KYRGYZ OPPOSITION DEPUTY COMMENTS ON MANAS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000124 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P AND SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION DEPUTY COMMENTS ON MANAS AND RUSSIAN DEAL REF: A. BISHKEK 121 ¶B. BISHKEK 119 (NOTAL) ¶C. BISHKEK 109 BISHKEK 00000124 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. According to a Kyrgyz opposition deputy, the $2 billion Russian assistance package is the latest step in a concerted Russian campaign to control Kyrgyzstan. It will give Moscow control of the country's defense and energy/water industries and make Kyrgyz President Bakiyev beholden to Russia for financing his reelection. The deal also sends the signal to the U.S. that Russia controls Central Asia, and if the U.S. wants to do anything in the region, it must talk to Moscow first. He predicted a tough spring economically, but did not see major political clashes prior to expected early Presidential elections this summer. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a meeting with DCM on February 10, opposition Social Democratic member of parliament Bakyt Beshimov said that the recent deal for a $2 billion Russian economic assistance package is the latest step in a concerted Russian campaign to control Kyrgyzstan. Beshimov claimed that the Russian FSB Security Service has penetrated the government; the recent appointment of Oxana Malivannaya as Presidency Secretariat Chief and a new head of the Presidential Institute for Strategic Analysis was part of this process. Both were appointed, in part, to create the infrastructure for the pro-Russia lobby to influence the media and will also be active in preparing groups to protest against the West. Media control -------------- ¶3. (C) Beshimov claimed the Bakiyev family and its proteges were now trying to control the internet, one of the last media where the Kyrgyz public can obtain objective information or even hear alternative voices. He said media outlets have told him the Bakiyev government is approaching media owners with lists of opposition leaders, Beshimov included, offering money and support if the media agrees not to provide them coverage. Dissecting Russia's Assistance Package -------------- ¶4. (C) Beshimov said the huge economic assistance package confirms that Moscow has agreed to keep Bakiyev in place for a second presidential term. Confirming what many others have said, he explained that Bakiyev will use the $150 million cash grant that Russia has pledged to provide in April to buy his re-election. The deal, which Beshimov said Moscow pressured Bakiyev to sign, is advantageous to Moscow bilaterally, regionally and internationally. Bilateral benefits: buying Maxim -------------- ¶5. (C) First, by providing Bakiyev with a campaign chest with which to buy his re-election, Russia secures Bakiyev's loyalty on a range of issues, and further tightens its grip on Kyrgyz politics and policies. Next, the deal gives Russia enhanced control of defense industries in Kyrgyzstan and over the energy sector. Beshimov believes the Russians deliberately crafted these parts of the deal to benefit Bakiyev's son, Maxim, in order to gain Bakiyev's agreement. For example, part of the deal involves the forgiveness by Russia of what Beshimov termed "questionable" debt, in return for a stake in the Dastan defense plant. That plant is run by Alexei Shirshov, who works for Maxim. Secondly, the deal to finance construction of the Kambarata 1 hydro-electric station through a Kyrgyz-Russian joint venture includes, as the Kyrgyz participant, the Kyrgyz electrical generation company that is run by former Energy Minister Balkibekov, who is Maxim's "puppet," according to Beshimov. Beshimov said BISHKEK 00000124 002.2 OF 003 this was a shrewd tactic that required the Russians to overlook bad blood between Moscow and Maxim over the latter's fraudulent business activity in Russia, which had led the FSB to warn Maxim and Putin to admonish his father. Regional control of water, power -------------- ¶5. (C) Regionally, the deal will give Russia control over water and power resources that affect Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Beshimov said it is widely expected that the Russians will buy out the Kyrgyz JV partner and thus control the generation of electric power and the release of water in much of Central Asia. And whoever controls water and power controls the region. And a sharp message to the U.S. -------------- ¶6. (C) Internationally, the Russians also benefited by tying the assistance package to a decision by Bakiyev to close Manas Air Base. Beshimov said the message Russia wanted to send was that it controls Central Asia. If the U.S. wants to do anything in Central Asia, it needs to talk to Moscow first. Beshimov interpreted Medvedev's recent comment in Moscow that the base decision was an independent action of Kyrgyzstan's as an invitation for the U.S. to talk to Moscow about the base. Taking the bilateral, regional and international aspects of the package together, Beshimov argued, it is a highly advantageous deal for Moscow. Timing on base legislation -------------- ¶7. (C) Beshimov said he expected Parliament to approve next week the proposed legislation to close the Base. The delay in approval was designed by the Government to de-couple the Base legislation from the three agreements that comprise the Russian assistance package, which were quickly approved last Friday. Popular discontent, but no revolt -------------- ¶8. (C) Beshimov cited a litany of problems that beset average citizens, especially outside Bishkek. These included no electricity, higher prices, unemployment and rising crime. He said the government is already having trouble paying salaries, with teachers and health care workers in the provinces starting to complain. He said as many as 30% of the Kyrgyz working abroad may return, and remittances are already declining. He predicted that April, May and June would be particularly tough for the economy, giving the opposition the possibility of turning discontent into political action. But he saw no real opportunity to confront Bakiyev until early Presidential elections are called, widely expected for late summer. Beshimov himself may run, but he claimed the opposition will unite around one candidate. Only two parties have any public support -- Beshimov's Social Democrats and the opposition Ata Meken party. He discounted the notion that any of the recently resigned/fired Government officials might gravitate to the opposition; most, he said, "are waiting to be reappointed." What the U.S. can do -------------- ¶9. (C) Beshimov asked for the U.S. to step up assistance to support free press, expand exchange programs, strengthen civil society, and increase student access to the internet. He also called on IRI and NDI to increase the number of debates and discussions they sponsor, and asked for the U.S. to urge the OSCE mission to step up its support for democracy. And gossip about MFA -------------- ¶10. (C) Asked about his brother Askar, who was fired recently from his position as Deputy FM for CIS affairs, BISHKEK 00000124 003.2 OF 003 Beshimov claimed that Russian FM Lavrov requested his dismissal. Lavrov was reportedly displeased over Askar Beshimov's forceful arguments, at a Moscow meeting in the run-up to this summer's CIS summit, for maintaining a balance in Kyrgyz relations between Russia and the West, and for arguing against Kyrgyz recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to Beshimov, FM Karabayev agreed with Askar's analysis, and persuaded Bakiyev not to recognize the separatist regions. Beshimov claimed that in MFA, all those who support Russia and the SCO had just been promoted, and he expects Kyrgyzstan to move to recognize the Georgian breakaway republics. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Beshimov has been an outspoken opponent of the decision to close Manas Air Base, and issued a public statement the day the draft bill on the closure was sent to Parliament. He did not have a prescription for the present situation, other than for the U.S. to continue to support democratic freedoms, and the wishful desire to see Bakiyev somehow leave office. It was clear from his comments that he has not been in touch with former Presidential Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov and former Deputy Prime Minister Ibraimova about their plans to oust Bakiyev (reftels). GFOELLER