FRENCH DEMARCHE KYRGYZ ON MANAS; BELIEVE AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000123 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: FRENCH DEMARCHE KYRGYZ ON MANAS; BELIEVE AGREEMENT STILL POSSIBLE REF: A. BISHKEK 113 ¶B. BISHKEK 96 BISHKEK 00000123 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: French Charges from Bishkek and Astana briefed the Ambassador on their February 9 meetings with Kyrgyz officials to protest Kyrgyzstan's plans to close Manas Air Base. They told Presidential Chief of Staff Usenov that Kyrgyzstan was hurting the global anti-terrorism coalition by its actions, and they protested Kyrgyzstan's failure to provide advance notice to France, which also operates out of Manas. They asked Usenov whether the decision to close the Base could still be reversed; Usenov replied: "yes, absolutely!" adding that now "the ball is in the Americans' court." Usenov provided an account to the French of his earlier discussions with the Ambassador (Ref B) and Under Secretary Burns, and said that doubling or quadrupling payments was "not nearly enough." Usenov ran through a long list of other grievances, but said the decision on the Base was "just business." Usenov told them that Parliament would take 3 to 4 weeks to review the law on closing the Base. End Summary. ¶2. (C) France's Charge d'Affaires in Bishkek, Jean-Pierre Godart, and the Charge from Astana, Gregoire Chilovsky, met with the Kyrgyz officials February 9 to deliver an 8-point demarche demanding that Kyrgyzstan rescind its decision to close Manas Air Base, and warning that there will be bilateral consequences if Kyrgyzstan refuses. France also operates out of Manas. The French met first with Kainar Toktomushev, the Deputy Director of the Western Countries Department at MFA, and then they met for over an hour with Presidential Chief of Staff Daniyar Usenov at the Kyrgyz White House. Godart and Chilovsky then came directly to the Embassy to brief the Ambassador, before even going to their own office to report back to Paris on what had happened. MFA: AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED "BETWEEN CIVILIZED PEOPLE" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) At MFA, Toktomushev apologized for receiving them at such a low level, but explained the Ministry is currently in "turmoil." He said that President Bakiyev had been speaking "in the name of the Government," but the decision has yet to be ratified. Toktomushev then launched into a long list of Kyrgyz complaints about the U.S. side: after two years, still no results or indication of a trial in the Ivanov shooting investigation; two Kyrgyz planes destroyed; ecological damage resulting from fuel dumping; and General Petraeus being "unacceptably impolite" by referring to "Central Asia negotiating" during a January press conference. Toktomushev said that Kyrgyzstan had no complaints against other members of the coalition. ¶4. (C) Toktomushev said that the war in Afghanistan was "taking too long." However, he continued, the Kyrgyz side understood that the new U.S. Administration "cares about Afghanistan," which makes Manas more important. He said that if the Kyrgyz side could be sure that further actions in Afghanistan would be finished quickly, then they might consider allowing the Base to remain temporarily. ¶5. (C) The French asked how long it would take Parliament to review the draft law to nullify the Base agreement. Toktomushev implied that parliamentary review would take some time, as Parliament would first review the law in committees, then in party factions, and then in plenary session. After Parliament passes the law, he said, Bakiyev would have to sign the law for it to take effect. At that point, MFA would BISHKEK 00000123 002.2 OF 003 provide notice. Toktomushev speculated that there was still a chance to reach an agreement "between civilized people." ¶6. (C) The French told the Ambassador that they rebuked Toktomushev strongly, telling him that Kyrgyzstan was hurting the global anti-terrorism coalition by its decision, and they deplored the failure to provide any advance notice to France of the decision to close the Base. Toktomushev, clearly flustered, said that the lack of notice was the "fault of the new administration in MFA." USENOV: CAN DECISION BE REVERSED? "YES, ABSOLUTELY!" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Usenov kept Godart and Chilovsky waiting for 30 minutes, claiming he had been meeting with Bakiyev. Following the French demarche, Usenov was defensive. He said the Kyrgyz had not provided notice to the French because "no definite decision" had yet been taken. Usenov said that Parliament would take 3 to 4 weeks to act, and after that, "you'll still have 180 days." Usenov said that the government was examining what to do with the 12 other coalition states that have agreements on Manas, but he expected the Government to make a decision on February 11. ¶8. (C) The French told Usenov that Kyrgyzstan was damaging global solidarity in the fight against terrorism. Usenov claimed that Kyrgyzstan wanted to cooperate, but was against using violence in this fight. Usenov said, "We want to use our values, we want to find an economic solution to terrorism." Kyrgyzstan would continue to fight terrorism through the CSTO and the SCO, he added. ¶9. (C) Usenov said that Kyrgyzstan "accepts the consequences" of closing the Base, "but we'll have to find other ways to cooperate." Usenov then pointed out that Kyrgyzstan is a member of the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. (Note: In the past, Usenov has spoken out strongly against Kyrgyzstan's cooperation with the IMF and World Bank, and he led the effort to keep Kyrgyzstan from participating in the Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative. End Note.) ¶10. (C) Usenov then ran through a litany of complaints about the U.S. side. He said that Kyrgyzstan had been trying to get a "better agreement" for the Base since Bakiyev came to power in 2005, and they had told "all visiting Americans" about the problems with the Base for years with no results. He said that Kyrgyzstan needs more money for the Base, in line with what the United States paid in Turkey and the Philippines. ¶11. (C) Not trying to hide the linkage between Manas and money, Usenov noted that Kyrgyzstan has over $2 billion in foreign debt, "and the Russians are ready to help." He complained about the lack of U.S. and Coalition help with investment, adding that the U.S. "could have helped" build the Kambarata hydropower station. ¶12. (C) Usenov explained that the Kyrgyz Government faced many problems. He said there was popular pressure in Kyrgyzstan against the Base, and he said that the CSTO and SCO were pressuring Kyrgyzstan to close the Base. He said that the "economic crisis" was the catalyst for the decision to close the Base, because Kyrgyzstan needed the $2 billion (from Russia). ¶13. (C) Usenov then provided the French an account of his meeting with the Ambassador (Ref B) and his conversation with Under Secretary Burns. He said that the U.S. had offered to "double, even quadruple" payments for the Base, but "that's BISHKEK 00000123 003.2 OF 003 not nearly enough." Usenov complained that the U.S. "never listens when we talk about how much money we really need." ¶14. (C) Godart and Chilovsky asked Usenov, if the U.S. were to "treat the Kyrgyz position with understanding," could the decision be reversed? Usenov answered, "Yes, absolutely! The ball is in the Americans' court. We're waiting for an offer. We need money." Referring to the long litany of complaints, the French asked Usenov if had "hurt feelings" over the Base. Usenov replied that there were no hurt feelings; "this is just business." A RUMOR ABOUT BAKIYEV'S MOSCOW TRIP -------------- ¶15. (C) The French Charges passed on a rumor they had picked up concerning the timing of Bakiyev's decision to close the Base. According to the story they heard, Bakiyev was already in the plane flying to Moscow February 3 when he received a phone call from Medvedev telling him to close the Base. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Our French colleagues came away from the meeting with Usenov convinced that there is still an opportunity to negotiate, and that the next move is ours. They also indicated they will follow the U.S. lead regarding the Base. Godart noted that the French had been planning to open a full embassy, but if the Base closes, they would close even their small (Charge-level) representation in Bishkek. "We have no other interests here." GFOELLER