KYRGYZ PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: BAKIYEV NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000138 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: BAKIYEV NOW "DESPERATE" TO GET OUT OF "MANAS MESS" HE CREATED BISHKEK 00000138 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met newly minted Presidential Adviser Muratbek Imanaliyev to discuss the proposed Manas Base closing. Imanaliyev claimed that Bakiyev had made the deal with the Russians to close the Base partly for the money but also because he is so enthralled with Medvedev. Bakiyev is now "terrified" of the consequences of what he has done and "desperate" to get out of this "Manas mess." A Russian delegation should arrive in Bishkek this week to "stiffen his spine." Imanaliyev urged that an American negotiating team come as well to try to get a "reasonable" deal and save Bakiyev from himself. End Summary. "I HAVEN'T SOLD OUT AFTER ALL" ¶2. (C) Ambassador met over the week-end with newly minted Presidential Adviser Muratbek Imanaliyev. A noted academic, former Foreign Minister, and think tank Director, Imanaliyev had last seen the Ambassador at a lunch at her house in honor of visiting CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus. Heretofore politically neutral (though privately critical of Bakiyev),Imanaliyev surprised and horrified many "thinking Bishkekians" by agreeing to work for President Bakiyev during the January 2009 "shake-up" of the government. One of them told Ambassador recently that when chastised for his "betrayal" at a meeting of the intelligentsia, Imanaliyev had defended himself by saying: "I told Petraeus that I support the American Base. That shows that I haven't sold out after all." ¶3. (C) Imanaliyev acknowledged the criticism to the Ambassador, complaining that he had been "pilloried" by all his friends as a "turncoat." He admitted that in the abstract, he had "no excuse," but claimed that Bakiyev had "hounded" him to come on board, even offering him his old job of Foreign Minister back or to become a State Secretary. Imanaliyev had refused and had finally settled on the (pro bono, he emphasized) post of Presidential Adviser as a compromise. He stated that he had agreed even to that under duress, "so that people would finally leave me alone," implying that he could have suffered harassment or even worse if he had refused the President outright. IN LOVE WITH RUSSIA -- AND MEDVEDEV ¶4. (C) Imanaliyev bemoaned Bakiyev's announcement in Moscow regarding the closure of Manas Base, which he claimed he had not been consulted about. Imanaliyev explained it as partly motivated by Bakiyev's dire need for the money the Russians promised him in exchange for the closure, but partly based on the fact that Bakiyev is "in love with all things Russian -- look, even his wife is Russian." In addition to this general Russophilia, Imanaliyev made the somewhat startling claim that Bakiyev is personally enthralled with Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, who is "everything Bakiyev is not: young, handsome, elegant, and smart." ¶5. (C) Back in Bishkek, however, with his "Moscow honeymoon" over, Imanaliyev claimed that Bakiyev is now truly "terrified" of what he has wrought. He had never really envisaged for the Americans to actually leave. In his euphoric state in Moscow, he had somehow persuaded himself that he could please the wonderful Medvedev, pocket the Russians' money, and use this all to get a much higher price for Manas from the Americans. But now there was silence from the USG and Bakiyev was panicking, thinking that he might be "locked up in a room alone with the Russians" for the rest of his Presidency, with no Americans to balance them off and provide him with breathing room. BISHKEK 00000138 002.2 OF 002 "WHAT SHOULD I DO?" ¶6. (C) Imanaliyev told the Ambassador that he had fielded two distraught phone calls from Bakiyev in the last week alone, plaintively asking him: "When are the Americans coming to negotiate? What should I do?" Imanaliyev claimed that he had scolded Bakiyev for his lack of foresight and told him: "At this point, your government has lost. You should have never gone for this bad deal in Russia. It was a trick. The Russians will never pay you what they promised. You're in so deep, how can I help you now?" When Bakiyev asked him what he personally should do to get out of the "Manas mess," Imanaliyev claimed he responded testily: "Buy a one-way ticket to Moscow." ¶7. (C) Tart comments aside, Imanaliyev was eager to share with the Ambassador his vision of what to do about the "Manas mess." He stated unequivocally that the Russians had "bought" Bakiyev but that now that Bakiyev was having second thoughts, sending an American negotiating team out to talk to the Kyrgyz was imperative. With Bakiyev thoroughly rattled and regretful of his prior impulsiveness, Imanaliyev thought a "reasonable" deal, i.e. for a significant but not outrageous increase in rent for Manas, was possible. ¶8. (C) Imanaliyev said he understood that the USG could "bargain somewhat" for the Base but that "you have a limit on your price." He for one and unnamed other "reasonable" people in Bakiyev's entourage would urge acceptance of such a deal. He added, however, that others close to Bakiyev (he implied Presidential Administration Chief Usenov) were "crazy" and were still pushing the "stupid" Bakiyev to overreach and ask for too much for Manas. "If they start making crazy demands, just walk away and you won't have lost anything," he advised. COMMENT ¶9. (C) We are receiving a number of indications that our hands-off approach subsequent to Usenov's original outrageous demands is having the effect of rattling the Kyrgyz, who do not know what our intentions vis-a-vis Manas now are. That is all to the good if it "softens" their ultimate negotiating position -- and assuming that we want to take another crack at negotiating a "reasonable" price for Manas. GFOELLER