AMBASSADOR DELIVERS INSTRUCTIONS ON MANAS; KYRGYZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000164 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO (DAS KROL) SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS KG SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DELIVERS INSTRUCTIONS ON MANAS; KYRGYZ RESPOND WITH NEW "REDLINE" REF: A. STATE 17012 ¶B. BISHKEK 96 ¶C. BISHKEK 138 Classified By: Amb. Tatiana Gfoeller, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 25, Ambassador presented reftel A demarche in separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sarbayev, Presidential Chief of Staff Usenov and Presidential Advisor Imanaliyev. Sarbayev had no comment, but clearly briefed Usenov, who was ready with a response. Usenov said that the Kyrgyz were open to negotiations "anytime, anyplace, any format," but laid out a new "redline" -- there could be no U.S. military personnel at Manas. Kyrgyzstan could offer to do what Russia has offered -- the transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan; but the U.S. could use only civilian contractors at Manas. Imanaliyev lamented Usenov's "redline," which he termed, "absurd," commenting that now he understood the price Russia extracted for its economic package. He stated that he would use his contacts in the Presidency to make a last-ditch effort to change the Kyrgyz position to his proposed solution: change the name of the Base to a transport/logistical hub, but allow U.S. military personnel to remain. The Embassy does not think it likely that he will be successful. At this stage, it does not appear that a visit by a negotiating team is warranted. End Summary. Sarbayev: No Comment -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 25 Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, met with Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, per instructions reftel A. Sarbayev, accompanied by MFA desk officer, took careful notes as the Ambassador delivered the demarche. When the Ambassador finished presenting the demarche, Sarbayev said he would convey the information to his government and that he expected to have a response soon. He had no other comment. Presidential Chief of Staff Usenov Responds -------------- ¶3. (C) Later that afternoon, the Ambassador met separately with Presidential Chief of Staff Daniyar Usenov to present the demarche to him. After the Ambassador's careful presentation, Usenov thanked her for conveying the "exactness" of the U.S. position. He said he had listened carefully to the point about the U.S. having identified alternative options to replace Manas; this was "reassuring" as it meant that the Kyrgyz decision "would not impede U.S. efforts to fight terrorism in Afghanistan." (Note: This was disingenuous on his part, since the Ambassador had stressed the previous point, that closure is a "regrettable step." End Note) Pulling out the calculator -------------- ¶4. (C) Usenov then digressed, stating that U.S. military forces must leave Manas within 180 days. As they depart, Usenov said, the Kyrgyz understand that contract payments will decrease and eventually stop. Usenov said they also understood that rent payments would be pro-rated. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would not stop payments from the date of President Bakiyev's February 3rd announcement, but would continue payments through the time that the Base is used. At this point, Usenov pulled out a calculator and divided the $17.4 million annual compensation payment by 12 and said, "That makes $1.45 million per month." Negotiations? Okay, but no U.S. troops -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to future negotiations, Usenov said, "We are ready anytime, any place, in any format regarding the Base. We have also agreed to have a team come to interview witnesses for the Ivanov investigation, or to do it by DVC. This is how open we are to negotiations." Turning to the U.S. proposal of February 2 and the Kyrgyz counter-proposal, Usenov said that, "The truth has to lie between your proposal and ours." The U.S. demarche made clear that the Kyrgyz request for $300 million per year and to move the Base to Osh were unacceptable. But Usenov had asked for other things, such as U.S. help with forgiveness of Kyrgyzstan's debt and U.S. investment in energy infrastructure. Also -- and this was the most important point, Usenov said -- was the insistence on the non-military aspect of the Base. Use the "Russian Model" -------------- ¶6. (C) Usenov said they had looked carefully at the proposals of Russia, ("especially Russia"),Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, all of whom were prepared to support the transit of non-lethal goods through their territories. Usenov claimed a U.S. general had said he envisaged between 50 and 200 containers transiting Tajikistan daily. In the context of the wishes of Kyrgyzstan's allies, and its membership in SCO and CSTO, Usenov said he was sure no one would oppose Kyrgyzstan also following the "Russian model" of allowing the transit of non-lethal goods. In this regard, Manas with its infrastructure, would be very useful, he claimed. Manas Can Not Be a Military Base -------------- ¶7. (C) Continuing, Usenov said that Kyrgyzstan's "allies have a principled position: the use of Manas as a military installation must end. If the U.S. can discuss this, we are open to all negotiations. But the U.S. team cannot ignore this point. The U.S. and Kyrgyzstan are old friends, and strategic partners. We can resolve this issue." The Ambassador sought to clarify if Usenov was saying that this point constituted a new "redline" of sorts. Usenov replied, "We have two redlines. The first is that we want to continue our friendship with the U.S. We never want to be the enemy of the U.S. Second, Manas cannot be a military base. It can be a transport and logistics hub." The Ambassador interjected that that was precisely what Manas was now -- a transport and logistics hub. Usenov replied, "But it cannot have U.S. military personnel on it. Kyrgyzstan will provide security." Usenov then said that, in light of this condition, the Kyrgyz would reduce their requested rent below the $300 million he earlier had proposed. He added, though, that even for this new arrangement, the Kyrgyz side "would need agreement from its allies." He explained, "When the Base was opened, Kyrgyzstan was not in CSTO and there was no SCO. Now, the world has changed." Usenov Now Denies Russian Connection -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador referred to her previous meeting with Usenov (reftel B) and asked whether, under the terms Usenov outlined -- no U.S. military personnel -- Kyrgyzstan would be able to keep the assistance pledged by Russia. Usenov responded, "There has never been any connection with Russia. I must have misspoken that day." Usenov concluded by saying he would relay the U.S. position to President Bakiyev, and reiterated that the Kyrgyz would welcome any delegation -- to discuss the Base, to discuss economic issues, or for other purposes. "We will offer to do for you what Russia has offered -- the transit of non-military goods. But there can be no U.S. servicemen on our soil." The Ambassador asked how the Base could operate without U.S. military personnel. "Use civilian contractors -- use the Russian model," Usenov responded. "Whatever the Russians allow you to do on their soil, we will allow you to do on ours." Presidential Advisor Imanaliyev -------------- ¶9. (C) Following her meeting with Usenov, the Ambassador also conveyed reftel A demarche in a separate meeting with Presidential Advisor (and former Foreign Minister) Muratbek Imanaliyev. After hearing the demarche, Imanaliyev told the Ambassador that he had been speaking to people in the Presidential Administration since their last meeting (reftel C),but had not had the opportunity to speak directly to President Bakiyev about Manas. He said there were still a lot of people there who had doubts about the correctness of the Kyrgyz decision -- but out of fear, and not out of concern for Kyrgyz national interests. ¶10. (C) They were afraid first of the U.S., and that donor contributions -- both American and international -- would dry up in the aftermath of the Base closure. They were also afraid of what Russia would do, if the Kyrgyz went back on their agreement and reached an understanding with the U.S. that allowed Manas to continue to operate. They asked: how can Kyrgyzstan satisfy Russia if it negotiates with the U.S.? Imanaliyev told the Ambassador his reply was that there should be three-way negotiations between Moscow, Washington and Bishkek and the ball was now in Kyrgyzstan's court to approach the Russians to get this started. Russians are lying -------------- ¶11. (C) Imanaliyev told the Ambassador that he was sure the Russians have denied they have anything to do with the Manas decision. That, he said, was because "they are lying." He said that Usenov's "redline" of no U.S. military personnel "makes no sense." But, he added, it explains precisely what the price for the Russian aid package was -- no U.S. military personnel on Kyrgyz soil. Imanaliyev said Russia was pushing too far with this -- their assistance package will give them control of the water in the region as it is. He stated that he would seek meetings at the White House and with the Foreign Minister to push to revisit this position. As it stands, he termed Usenov's condition "absurd." He said he would propose creating a group of experts to negotiate with the U.S. and Russia. He said it was clear that Bakiyev made a pact with Russia that he cannot get out of now. But Imanaliyev was "hopeful that there were cracks in the wall of the dead end Krygyzstan put itself in." Imanaliyev's "Ideal Solution" -------------- ¶12. (C) Asked what he saw as the best way out, Imanaliyev said it would be to re-name the Base as a logistical/transport hub, but to continue to allow the presence of U.S. military personnel. That would be a true compromise. If the U.S. agreed to the "Russia model" for Manas, it would not need Kyrgyzstan. Only the Base made Kyrgyzstan useful. Russia would increase its importance to the U.S.; Kyrgyzstan's would diminish. He then added, "In a sense, you are paying for your own departure from Manas. Russia is in effect charging you the cost to get you out. Within one to two years, Russia will make up in transit fees the $150 million it is paying Bakiyev to get you out." ¶13. (C) Imanaliyev concluded by saying that the Kyrgyz position was "laughable, but also sad." He was certain that both Russia and China were behind this. He then lamented that then-Foreign Minister Karabayev had not followed his advice last fall. Imanaliyev said he had advised Karabayev, who approached him for advice about Russian pressure to close the Base, to take the issue to the UN, and seek a report from the UN representative in Kabul. The report would have been negative, and could have been used to draft a UN Security Council Resolution stating the seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan. That would have provided political cover to Kyrgyzstan to resist Russian pressure. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Usenov, Sarbayev and Imanaliyev are the three most senior interlocutors involved in the Base issue. Although the demarche set a cool tone for the meetings, which were formal and business-like, Usenov had clearly been briefed by Sarbayev and was ready with his response. This is the first time that anyone in the Kyrgyz government has raised Usenov's absurd "redline" that there can be no U.S. military personnel at Manas. It may be that Imanaliyev correctly surmised that this was the "prize" for which the Russians were paying. At this stage, it does not appear that a visit by a negotiating team is warranted. GFOELLER