreign diplomats. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) U.S. Helsinki Commission staff members Janice Helwig and Shelly Han, accompanied by Embassy officers, held meetings in Bishkek and Osh as part of their May 2-8 visit to the Kyrgyz Republic. Reftels A-C cover their earlier meetings, while this cable discusses their meeting with Temir Sariyev, Chairman of the Ak Shumkar Party and candidate in the July 23 Presidential election. The State of Kyrgyzstan's Democracy -------------- ¶3. (C) Sariyev told the staffdel that the Kyrgyz government exerted complete control over most media outlets, thereby limiting public access to objective information. He claimed that Kyrgyz citizens lacked the right to peaceful assembly, administration critics suffered from harassment, and state security services, especially the State Committee for National Security, aroused fear among citizens. Sariyev opined that the courts supported these violations, leaving citizens without legal remedies for the government's actions. ¶4. (C) Turning to the July 23 Presidential election, Sariyev noted that the flawed December 2007 Parliamentary elections had discredited the electoral process in the eyes of many Kyrgyz citizens. Sariyev cited the September 2008 resignation of Central Election Commission chief, Klara Kabilova, as an example of the government's strong-arm tactics in manipulating the election process (Ref D). (Note: ;Kabilova resigned and fled the country after allegedly receiving threats from President Bakiyev's son Maxim and then Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov. Kabilova recently returned from Moscow and, via the media, retracted her accusations. End note.) Sariyev believed that the opposition had limited time to spread its message. (Note: On the day of this meeting, the main opposition umbrella group, the United People's Movement, expelled Sariyev and his party for splitting the opposition. End note.) Sadyrkulov's Death -------------- ¶5. (C) Sariyev voiced the common belief that Sadyrkulov's March 13 death was a "political murder," and that the official account was not plausible (Ref E). He said that Sadyrkulov had met with opposition members prior to his death and apologized for his activities under President Bakiyev. Sadyrkulov, Sariyev believed, had significant knowledge of Bakiyev's power structure, knew how to break it, and had been prepared to do so. Sariyev lamented that, after Sadyrkulov's death, only former Deputy Prime Minister Elmira Ibraimova had followed through on plans to speak out against the President. Fear, he said, forced others to renege on their promises to BISHKEK 00000501 002.2 OF 002 join her. Future Prospects -------------- ¶6. (C) Sariyev revealed little about his election strategy, but acknowledged that opposition candidates faced long odds. He believed that limited support in southern regions, in addition to the government's complete control of the election process, left the opposition with little hope of success. Sariyev said that his greatest fear was that both sides would declare victory, regardless of the announced results, and that protest actions would ensue. How Did We Get Here? -------------- ¶7. (C) While acknowledging that his countrymen should shoulder much blame for the state of Kyrgyzstan's democracy, Sariyev also blamed former foreign diplomats for the fall of former President Akayev and the ascent of Kurmanbek Bakiyev in March 2005. He included former U.S. Ambassador Stephen Young among the "primary culprits," claiming that Young met almost daily with opposition leaders at the time of the revolution and that the United States reacted too slowly to condemn events in southern Kyrgyzstan in early 2005, where then-opposition gangs took over government administration buildings ostensibly to protest falsified Parliamentary election results. The staffdel members pushed back, asking Sariyev if he really believed that the U.S. had a role in bringing Bakiyev to power, noting that many "untruths" about USG actions are widely believed. Sariyev backed off slightly, saying it "could not be denied" that Young met with the opposition. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Sadly, Sariyev's attack on former foreign diplomats is typical of a mindset here that seeks to put the blame on outsiders for any negative outcomes. Sarbayev can be combative in meetings, as he was during a previous meeting with the Ambassador, when the first sentence out of his mouth was: "So when will the Russians finally kick you out of Manas?" However, he has also been quick to seek our assistance when it was convenient for him to do so. Post certainly does not accept his attack on former Ambassador Young. During the later years of the Akayev Presidency, Ambassador Young did what every American Ambassador should do: he spoke out regularly against the regime's many abuses and in favor of the principles of free speech, free media, and free assembly. ¶9. (U) Staffdel Helwig did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. GFOELLER