KYRGYZ, IN REVERSAL, SAY THEY CAN NOW DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BISHKEK 000165 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO -- DAS KROL AND SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ, IN REVERSAL, SAY THEY CAN NOW DISCUSS CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE REF: BISHKEK 0164 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Late evening of February 25, Foreign Minister Sarbayev telephoned the Ambassador. He stated that he was speaking "with the sanction of the President." He asked her to convey to the Department the urgent message that "We can discuss the presence of U.S. military personnel at Manas if a negotiating team comes out." The Ambassador referred him to her discussion that same day with Chief of the Presidential Staff Usenov, at which the latter had laid down a clear "redline" regarding U.S. military personnel. The Ambassador asked Sarbayev for a clarification of this contradiction. Sarbayev apologized for "what was said earlier today" and stated: "the redline is off the table now." He added that while he was speaking on behalf of President Bakiyev, only "two or three people know that I am doing this." He specifically stated that Usenov was unaware of this telephone exchange. He urged that a USG negotiating team be sent out promptly. When asked by the Ambassador what had occasioned this reversal, he said that this was the result of Presidential Adviser Imanaliyev's "getting to the highest levels." He added in a weak explanation that he understands how awkward this will look in Washington and that it will raise doubts about Kyrgyz reliability but "our world is in turmoil -- that's the best way I can put it." ¶2. (C) The Ambassador followed up with a telephone call to Imanaliyev, who was at that time celebrating his 53rd birthday, for corroboration. Imanaliyev confirmed Sarbayev's account. He said that he had met with Sarbayev immediately after his meeting today with the Ambassador and had also met with unspecified members of the Presidential Administration. He had urged them to seek a compromise along the lines of what he had shared earlier with the Ambassador, i.e. rename Manas Airbase as a logistical/transit hub but maintain U.S. military presence (reftel). He said they were all still fearful whether a compromise was possible with the U.S. He had assured them he thought this was still possible. He had appealed to Sarbayev along the same lines and urged him to take this message directly to President Bakiyev. Imanaliyev was careful to say that he could not prove that Sarbayev had done so, but believed Sarbayev would have never called without such sanction. He urged the USG to send out a negotiating team. Imanaliyev concluded by stating angrily that Usenov "should be punished" for the havoc he had created today with his ill-considered "redline." He doubted this would happen, though. But the President's repudiation of this spurious device would be punishment aplenty, thought Imanaliyev. The Ambassador assured both Sarbayev and Imanaliyev that she would convey their messages to the Department immediately. Comment -------------- ¶3. (C) Clearly, there are deep divisions within the top leadership over Manas. Usenov, for whatever reason, has consistently played the spoiler, and we should avoid using him as an interlocutor. Moreover, it now appears that he is not always able to call the shots on this issue. The "turmoil" that Sarbayev described within the Kyrgyz government may offer us an opportunity to negotiate continued access to Manas. However, Bakiyev is notorious for agreeing with the last person who talks to him so we still need to make direct contact with him. GFOELLER