KYRGYZSTAN: SECOND DAY OF MANAS DISCUSSIONS

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000297


NSC FOR GENERAL JONES
CENTCOM FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS
OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES
DEPT FOR P - U/S BURNS
DEPT FOR SCA - DAS KROL
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR CLASSIFICATION CHANGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: SECOND DAY OF MANAS DISCUSSIONS

REF: BISHKEK 292

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) On April 3, U.S. and Kyrgyz delegations continued
discussions on the presence of U.S. defense personnel in
Kyrgyzstan. Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev and Minister
of Defense Bakytbek Kalyev again represented the government
of Kyrgyzstan, with no other Kyrgyz participants present.
Ambassador Jackson McDonald led the joint State-DOD
delegation. The two sides met twice in plenary session.
Between the two full sessions, Ambassador McDonald and
Ambassador Gfoeller met with the two Kyrgyz Ministers alone.


2. (S) Foreign Minister Sarbayev said that during the 2006
negotiations regarding compensation for access to Manas, the
Kyrgyz side had raised a number of issues related to the 2001
framework agreement (i.e., the exchange of diplomatic notes
that essentially constituted a status of forces agreement).
Sarbayev said the Kyrgyz concerns were not resolved during
the 2006 discussions and remain just as important today. He
said the Kyrgyz side continued to have concerns over status
of personnel, taxation, and jurisdiction. Sarbayev said that
these unresolved concerns were why the Kyrgyz Parliament
nullified the 2001 agreement. He said the Kyrgyz side was
amenable, however, to taking "the bulk" of the 2001 agreement
and incorporating it into a new agreement.


3. (S) Ambassador McDonald repeated that the U.S. side was
willing to conclude a new framework agreement that was the
same in substance as the 2001 agreement, either in the form
of an exchange of diplomatic notes or as a signed agreement.
He reiterated that this framework agreement refers to "other
mutually agreed activities" and thus serves to enable all of
our military-to-military cooperation with Kyrgystan. He
again emphasized that the U.S. was not prepared to modify the
substantive terms of the framework agreement. He also
repeated that the U.S. side was prepared to negotiate the
terms of a separate protocol covering the operations at
Manas, including compensation. He acknowledged Kyrgyz desire
that the protocol be binding on both parties; he proposed to
work first to reach agreement on the substance of a
non-binding draft protocol and then take the draft text to
Washington for authority to make it a binding agreement.


4. (S) Sarbayev agreed to focus on the two documents. He
said he understood that the protocol would cover financial
and other issues related directly to Manas. Sarbayev stated
that while financial issues were important to the Kyrgyz
side, the "other issues" were just as important, and the
Kyrgyz side wanted to address or clarify a number of issues
in the framework agreement. Sarbayev then rattled off a long
list of substantive issues:

--outer perimeter site security to be provided by the Kyrgyz
Ministry of Defense;

--entry and exit procedures, including contractors and
contractor personnel;

--status of contractors;

--prohibition on transit or storage of weapons of mass
destruction;

--prohibition on the technical means for surveillance and
intelligence-gathering;

--payment of claims and reimbursement for damages;

--motor vehicle insurance;

--joint investigation of aircraft crashes and accidents;

--environmental issues;

--payment of air navigation fees; and

--taxation.


5. (S) Ambassador McDonald said he was greatly discouraged

that the Kyrgyz side wanted to reopen and renegotiate nearly
every substantive provision of the 2001 framework agreement.
He once again pointed out that the 2001 framework agreement
represented the type of agreement that the United States has
with numerous other partners. He repeated that the U.S. side
had no intention of modifying the substance of the 2001
framework agreement. He also made clear, however, that the
U.S. was willing and eager to focus on issues relating
specifically to Manas and would do its utmost to address
Kyrgyz concerns in the Manas-specific protocol. He warned
that if the Kyrgyz side insisted on renegotiating the
substantive terms of the 2001 framework agreement, then we
would find ourselves obliged to shift the focus of
discussions to the orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Manas.


6. (S) A visibly shaken Sarbayev said the list he had given
were issues on which the Kyrgyz side needed clarification.
For example, he said, the Kyrgyz side had questions about the
tax exemption for contractors and whether Kyrgyz firms who
contracted with the base were exempt from Kyrgyz taxes.
Ambassador McDonald explained that the provision on taxes
applied to goods and services provided to the base, and did
not cover the other activities of contracting firms in
Kyrgyzstan. Sarbayev then proposed that following a break,
Ambassador McDonald and Ambassador Gfoeller meet in small
session with the Kyrgyz Ministers.


7. (S) The two-on-two session was discouraging. Minister of
Defense Kalyev focused on the title of the framework
agreement, insisting that he did not want any references to
"defense" or "military" in the title. Sarbayev raised the
issue of cargo transit, suggesting the agreement should be
limited to "non-military" cargo. Kalyev and Sarbayev
suggested that the jurisdiction issue could be addressed by
the U.S. providing a list of personnel who would be
authorized to go off base. Ambassadors McDonald and
Gfoeller indicated that the U.S. would be as flexible as
possible with regard to the title. They pushed back hard on
the idea of limiting Manas to the transit of non-military
cargo. They reiterated emphatically that all U.S. defense
personnel needed the legal protection throughout the
territory of Kyrgyzstan. Ambassadors McDonald and Gfoeller
noted that Russian soldiers based in Kyrgyzstan benefit from
such privileges and immunities.


8. (S) Following a two-hour break, the U.S. side presented
two draft documents: (a) a framework agreement substantively
mirroring the 2001 framework agreement and covering the
presence of U.S. defense personnel in the Kyrgyz Republic and
(b) a draft non-binding protocol of intentions covering
operations at Manas. The Kyrgyz side asked for time to
review the documents overnight. The two sides agreed to
resume discussions on the morning of April 4. Ambassador
McDonald emphasized that, by the end of their discussions on
April 4, the two sides must have reached substantive
agreement on all points.

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COMMENT
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9. (S) The Kyrgyz claim they want a "positive result," but
they are doing nothing in practical terms to reach such a
result. Their actions do not match their stated intentions.
We tabled the two drafts in an effort to get them to focus on
substance. Even after we had done so, however, they dodged
our efforts to engage in a detailed substantive exchange. To
our surprise, they have given no indication as to whether the
$40 million in reimbursement for Manas (part of the February
2 offer) is satisfactory. We had expected a hard push on
their part for a greater sum. Such a push has not
materialized.


10. (S) It is unclear whether the two Kyrgyz ministers were
able to report to President Bakiyev and seek his guidance
following the first round. While we were guardedly
optimistic following the first day of negotiations (reftel),
we were disappointed by our interlocutors today, most notably
when Foreign Minister Sarbayev sought to reopen most of the
substantive provisions of the 2001 framework agreement.


11. (S) We remain forward-leaning whenever and wherever
possible. We are trying to accommodate the Kyrgyz when they
need to save face or assuage public opinion. In accordance
with our instructions, however, we have resisted Kyrgyz
attempts to renegotiate the terms of the 2001 framework
agreement.


12. (S) As a forcing function, Ambassador McDonald plans to
make a formal request to meet with President Bakiyev tomorrow
morning, April 4.

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ACTION REQUEST
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13 (S) Based on the unanimous recommendation of his
interagency delegation, Embassy Bishkek, and the CENTCOM
POLAD, Ambassador McDonald requests Washington's
authorization to make the determination whether to shift the
focus of discussions from negotiating the two agreements to
negotiating the terms of an orderly withdrawal. Ambassador
McDonald would make such determination based on what the
Kyrgyz bring to the table during the last scheduled session
of talks tomorrow morning, April 4.


14. (S) If Washington opts not to provide the requested
authority at this time and the Kyrgyz bring nothing positive
to the table on April 4, then Ambassador McDonald proposes to
inform the Kyrgyz that, unfortunately, we have not reached
agreement and then depart with his team as scheduled on April 5.


GFOELLER