NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): SWISS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000108 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA (S.DAVIS),EUR/PGA, AND EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE); GENEVA (CD); UNVIE (IAEA); USUN (POL); USNATO (POL); AND USEU (POL) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019 TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP AORC PREL UNGA IAEA SZ SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): SWISS EMPHASIZING DISARMAMENT REF: STATE 6970 Classified By: A/DCM Richard A. Rorvig; reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Swiss government generally believes that the U.S. Administration has outlined a "good agenda" for the NPT, particularly with regard to disarmament and arms control issues. Switzerland has sponsored UN resolutions on de-alerting nuclear weapons, and will continue to do so. For the Swiss, a successful substantive outcome of the 2010 NPT RevCon would be a consensus document that contains new obligations for nuclear weapon states, along the lines of the 1995 NPT RevCon objectives and the 2000 NPT RevCon "13 Steps" -- especially with regard to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification and commencement of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Swiss government officials and pundits are convinced that the success of the next NPT RevCon will depend more on further progress on nuclear disarmament than on nonproliferation. Given Switzerland's unique international profile and the presence of UN agencies in Geneva, the Swiss government often enjoys disproportionate influence in international forums. In the context of the NPT, the Swiss view the Administration's disarmament and arms control related goals very positively. We can harness Swiss influence for our vital nonproliferation objectives by demonstrating near-term down payments on the key disarmament and arms control goals in our agenda. End Summary. -------------- USG Questionnaire -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff received Swiss government feedback to reftel questions in a February 26 meeting with Andreas Friedrich, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Section of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA). Questions and answers follow: Question: A. What are Switzerland's objectives for the NPT in general, and for the current review process in particular? Answer: A. Friedrich said that Switzerland seeks "a world without nuclear weapons." He underlined that, while Switzerland had not expected nuclear weapons to be eliminated right away, the Swiss government had expected that nuclear weapons would be eliminated in "a foreseeable timeline." 
Friedrich, who personally has attended all NPT RevCons for the past 30 years, recalled that Switzerland had not favored indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, but ultimately had found itself in the minority ("in bad company") in that position. Question: B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Switzerland hope to see from the United States? Answer: B. Friedrich said that he thought that the "Nuclear Weapons" sub-section of the Foreign Policy page of White House website outlines a "good agenda", particularly the references to moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and de-alerting nuclear weapons. He said that Switzerland has always put much emphasis on disarmament and that "many people are very excited about the White House agenda -- do all this, and we will be very happy." In this context, he noted that Switzerland has sponsored UN resolutions on de-alerting, and would continue to do so. Friedrich added that, from Switzerland's perspective, U.S. pursuit of the Reliable Replacement Warhead would be "a real setback." He also commented that U.S. nuclear doctrine regarding "no first use" and possible use under certain circumstances remained "problematic." Under the rubric of NPT Article IV, Friedrich said that Switzerland is very reluctant to accept broad restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (e.g., such as the initiative to restrict the transfer of new uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies to only those countries that already possess such technologies). He said that the Swiss government "does not think nuclear technology should be denied to a whole group of countries that are in good standing with their obligations." Question: C. What does Switzerland believe would represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is if for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters? Answer: C. Friedrich said that the Swiss government believes it important for NPT Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters. He said that a successful substantive outcome of the 2010 NPT RevCon would be a consensus document that contains new obligations for nuclear weapon states, along the lines of the 1995 NPT RevCon objectives and the 2000 NPT RevCon "13 Steps" -- especially with regard to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification and commencement of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Question: D. Does Switzerland believe that NPT Parties should take action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what actions would it support? -- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North Korea: Friedrich said that the problem is that the NPT itself does no address non-compliance, "which is an issue handled by the UN Security Council." Thus Switzerland does not see a specific role that NPT Parties could play within the treaty framework to address noncompliance. -- The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the Treaty: Friedrich said that this is another area where the Swiss government does not see much room for action on the part of Treaty Parties, since the right to withdraw from treaties is "enshrined in international law." -- The lack of NPT universality: Friedrich underlined that the Swiss government naturally would like to achieve NPT universality. However, he suggested that the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement and India's subsequent special arrangement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had undermined the prospects for achieving universality. -- The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol: Friedrich said that the Swiss government agrees on the importance Q NPT safeguards and the Additional Protocol. -- The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to additional countries: Friedrich reiterated that Switzerland "does not want to foreclose the possibility of additional countries using this technology for civil purposes. He further suggested that this issue is connected to the fate of FMCT negotiations -- "if there is a (verifiable) FMCT, there would be more safeguards on enrichment processes." -- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations: Friedrich said that this is something Switzerland strongly supports. Asked why Switzerland has not therefore joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),Friedrich said that the Swiss government thus far has not been convinced of GNEP's utility, believes that the private sector is working fine, and does not wish to become involved in a new nuclear technology "cartel." -- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament: Friedrich said that Switzerland strongly supports this. He commented in a collegial manner that this is an item that the Swiss government "would have placed higher on this list." -- Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons forces and policies: Friedrich again emphasized concurrence, noting in particular Swiss concern about non-strategic nuclear weapons. -------------- CommenQ -------------- ¶3. (C) The Swiss government's tendency to emphasize disarmament over nonproliferation in the framework of the NPT reflects in part Switzerland's unusual circumstance as a neutral nation standing outside of NATO and the EU, and thus disconnected from the security commitments ultimately underwritten (explicitly or implicitly) by Western nuclear weapon states. Switzerland's views on the NPT also are driven by the same general forces shaping attitudes in other European countries, with many Swiss finding it difficult to understand why the nuclear weapon states continue to maintain and to modernize large nuclear arsenals. When evaluating arms control and disarmament agreements, the Swiss government's mantra is "non-discriminatory, verifiable, and legally binding." ¶4. (C) Swiss government officials and pundits are convinced that the success of the next NPT RevCon will depend more on further progress on nuclear disarmament than on nonproliferation. Swiss MFA Director for Security Policy Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud emphasized to the Charge in a March 10 meeting that he believes that "two states" -- the United States and Russia -- have it in their hands to make the NPT RevCon a success by demonstrating further progress on nuclear disarmament. The Swiss corollary to this argument is that greater progress on nuclear disarmament will allow like-minded states to gain more traction on nonproliferation initiatives. ¶5. (C) Given Switzerland's unique international profile and the presence of UN agencies in Geneva, the Swiss government often enjoys disproportionate influence in international forums. In the context of the NPT, the Swiss view the Administration's disarmament and arms control related goals very positively. We can harness Swiss influence for our vital nonproliferation objectives by demonstrating near-term down payments on the key disarmament and arms control goals in our agenda. -------------- POCs for NPT Issues -------------- ¶6. (U) Swiss government POC for NPT-related issues is: Andreas Friedrich Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Section Directorate of Political Affairs Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) Bernastrasse 28 CH-3003 Berne Switzerland tel: (41)(31) 324-6266 (work) fax: (41)(31) 324-9067 (work) e-mail: andreas.friedrich@eda.admin.ch ¶7. (U) Post's POC for NPT-related issues is: Chris Buck Political Officer Political-Economic Affairs Section tel: (41)(31) 357-7213 (work) fax: (41)(31) 357-7344 (work) tel: (41)(79) 343-5546 (mobile) tel: (41)(31) 951-0290 (home) e-mail: buckc@state.gov (Opennet); chrislbuck@yahoo.com (internet) CARTER