KYRGYZ, IN REVERSAL, SAY THEY CAN NOW DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BISHKEK 000165

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO -- DAS KROL AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ, IN REVERSAL, SAY THEY CAN NOW DISCUSS
CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

REF: BISHKEK 0164

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Late evening of February 25, Foreign Minister
Sarbayev telephoned the Ambassador. He stated that he was
speaking "with the sanction of the President." He asked her
to convey to the Department the urgent message that "We can
discuss the presence of U.S. military personnel at Manas if a
negotiating team comes out." The Ambassador referred him to
her discussion that same day with Chief of the Presidential
Staff Usenov, at which the latter had laid down a clear
"redline" regarding U.S. military personnel. The Ambassador
asked Sarbayev for a clarification of this contradiction.
Sarbayev apologized for "what was said earlier today" and
stated: "the redline is off the table now." He added that
while he was speaking on behalf of President Bakiyev, only
"two or three people know that I am doing this." He
specifically stated that Usenov was unaware of this telephone
exchange. He urged that a USG negotiating team be sent out
promptly. When asked by the Ambassador what had occasioned
this reversal, he said that this was the result of
Presidential Adviser Imanaliyev's "getting to the highest
levels." He added in a weak explanation that he understands
how awkward this will look in Washington and that it will
raise doubts about Kyrgyz reliability but "our world is in
turmoil -- that's the best way I can put it."


2. (C) The Ambassador followed up with a telephone call to
Imanaliyev, who was at that time celebrating his 53rd
birthday, for corroboration. Imanaliyev confirmed Sarbayev's
account. He said that he had met with Sarbayev immediately
after his meeting today with the Ambassador and had also met
with unspecified members of the Presidential Administration.
He had urged them to seek a compromise along the lines of
what he had shared earlier with the Ambassador, i.e. rename
Manas Airbase as a logistical/transit hub but maintain U.S.
military presence (reftel). He said they were all still
fearful whether a compromise was possible with the U.S. He
had assured them he thought this was still possible. He had
appealed to Sarbayev along the same lines and urged him to
take this message directly to President Bakiyev. Imanaliyev
was careful to say that he could not prove that Sarbayev had
done so, but believed Sarbayev would have never called
without such sanction. He urged the USG to send out a
negotiating team. Imanaliyev concluded by stating angrily
that Usenov "should be punished" for the havoc he had created
today with his ill-considered "redline." He doubted this
would happen, though. But the President's repudiation of
this spurious device would be punishment aplenty, thought
Imanaliyev. The Ambassador assured both Sarbayev and
Imanaliyev that she would convey their messages to the
Department immediately.

Comment
--------------

3. (C) Clearly, there are deep divisions within the top
leadership over Manas. Usenov, for whatever reason, has
consistently played the spoiler, and we should avoid using
him as an interlocutor. Moreover, it now appears that he is
not always able to call the shots on this issue. The
"turmoil" that Sarbayev described within the Kyrgyz
government may offer us an opportunity to negotiate continued
access to Manas. However, Bakiyev is notorious for agreeing
with the last person who talks to him so we still need to
make direct contact with him.
GFOELLER