NATO COMS UNANIMOUS: NEGOTIATE FOR MANAS!

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000113 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: NATO COMS UNANIMOUS: NEGOTIATE FOR MANAS! REF: BISHKEK 108 BISHKEK 00000113 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met separately with the three NATO COMs resident in Bishkek February 5 to discuss the proposed Manas Base closing. Uncannily playing to their national stereotypes, they were nevertheless unanimous in their advice to negotiate hard with the Kyrgyz to keep the Base open. The only difference was when to negotiate and how much money to pay. The French Charge d'Affaires is supposed to come from Astana to deliver a demarche protesting the proposed closure early next week. The German is awaiting instructions. End Summary. FRENCHMAN IMPLORES -------------- ¶2. (C) Not surprisingly, the Frenchman waxed eloquent on the subject. Jean-Pierre Godart began by quoting a famous saying of Prince William of Orange's (a famous Dutch warrior who unfortunately ended up assassinated): "You do not have to have hope to begin an enterprise nor to succeed to persevere in it." "I implore you Americans to save your honor and not run away," he continued. He shared that his Ambassador in Astana is extremely agitated about developments and is calling him every hour for an update. Godart himself thought he would be delivering a demarche deploring the Kyrgyz proposal to close Manas today; the EU issued a statement deploring it February 5. ¶3. (C) Godart then turned to negotiating strategy. He urged that an American negotiating team be sent to Bishkek ASAP. He was familiar with the Russian financial package but pooh-poohed its overwhelming dimensions. He pointed out that all Bakiyev cared about was the cash upfront. Here his calculation was different from the others: his understanding is that while Bakiyev will pocket $150 million right away, the $300 million loan actually includes repayment of $120 million owed by the Kyrgyz to the Russians. So he thought Bakiyev's actual take would be $330, not $450 million. In any case, Godart thought the Kyrgyz were just using the Russians as a negotiating tactic, "in a Central Asian way, like your General (Petraeus) said when he was here." He thought if the American team were quick and aggressive enough, "you could probably settle for a totally reasonable" yearly increase in rent. The key was for the negotiators to be "culturally sensitive," and not impose American standards of efficiency, logic, and timeliness. "Listen for a couple of days, drink lots of tea, and then a reasonable compromise will present itself naturally." ¶4. (C) The Frenchman stressed how important Manas is for the French military and for France's sincere desire to be helpful in Afghanistan. He said the French had no "Plan B" if evicted from Manas, "we will just follow you wherever you go. We are helpless without you." But then he cheered up. "No one's moving from Manas," he concluded. "Get some good negotiators out here soon and we will win this thing!" Ambassador followed up with Godart February 6 to find out reactions to his demarche. He revealed to his chagrin that the French Ambassador in Astana (who is leaving on vacation) had decided that the demarche would have more gravitas if delivered by the Charge d'Affaires in Astana. That diplomat is to come to Bishkek early next week to deliver it. TURK BARGAINS -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkish Ambassador Serpil Alpman agreed with Godart BISHKEK 00000113 002.2 OF 002 that this was just the opening gambit of a Kyrgyz desire to renegotiate the terms of the Base at a higher price. "I know the Kyrgyz," she explained. "They're Turkic people, remember? Right now we could be in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar, bargaining over a rug." She praised the U.S. Embassy's restrained and measured press statement as "right on target." She declined the idea of issuing a NATO demarche of protest (she is the NATO representative in Kyrgyzstan) as "counterproductive." She too urged that a U.S. negotiating team come to Bishkek, but differed on timing. She thought the most important thing at this point should be not to show desperation. "This is the Kyrgyz way," she advised. "Nothing is really ever settled. So don't do anything for awhile. Keep them guessing and let them stew!" She thought a team with the power to sign a new Base agreement and deliver an increase in rent would be most productive at the end of March. By then, cracks would have appeared in the Russian financial package and "they'll be the ones running to you." GERMAN CALCULATES -------------- ¶6. (C) German Charge Peter Neven agreed with his French colleague that a team should come sooner rather than later. His focus was on the nitty-gritty of how much would it take to keep Manas. He too discounted the non-cash parts of the Russian financial package. His take was that Bakiyev would receive $450 million for closing the Base. "So offer him more -- say $500 -- to keep it open and he will. No question about it. It's not complicated." Neven said that he had asked for instructions from his Ministry regarding a Manas demarche on behalf of Germany, the EU, and Spain (Germany represents the EU in Kyrgyzstan). He was pleased to hear that the French were planning on doing one soon, as this would give him more ammunition vis a vis his Ministry. ¶7. (C) Note: Spain also has a military contingent at Manas. Her Ambassador to Bishkek (resident in Astana) has not yet been accredited, however. He told the Ambassador February 6 that despite that, he has already talked to Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Sarbayev on a related topic, requesting permission for an overflight with a hot cargo because it was "an emergency situation." He will be requesting instructions from Madrid as to whether or not to contact the Kyrgyz again over Manas despite his lack of accreditation. End Note. GFOELLER