KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER WELCOMES PROPOSED U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000185 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO (DAS KROL) SCA/CEN PM/SNA (AMBASSADOR MCDONALD) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER WELCOMES PROPOSED U.S. NEGOTIATING TEAM REF: A. STATE 20093 ¶B. BISHKEK 180 ¶C. STATE 17012 BISHKEK 00000185 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Amb. Tatiana Gfoeller, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. On March 5, Ambassador delivered to Foreign Minister Sarbayev Ref (A) instructions offering to send a U.S. negotiating team in late March to discuss Manas Air Base. Sarbayev welcomed the offer, but noted he would be out of the country March 24-27, probably returning some time on the 28th. Sarbayev was concerned that Russia was aware of the proposal, and urged the U.S. side to maintain secrecy. He asked for U.S. help to deflect Russian pressure to close the Base, and asked that Secretary Clinton raise Manas in her March 6 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. He also conveyed four additional steps the U.S. could help take to facilitate reaching a new agreement on Manas. The Embassy recommends that the U.S. team plan to begin talks on Monday, March 30, but arrive in country earlier for consultations with Embassy staff. End Summary. Moscow Knows! -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 5, Ambassador had a one-on-one meeting with Foreign Minister Sarbayev to present Ref (A) points. Sarbayev began the meeting oddly. He pulled out four paper strips with handwritten phrases, handing them in sequence to the Ambassador and indicating she should read them. The first said, "They are listening here!" The second note read, "They know in Moscow (Smolensk Square) about our discussions." (Note: an apparent reference to the Russian MFA). End Note) The third said, "Washington openly discussed by telephone with Ambassador Sydykova that there would be negotiations." The last said, "Please preserve extreme confidentiality." He indicated to the Ambassador that Moscow knows about the proposed Base negotiations, either by tapping the Kyrgyz Embassy lines in Washington, or, more likely, by listening in when an excited and pleased Ambassador Sydykova called Sarbayev on his cell phone to convey the news that the U.S. planned to send a negotiating team. Dates Problematic: How is March 30? -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador proceeded to deliver the Ref (A) instructions on negotiations. Sarbayev said he welcomed the U.S. proposal to send a team, noting, "That's exactly what I hoped for!" He said the U.S. proposed team composition looked good. The dates, however, might be problematic. Sarbayev said that he was scheduled leave for Uzbekistan on March 24 and then go to Russia for the Moscow Afghanistan Conference, and would not return until some time on the 28th. We suggest that our team be ready to begin negotiations with the Kyrgyz the morning of Monday, March 30th but arrive in country earlier to have time for consultations with Embassy staff. Public Statement -------------- ¶4. (C) Sarbayev offered the following suggestion for the public line that the U.S. would take. Drawing on the U.S. proposed language, he proposed saying, "The United States is continuing to discuss the questions/issues facing the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan following the passage of the law nullifying the Manas Base agreement." BISHKEK 00000185 002.2 OF 003 Personal Message to President Obama: Clinton Must Talk to Lavrov about Manas -------------- ¶5. (C) Sarbayev reiterated the extreme confidentiality of the proposed negotiations. Russia now "knows everything; we must keep our negotiations as secret as possible." The Ambassador asked how this concern squared with President Bakiyev's recent BBC interview, in which he welcomed new U.S. proposals on Manas. The Ambassador said the U.S. appreciated the statement very much. We welcome Bakiyev's implied support for stability operations in Afghanistan and opening the door for renewed negotiations. But would that interview not confirm what Moscow now knows? ¶6. (C) Sarbayev responded that the BBC interview had been carefully planned and scripted to send a "personal message to President Obama." They intentionally selected a major Western media service, not Kyrgyz or Russian. This was designed to send a message to President Obama in advance of Secretary Clinton's March 6 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. The message is that Bakiyev is ready and able to negotiate seriously on Manas but that in return the Kyrgyz need help with the Russians. ¶7. (C) Sarbayev emphasized that the Kyrgyz took to heart President Obama's personal interest in Manas Air Base, and have great respect for the new U.S. President. Expanding on the "personal message for President Obama," Sarbayev told the Ambassador, "We need your President to tell Secretary Clinton to talk to Lavrov about Manas -- get Russia to soften their position on the Base, and you come to an understanding with Moscow over Manas." Additional Four Requests -------------- ¶8. (C) Sarbayev then proceeded to outline four additional requests that, he indicated, would help facilitate a new agreement on Manas: -- First, he asked for a readout of Secretary Clinton's China trip -- was Manas brought up with the Chinese? -- Second, Sarbayev said it was crucial that the U.S. ensure that when UNSYG Ban Ki-moon visits Central Asia in April he stop in Bishkek and say that Manas is crucial to stability in Afghanistan. -- Third, Sarbayev indicated that a UN report on Afghanistan was due out in March. It was essential, he said, that it paint a bleak picture in order to justify Kyrgyzstan granting continued U.S. access to Manas. -- Fourth, he said it was crucial for Afghan President Karzai to come to Kyrgyzstan and ask the Kyrgyz to keep Manas open. More on Russia: Kyrgyz Felt Tricked -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's probing, Sarbayev responded, "Look, in the worst case we may need your help to push the Russians back on Manas. One reason we are coming back to the negotiating table with you is that, once we had announced our decision to close the Base, Moscow and all our Central Asian neighbors lined up to join the Northern Distribution Network. We felt tricked." Kyrgyz Negotiating Team BISHKEK 00000185 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶10. (C) Sarbayev said he was in the process of pulling together the Kyrgyz team -- did she have any suggestions? The Ambassador responded that we hoped Sarbayev would lead it. He said, "Who else is respected by you?" The Ambassador noted that former Foreign Minister Imanaliyev was a good example of a well-respected statesman. Sarbayev said, "What about (Presidential Chief of Staff) Usenov?" The Ambassador replied diplomatically that Usenov seemed to be a source of some confusion; it was his remarks that had led to the Ambassador having to call directly on President Bakiyev to clarify Kyrgyzstan's position on the Base. "That was a joke," Sarbayev smiled. "I just wanted to see your face when I proposed that." ¶11. (C) Sarbayev said he'd been thinking about where to conduct the negotiations. His idea was to go out to Lake Issyk-Kul -- it was quiet, remote, and confidential. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. side may want to be near the Embassy, and be able to consult confidentially with Washington. Sarbayev understood, and said, "Okay. We'll find a dacha in Bishkek. We'll start here at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a discussion of the consequences of the nullification bill. Then we'll move to the dacha; otherwise we would be listened to at the Ministry." Parliamentary Ratification? Not a Problem -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked Sarbayev whether, in Kyrgyz minds, the nullification of the 2001 agreement meant that any new agreement would need Parliamentary ratification? "Of course," he replied. "Would this be a problem?" the Ambassador asked. "No, not at all," Sarbayev said. "We control the Parliament. I'll just go to Parliament and say the opposite of what I said when we introduced the nullification bill, and they'll vote our way again." Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) We infer from Sarbayev's remarks that the Kyrgyz have not completely worked out how to reconcile Moscow to a renewed agreement on Manas, and now Sarbayev hopes, as do others here, that the U.S. can help smooth the way. The Kyrgyz obsession with secrecy is due in part to their hope to at least obtain the first tranche of promised Russian aid -- a $150 million grant -- before reaching a deal with us on Manas. Trying to have their cake and eat it too is turning out to be more complicated than they first envisioned, but gives us the opportunity to secure continued access to Manas. We recommend our team accept Sarbayev's proposal and begin talks on March 30. GFOELLER