KYRGYZ OPPOSITION STICKING TOGETHER BUT GOING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000346 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION STICKING TOGETHER BUT GOING NOWHERE REF: A. BISHKEK 290 ¶B. BISHKEK 156 BISHKEK 00000346 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Poloff held separate meetings April 8 with Ata Meken Party and Social Democrat Party representatives. Both men sounded common themes: The alliance of opposition parties within the United People's Movement (UPM) is holding, for now, in spite of ongoing internal struggles over who will be the UPM's candidate in the Presidential race. However, neither evinced any realistic hope that UPM's candidate would actually triumph in the face of overwhelming government resources and unrelenting pressure. END SUMMARY. The United Opposition's Candidate Is . . . -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met with Ata Meken Press Secretary and Youth Wing leader Joomart Saparbayev on April 8. According to Saparbayev, Social Democrat (SDPK) leader Almaz Atambayev is currently slated to be the UPM candidate for President. However, he emphasized the present tense, noting that not all of the principals within UPM are reconciled to putting Atambayev in the front, and that the candidate could well change before there is a formal announcement. Saparbayev said that the announcement by Ata Meken leader Omurbek Tekebayev that he would not stand as a Presidential candidate had taken everyone in the party by surprise, contrary to Tekebayev's claim that the decision had been made by the Party, and not by him personally. However, Tekebayev seems to be leaving his options open: in an April 9 press story he said that if the UPM could not identify a candidate, he might reconsider his decision. ¶3. (C) Saparbayev alluded to ongoing struggles within the UPM, and indicated some uncertainty about how long the alliance would hold together. He said that Ata Meken was committed to the alliance, and regardless of which candidate is ultimately chosen, will mobilize all of its resources in the campaign. But he was skeptical that all of the UPM's members would be similarly steadfast, and said that he believed some alliance members were already negotiating separate deals with the government. ¶4. (C) With remarkably little enthusiasm, he claimed that he was optimistic about the campaign, but then admitted that the constant government pressure on the opposition was draining. Both his brother and his father had lost their government jobs because of his political activities, and he had been questioned several times by the GKNB intelligence service. He said that this pattern of legal and family harassment was typical of all active opposition party members. Or maybe not . . . -------------- ¶5. (C) SDPK Parliamentary Secretary Asylbek Bolotbayev confirmed reports that the UPM had decided to field several candidates as a tactical measure (ref A),but said that the UPM has not yet settled on a final candidate. Rather than Atambayev, he thought that SDPK Parliamentary Leader Bakyt Beshimov stood the best chance of becoming the UPM's candidate. Bolotbayev did not view Tekebayev's decision to stand down as a candidate as a self-sacrificing move for the sake of the opposition's unity. Rather, he wondered what kompromat the government had on Tekebayev, noting that it must go well beyond the "video porn" that has already been released (ref B). ¶6. (C) Bolotbayev was somewhat more positive than Saparbayev on the UPM, saying that the members of the opposition understand that they need each other, and that the joint selection of a single candidate would be a significant BISHKEK 00000346 002.2 OF 002 accomplishment. According to Bolotbayev, the government is actively trying to pick apart the UPM, and he attributed the opposition party Asaba's recent departure from the UPM to some combination of government blandishments and pressure. However, he minimized the political importance of Asaba's departure, and said that so far, the main powers in the UPM were holding tight. ¶7. (C) On the flip side, Bolotbayev saw few gains to the opposition from potential splits in the ruling Ak Jol party. Bolotbayev said that Medet Sadyrkulov's death scared many people, opposition and government alike, but he judged the loyalties of former Sadyrkulov proteges in Parliament as shallow. Of the 25 deputies with strong ties to him, only one spoke out when it became apparent that the investigation of Sadyrkulov's death would be a whitewash. He was particularly dismissive of Former Deputy Prime Minister Elmira Ibraimova, saying that she could bring nothing useful to the UPM. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Bolotbayev identified an additional reason for the opposition not to get their hopes up. Even beyond the government's administrative resources, superior financing, and control of the media and the power organs, the government has one more thing going for it: the majority of Kyrgyz are uneducated and politically unsophisticated, and they think the current government is doing a good job. If Bolotbayev's pessimistic analysis is correct, it will be very hard for the UPM's Presidential candidate to gain traction, absent some event that sparks popular anger at the government. GFOELLER