Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN896
2009-07-24 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN BEYOND THE AUGUST

Tags:  EAID EFIN EUN MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF PK GM 
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VZCZCXRO5815
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #0896/01 2051441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241441Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4697
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0525
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0651
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 8113
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000896 

STATE FOR EEB/IFD/ODF (MONAHAN),SCA/A (LONDONO),EUR/CE
(SCHROEDER) AND EUR/RPM (RECINOS)
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: EAID EFIN EUN MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF PK GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN BEYOND THE AUGUST
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

REF: A. SECSTATE 74362

B. BERLIN 835

C. BERLIN 688

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR STAN OTTO FOR REASON
S: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000896 STATE FOR EEB/IFD/ODF (MONAHAN),SCA/A (LONDONO),EUR/CE (SCHROEDER) AND EUR/RPM (RECINOS) SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: EAID EFIN EUN MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF PK GM SUBJECT: GERMAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN BEYOND THE AUGUST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION REF: A. SECSTATE 74362 ¶B. BERLIN 835 ¶C. BERLIN 688 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR STAN OTTO FOR REASON S: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Berlin presented REF A points to contacts at the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interlocutors believe Germany is unlikely to take any major new decisions on Afghanistan before parliamentary ("Bundestag") elections on September 27. Following the elections, there is little possibility Germany will substantially increase its troop levels, even if a coalition between Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) emerges. A new German government may, however, be receptive to requests for more civil reconstruction and development assistance for Afghanistan, as the German public could more easily stomach this. Currently, Germany is on track to contribute a total of 215 million euros in civil reconstruction and economic development assistance in Afghanistan in 2009, as well as an additional 50 million euros for the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. END SUMMARY. MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 21, Poloff presented REF A points to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Afghanistan/Pakistan Task Force Director Ruediger Koenig. Koenig noted it was difficult to respond to our request at this time, as candidates were just about to begin serious campaigning for the parliamentary ("Bundestag") election on September 27. The government was highly unlikely to take any major new decisions on Afghanistan until after the election. He noted it would take a while for a new government coalition to be formed ) at least until mid-October, if not later. While Koenig said he could not speak for the next government, which could very well differ from the current one (i.e., with the Free Democrats (FDP) replacing the Social Democrats (SPD) as the Christian Democrats' (CDU's) coalition partner),he thought it highly unlikely that the German commitment in Afghanistan would decrease; i.e., no reduction in troop levels or development assistance. At the very least it would remain &#x
000A;the same. He noted that the consistent trend since 2001 was for Germany to do more in Afghanistan each successive year. He agreed that if the international community wanted to succeed in Afghanistan, everyone needed to do more. Because time was limited, he also agreed that it was important to ramp up additional resources as soon as possible. ¶3. (C) As part of preparations for renewal of the parliamentary mandate for the German military's ("Bundeswehr's") participation in ISAF (which expires in December),Koenig noted that the four ministries involved in Afghanistan (MFA, MOI, BMZ and MOD) will begin updating the government's so-called "Afghanistan Concept" in September. The updated concept should be ready sometime in November to help inform the parliamentary debate on the mandate. He thought it was very unlikely that there would be big changes in the document, which emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach. ¶4. (C) Regarding the 220 extra troops, two helicopters and other material that Germany has deployed to Afghanistan in support of the upcoming presidential election, Koenig said his "educated guess" was that it would all remain in Afghanistan after the election given the deteriorating security situation in the north. He also thought it likely that Germany would contribute another 50 million euros to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund in 2010, as it has pledged to do in 2009. ¶5. (C) Koenig emphasized that while the international community must do more in Afghanistan, this must be equally matched by stronger effort by the Afghan government. He thought there not only had to be more Afghan ownership, but BERLIN 00000896 002 OF 003 also better performance, especially on governance. He cited President Karzai's common practice of rotating bad governors to other provinces rather than just firing them outright. On the question of channeling more aid through the Afghan government to reinforce ownership, Koenig said he agreed in principle, but said it was difficult to get the Bundestag on board with the idea. He thought that the Bundestag Budget Committee would "cut my head off" if he suggested giving German taxpayer money directly to the Afghan government for disbursement. While it was worth exploring some way of channeling money through reliable ministries, this had to be "water tight" or risk undermining all support for assistance to Afghanistan. ¶6. (C) On July 21, German National Security Advisor Christopher Heusgen told USAREUR Commander General Carter Ham that assuming the CDU stays in office after the September 27 election, it hopes to develop additional capabilities to deploy police abroad, including to Afghanistan. He noted that the government had already committed to tripling the number of police trainers in the focused district development (FDD) police training program to 200 over the next year. He also noted that a change of government (i.e., the exit of the SPD) would allow much needed changes to the "old-fashioned" Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),which under its current leadership insisted on maintaining an artificial separation from the military. ¶7. (C) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery had just been briefed that morning on the recent fighting in Kunduz between the Bundeswehr and local insurgents. He said that 20 years after reunification, "we're getting there" on finally bringing the German public around to the realization of the need for armed forces. He noted that the Chancellor's decision to participate very prominently in the annual swearing-in of several hundred new Bundeswehr recruits in front of the Reichstag on July 20 was part of this effort. He noted that Germany shared the view that it was extremely important to show significant progress over the next year in order to maintain public tolerance (if not support) for the mission. ¶8. (C) Bundeswehr Inspector General Schneiderhan told General Ham he was very sympathetic toward the U.S. proposal to create an intermediate ISAF command to better link the four-star ISAF commander with his one- and two-star regional commanders. The current command structure put too many different demands on COMISAF. Schneiderhan thought the new intermediate command could help improve coordination among regional commanders, who tended to be too narrowly focused on their individual areas of responsibility and not cognizant of the country as a whole. Schneiderhan said he was concerned about developments in Kunduz, noting that security conditions had been deteriorating there over the past 18-24 months. He said that Germany had identified about 10 insurgent leaders, but had not yet been able to track them down. He speculated that the insurgent campaign in the north was a deliberate effort to show off their ability to cause instability anywhere in the country, not just in the south and east. Schneiderhan said many people concluded that the way to deal with the increased threat was through more firepower and heavy weapons. He thought, however, that the real deficiency was the lack of intelligence, especially HUMINT, to break into insurgent networks. CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Martin Kipping, Afghanistan Desk Officer, German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) told Econoff that BMZ was concentrating its efforts mainly in northern Afghanistan, with a focus on longer-term energy, water, education and sustainable development projects (REF C). In 2009, BMZ is contributing nearly 106.6 million in economic development assistance. Combined with the 107.4 contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Germany is on track to contribute a total of 215 million euros on civil reconstruction and economic development assistance this year. This does not include the 50 million BERLIN 00000896 003 OF 003 euros pledged for the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. (NOTE: On July 7 the MFA announced it would increase reconstruction and development spending this year by 17.7 million euros. 7.5 million euros of this new money will go to the German police training mission, bringing the total in this area to 43.2 million euros.) Kipping said Germany was the third largest contributor of development assistance in Afghanistan, and that total contributions since 2001 would be over 1.2 billion euros by the end of next year. ¶10. (C) CDU Foreign Policy spokesman Eckart von Klaeden told the Charge d'Affaires it would be difficult to convince people even inside his own party to increase German troop numbers in Afghanistan, but more could be done on the civilian aid side. He characterized Germany,s present contributions in that area as "minimal," saying that Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) had "always been negative on the German intervention in Afghanistan." Von Klaeden added that a governing coalition with the Free Democrats was likely, with Guido Westerwelle emerging as a likely Foreign Minister. Bradtke

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