KYRGYZ PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: BAKIYEV NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000138

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: BAKIYEV NOW
"DESPERATE" TO GET OUT OF "MANAS MESS" HE CREATED

BISHKEK 00000138 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met newly minted Presidential
Adviser Muratbek Imanaliyev to discuss the proposed Manas
Base closing. Imanaliyev claimed that Bakiyev had made the
deal with the Russians to close the Base partly for the money
but also because he is so enthralled with Medvedev. Bakiyev
is now "terrified" of the consequences of what he has done
and "desperate" to get out of this "Manas mess." A Russian
delegation should arrive in Bishkek this week to "stiffen his
spine." Imanaliyev urged that an American negotiating team
come as well to try to get a "reasonable" deal and save
Bakiyev from himself. End Summary.

"I HAVEN'T SOLD OUT AFTER ALL"


2. (C) Ambassador met over the week-end with newly minted
Presidential Adviser Muratbek Imanaliyev. A noted academic,
former Foreign Minister, and think tank Director, Imanaliyev
had last seen the Ambassador at a lunch at her house in honor
of visiting CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus.
Heretofore politically neutral (though privately critical of
Bakiyev),Imanaliyev surprised and horrified many "thinking
Bishkekians" by agreeing to work for President Bakiyev during
the January 2009 "shake-up" of the government. One of them
told Ambassador recently that when chastised for his
"betrayal" at a meeting of the intelligentsia, Imanaliyev had
defended himself by saying: "I told Petraeus that I support
the American Base. That shows that I haven't sold out after
all."


3. (C) Imanaliyev acknowledged the criticism to the
Ambassador, complaining that he had been "pilloried" by all
his friends as a "turncoat." He admitted that in the
abstract, he had "no excuse," but claimed that Bakiyev had
"hounded" him to come on board, even offering him his old job
of Foreign Minister back or to become a State Secretary.
Imanaliyev had refused and had finally settled on the (pro
bono, he emphasized) post of Presidential Adviser as a
compromise. He stated that he had agreed even to that under
duress, "so that people would finally leave me alone,"
implying that he could have suffered harassment or even worse
if he had refused the President outright.

IN LOVE WITH RUSSIA -- AND MEDVEDEV


4. (C) Imanaliyev bemoaned Bakiyev's announcement in Moscow
regarding the closure of Manas Base, which he claimed he had
not been consulted about. Imanaliyev explained it as partly
motivated by Bakiyev's dire need for the money the Russians
promised him in exchange for the closure, but partly based on
the fact that Bakiyev is "in love with all things Russian --
look, even his wife is Russian." In addition to this general
Russophilia, Imanaliyev made the somewhat startling claim
that Bakiyev is personally enthralled with Russian President
Dmitriy Medvedev, who is "everything Bakiyev is not: young,
handsome, elegant, and smart."


5. (C) Back in Bishkek, however, with his "Moscow honeymoon"
over, Imanaliyev claimed that Bakiyev is now truly
"terrified" of what he has wrought. He had never really
envisaged for the Americans to actually leave. In his
euphoric state in Moscow, he had somehow persuaded himself
that he could please the wonderful Medvedev, pocket the
Russians' money, and use this all to get a much higher price
for Manas from the Americans. But now there was silence from
the USG and Bakiyev was panicking, thinking that he might be
"locked up in a room alone with the Russians" for the rest of
his Presidency, with no Americans to balance them off and
provide him with breathing room.

BISHKEK 00000138 002.2 OF 002



"WHAT SHOULD I DO?"


6. (C) Imanaliyev told the Ambassador that he had fielded two
distraught phone calls from Bakiyev in the last week alone,
plaintively asking him: "When are the Americans coming to
negotiate? What should I do?" Imanaliyev claimed that he
had scolded Bakiyev for his lack of foresight and told him:
"At this point, your government has lost. You should have
never gone for this bad deal in Russia. It was a trick. The
Russians will never pay you what they promised. You're in so
deep, how can I help you now?" When Bakiyev asked him what
he personally should do to get out of the "Manas mess,"
Imanaliyev claimed he responded testily: "Buy a one-way
ticket to Moscow."


7. (C) Tart comments aside, Imanaliyev was eager to share
with the Ambassador his vision of what to do about the "Manas
mess." He stated unequivocally that the Russians had
"bought" Bakiyev but that now that Bakiyev was having second
thoughts, sending an American negotiating team out to talk to
the Kyrgyz was imperative. With Bakiyev thoroughly rattled
and regretful of his prior impulsiveness, Imanaliyev thought
a "reasonable" deal, i.e. for a significant but not
outrageous increase in rent for Manas, was possible.


8. (C) Imanaliyev said he understood that the USG could
"bargain somewhat" for the Base but that "you have a limit on
your price." He for one and unnamed other "reasonable"
people in Bakiyev's entourage would urge acceptance of such a
deal. He added, however, that others close to Bakiyev (he
implied Presidential Administration Chief Usenov) were
"crazy" and were still pushing the "stupid" Bakiyev to
overreach and ask for too much for Manas. "If they start
making crazy demands, just walk away and you won't have lost
anything," he advised.

COMMENT


9. (C) We are receiving a number of indications that our
hands-off approach subsequent to Usenov's original outrageous
demands is having the effect of rattling the Kyrgyz, who do
not know what our intentions vis-a-vis Manas now are. That
is all to the good if it "softens" their ultimate negotiating
position -- and assuming that we want to take another crack
at negotiating a "reasonable" price for Manas.
GFOELLER