MANAS: SARBAYEV AND AMBASSADOR SIGN AGREEMENTS;

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000462 DEPT FOR SCA - PDAS MOON AND DAS KROL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS KG SUBJECT: MANAS: SARBAYEV AND AMBASSADOR SIGN AGREEMENTS; SARBAYEV URGES PHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT OBAMA TO BAKIYEV REF: A. BISHKEK 459 ¶B. STATE 47934 ¶C. BISHKEK 452 ¶D. BISHKEK 443 ¶E. BISHKEK 429 ¶F. STATE 43050 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) The Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Sarbayev May 13 at the Ambassador's residence to sign the framework agreement and the transit center agreement. Sarbayev signed the agreements, which were dated May 13, as a "guarantee to the U.S. government." However, he said that he needed undated documents -- with the dates to be filled in later -- to use when he presents the texts to Parliament sometime in June. He said that if he presented documents with today's date, he would have difficulty explaining to Parliament why the agreements were signed in May. A second set of documents was prepared with all references to the signature date left blank, and the Ambassador and Sarbayev then signed these documents anew. Sarbayev said he was leaving the May 13 signed documents behind as a sign to the USG of his and President Bakiyev's "commitment" to the agreements. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador reiterated that the USG, as agreed, would keep the fact of the agreements confidential until June ¶20. Sarbayev said that June 20 was the "latest date" he would go before Parliament, but he hoped to be able to move more quickly. He said he needed help from us to prepare public opinion and Parliament. Sarbayev said repeatedly that it was "absolutely essential" that President Obama call President Bakiyev. Sarbayev also stated that it would be "extremely helpful" to receive some news on the Ivanov investigation that the GOKG could use publicly. ¶3. (S) Sarbayev said that a planned phone call from President Karzai to Bakiyev had not come off, angering Bakiyev and damaging Sarbayev's credibility with him. According to Sarbayev, the Afghan Embassy in Astan had called Sarbayev May 12 to say that Karzai would call Bakiyev within the hour. Sarbayev rushed to Bakiyev to prepare him for the call. Bakiyev sat waiting for the call for over an hour, but the call never came through. Sarbayev said that it would have been better not to attempt the call rather than have it fail, leaving Bakiyev angry. However, he reiterated that it was essential to arrange another -- successful -- call. ¶4. (S) Sarbayev began to reveal his strategy for preparing public opinion and the Parliament for the change in course on Manas. He said that later this month, he would lead a roundtable discussion at the Diplomatic Academy focused on President Bakiyev's "Bishkek Initiative" (an offer to host in Bishkek an international conference on security in Afghanistan). Sarbayev said that in June he was preparing to hold another roundtable on Afghanistan, to which he would invite senior UN officials from the region, specifically mentioning UN Envoy for Afghanistan Kai Eide and Head of the UN Center for Preventative Diplomacy in Central Asia Miroslav Jenca. Sarbayev said he hoped for U.S. participation at the highest level possible. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador said that the Embassy would try to place articles on Afghanistan in the local press, and she asked what Sarbayev was planning for the government media. Sarbayev answered that he was preparing an "active media campaign." Sarbayev said he had few contacts among civil society leaders, and he asked if NDI and IRI would be able to help sway NGOs about the Base. ¶6. (S) Sarbayev repeated his earlier concern about leaks from the U.S. side regarding the agreements. He also asked that the U.S. not inform its allies -- specifically mentioning France and Spain -- until "everyone else is informed." The Ambassador made no commitment about not informing the allies. ¶7. (S) Sarbayev said he was traveling to Moscow May 14 for an SCO ministerial meeting. He was somewhat nervous about the meeting, but was confident that he would be able to fend off any pressure. ¶8. (S) Comment: Sarbayev appeared earnest in saying that his signature was a guarantee for the agreements, and it was encouraging that he has started to plan a strategy to deal with public opinion. However, that he insisted on undated copies of the texts shows how fragile these agreements remain. Post strongly recommends a Presidential call to Bakiyev ASAP to keep Bakiyev moving in the right direction, and post will forward proposed talking points tomorrow. GFOELLER