RETHINKING U.S. FORCES REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000935 NOFORN SIPDIS OSD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VERSHBOW STATE FOR EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG GM SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCES REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE: MISSION GERMANY'S PERSPECTIVE REF: USNATO 329 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ROBERT A. BRADTKE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AN D (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Mission Germany strongly endorses the call by USNATO (reftel) to give careful reconsideration to the planned continued draw-down of U.S. forces in Europe. If the draw-down continues as scheduled, two of the three remaining U.S. Army brigade combat teams in Germany will be withdrawn by 2012/13, leaving a skeleton force of less than 30,000 U.S. Army soldiers here. Similarly, the planned withdrawal of an F-16 squadron from Spangdahlem in 2010 will reduce the current number of U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft based in Germany by almost 50%. ¶2. (S/NF) Given that up to half of the U.S. forces assigned to Germany are deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere outside of Europe at any given time, it is already difficult for U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) to maintain minimum ties with long-standing traditional Allies like Germany, much less build relations and capabilities among the 12 new Allies that have joined NATO since the end of the Cold War, or to productively engage with the dozens of countries in the Alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP). It will be practically impossible to conduct this vital theater security cooperation if the draw-down continues its present course. As USNATO points out, building partnership capability among our friends and allies is a critical investment in our own national security -- assuming, of course, that we want their help in dealing with the myriad of 21st century threats we face. ¶3. (S/NF) We would also point out that Germany offers the U.S. unparalleled stationing rights and privileges, and we should be careful about giving up additional garrisons and bases that we almost certainly will never get back again. Once we draw down, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to build back up. If there was any question about Germany's unique reliability as a strategic staging ground for projecting our forces around the world, these were dispelled early in the Iraq War. Despite unequivocally opposing the war and refusing to send its own troops, Germany did not attempt to control or limit in any way the transit of U.S. troops or the deployment of German-based U.S. forces to Iraq and the rest of the region. In fact, to the contrary, the Bundeswehr deployed its own security forces to guard U.S. installations throughout Germany, freeing up thousands of critical U.S. Army military police to deploy to Iraq. Germany continues to play a critical role in supporting our deployments in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. Thousands of seriously wounded U.S. service members needing emergency treatment have been cared for at the U.S. Army Hospital in Landstuhl, while half a million U.S. soldiers going to and returning from the region transit through the civilian airport in Leipzig-Halle every year. ¶4. (S/NF) We believe that Germany's willingness to offer this kind of assistance in our hour of need -- notwithstanding clear political differences over our chosen course of action -- was based on the extremely close working and social ties that three generations of American service members stationed in Germany have built up over the past 60-plus years. By continuing to reduce our presence in Germany below already low levels, we are threatening to un-do one of the most productive and special alliances we have in the world today. We are also reducing our ability to shape whether (and how) the Bundeswehr transforms itself from a purely territorial military into an expeditionary fighting force. This unique relationship cannot be sustained by CONUS-based forces. We need to be here in sufficient numbers in order to maintain these critical ties. Fortunately, this is something that Germany wants as well. In a May 29 letter to Secretary Gates, Defense Jung referred to the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and said he wanted to "emphasize once BERLIN 00000935 002 OF 002 again Germany's special interest in a substantial and permanent presence of U.S. troops in Germany as a visual symbol of our outstanding relationship." ¶5. (S/NF) Finally, we agree with USNATO that current U.S. troop levels in Europe are already near the minimum we need in order to maintain leadership within NATO and to reassure Allies in the face of a resurgent Russia. This leadership and reassurance are especially important in the context of the upcoming negotiation of the new NATO Strategic Concept. Last summer's war in Georgia was a reminder -- especially from the European point of view -- that while NATO must be equipped, trained and ready to deal with security threats in far-flung places like Afghanistan, its goal of creating a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself remains incomplete. U.S. leadership will be indispensable for ensuring that this goal is finally and irreversibly achieved. Bradtke