SWISS VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND

S E C R E T BERN 000371 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/RA (M.BEDKE/J.DANIEL) AND EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE); UNVIE FOR IAEA DEL (D.PAPPAS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2024 TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA MNUC PREL SY IR SZ SUBJECT: SWISS VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA REF: STATE 91633 Classified By: Acting POLE Counselor Chris Buck; reasons 1.(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Swiss share our general analysis of the IAEA reports on Iran and Syria. They are curious to know how the recent P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting and "package" proposal announced by Tehran might affect the calculus with Iran. The main point of contact for IAEA issues at the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs (FDFA) expects that the Swiss government will make statements at the September 7-11 IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) meeting, but was not yet able to confirm the details of the content of those statements. His comments on the latest IAEA reports on Iran and Syria suggest the Swiss statements at the September 7-11 IAEA BoG will be generally in line with their more recent, firmer pronouncements. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Acting POLE Counselor presented U.S. views (reftel) on the latest IAEA reports on Iran and Syria on September 3 to Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Section at the FDFA, and the FDFA's main point of contact on IAEA issues. Praz appreciated the information, and concurred generally with the U.S. analysis. He said that he expects that the Swiss government will make statements at the September 7-11 IAEA BoG meeting addressing Iran and Syria, but was not yet able to confirm the overall content of those statements. -------------- IRAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Praz said that his first reading of the IAEA report on Iran left him with the impression that Iran had demonstrated some limited, but meaningful cooperation with the IAEA. Nevertheless, upon further consultation with Swiss technical experts regarding the details of the report, Praz said that he was less impressed. For example, Praz noted that the expansion of IAEA monitoring capacities at Natanz was nothing more than what is required under safeguards, given Iran's continued expansion of the Natanz facility. He agreed that the IAEA's visit to Arak, absent further access and design information, also was less forthcoming than it appeared. ¶4. (C) Praz inquired about the September 2 P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting in Frankfurt, as well as the USG's reaction to the latest "package" proposal recently announced by Iran. A/POLE Counselor responded that he had no readouts or assessments to share regarding the Frankfurt meeting or reports regarding a new Iranian package. A/POLE Counselor cautioned Praz that Iran had a history of announcing vague initiatives in advance of BoG meetings, in order to try to relieve some of the pressure it will face in Vienna. Maintaining a firm, united front remains the most promising path to convincing Iran to meet its international obligations. -------------- SYRIA -------------- ¶5. (C) Praz highlighted the IAEA's assertion in its Syria report that the Agency's access to a site (in this case, al-Kibar) cannot be limited simply because the site may be military related. He said that he expected the Swiss statement on Syria would underscore this point. As regards the IAEA's investigation into the traces of undeclared uranium found at Syria's Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, Praz said that "we are in a wait and see" posture. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (S) In recent BoG meetings, the Swiss have made firmer statements on Iran then during Switzerland's early tenure on the Board. In Switzerland's early days on the BoG (late 2007 and most of 2008),the Swiss were still attempting to inject themselves into a mediator role between Iran and the P5-plus-1, and thus were careful not to criticize Tehran too harshly in public settings. With Iran's continued recalcitrance, however, Switzerland began to lose patience. Even so, the Swiss are predisposed to place a premium on dialogue, and are vulnerable to interpreting half-steps as meaningful overtures by the Iranians. Though not directly related, in terms of the general atmosphere, the harsh response by the Iranian government to the demonstrations in Iran following Iran's June elections should serve to temper the Swiss reflex to give Tehran the benefit of any doubt. Praz's comments to us regarding the IAEA reports on Iran and Syria, while not definitive, suggest the Swiss statements at the September 7-11 IAEA BoG will be generally in line with their more recent, firmer pronouncements. BEYER