GERMAN VIEWS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000621

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO EUN FR GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Germans say they welcome French
reintegration into the NATO military command structure as an
historic event and a symbolically important political
accomplishment. They also hope it will lead to some concrete
benefits, like improved NATO-EU relations. When pressed,
however, the Germans are more circumspect about how much it
will change French attitudes toward NATO or result in
increased contributions to NATO operations, especially in the
short run. While the Germans resist cynical interpretations
for why France decided to rejoin the integrated military
command more than 40 years after leaving, they do not rule
out the suggestion that France remains committed to its
ambitions for ESDP at the expense of NATO and is following a
Trojan Horse strategy to achieve this. Nonetheless, they
claim to have no fears that French reintegration could result
in marginalization of their own influence in NATO. To the
degree that French integration exposes Germany's at times
obstructive approaches, Berlin may come to see France's
return as offering as many downsides as upsides. Because of
a shortage of French officers with English language skills,
the Germans have doubts about France's ability to fill and
sustain all 1,250 new staff officer positions that come with
the 25 "stars" it has been given. END SUMMARY.

SUNNY DAYS AHEAD FOR THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP?


2. (C) Chancellor Merkel told the German parliament during a
speech about NATO just before the April 3-4 NATO Summit in
Strasbourg/Kehl that she welcomed French reintegration
because she felt it would enhance NATO-EU cooperation and
help eliminate the perceived rivalry between NATO and ESDP.
This point has also been emphasized by many commentators in
Germany. But privately, several of our contacts have
expressed their doubts. Chancellery Military Affairs
Director Col. Erich Siegmann thought any potential
improvement in NATO-EU relations due to French reintegration
would unfortunately go unrealized until the Turkey-Cyprus
dispute was resolved, which represented the biggest obstacle
to real cooperation.


3. (C) MFA NATO Action Officer Stephan Evers said he was
hopeful that with more officers at SHAPE, the French would
gain a better understanding of NATO institutions and would
come to support further cooperation between NATO and the EU
on operational issues, such as integrated software and
standardized equipment. MOD NATO Office Director Col. Thomas
Hambach told us that originally he had also hoped that
reintegration would make the French great promoters of NATO
working with the EU, but now he is not sure. He noted that
the French had expressed great displeasure at the timing of a
recent German food-for-thought paper, which made the
innocuous argument that the EU and NATO defense planning
processes should be harmonized and synchronized to avoid
duplication.

NO IMMEDIATE CHANGE EXPECTED IN FRENCH VIEWS OF NATO'S ROLE


4. (C) German officials also believe that more generally,
French reintegration will lead to little or no change --
especially in the short to medium term -- in France's
traditional view of NATO and its role in international
security. In the context of the forthcoming review of the
NATO Strategic Concept, Evers thought that France would
continue to argue for a relatively more restrictive role for
NATO, in order to give more space for the EU to assume
greater responsibilities in the security realm. Evers
expected little change to French policy, since France has
already been able to influence these debates through its seat
on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military
Committee.


5. (C) Frank Kupferschmidt, a researcher at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP),which
is closely affiliated with the German government, also
expressed skepticism that French integration was necessarily
a sign of a fundamental shift in France's approach to NATO.
He pointed out that French policy toward NATO is set by
civilians in Paris and at NATO headquarters, where the French
have always been fully integrated. Thus the addition of
French military officers is unlikely to bring about
significant change. The hope, however, is that in the longer
term, there may be a positive socialization effect among
French soldiers who up to now have had little regular contact
with peers from other NATO countries and exposure to NATO
ideas and concepts. Kupferschmidt argued that the upcoming
Strategic Concept negotiations would be an early litmus test
on whether France had really shifted its view of NATO.

THE GERMAN 'NEIN' REPLACES THE FRENCH 'NON'


6. (C) Of course, even before the formal decision to
reintegrate, the shift in French attitudes at NATO toward
more openness and less gratuitous obstructionism had not
escaped German observers. Some of our German interlocutors
recognize that this could leave Germany exposed as a primary
impediment in opposing certain NATO initiatives. (Comment:
As reported by USNATO, German obstructiveness has eclipsed
that of France at NATO. The fact that even astute German
NATO observers have not picked up on this reflects the long
time lag for perceptions to travel from Brussels to national
capitals. End Comment.)

MORE CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO? PROBABLY NOT


7. (C) German officials are also pessimistic that French
reintegration into NATO will suddenly lead to an increase in
French contribution to NATO operations. For example, none of
our interlocutors thought the French would become more
willing to lead a PRT or approve the proposed NATO AWACS
deployment in Afghanistan as a result of reintegration.
Siegmann at the Chancellery thought the French were already
contributing what they could to the Afghanistan operation.
Hambach echoed this sentiment, although he noted that an
incident earlier this year in which several French soldiers
were killed might have been prevented with the presence of
AWACS. Continued French opposition to the AWACS deployment,
in spite of this incident, demonstrated that the French
position was based mainly on financial concerns rather than
operational or political reasons. Both Hambach and Siegmann
thought that changes in French policy in this regard have
occurred as a result of Sarkozy's assumption of office and
his particular ideas rather than as a result of reintegration.

ENOUGH INDIANS TO SUPPORT THE CHIEFS?


8. (C) The Germans do not believe that France has the
available resources to man and sustain all 1,250 staff
officer positions that come with the 25 "stars" worth of
general officer positions it has received. It is expected to
be a funding and personnel challenge for the French military
to find staff that are not only fluent in English, but also
have a strong understanding of the NATO institutions and
structure. But while expressing doubt about how quickly the
French could take the necessary steps to become fully
integrated into the military command, Evers at the MFA did
not feel that this would take away from the symbolic and
political importance of the French decision to reintegrate.
Both Siegmann at the Chancellery and Hambach at MOD expect
that the French will be able to fill some 800-900 positions
initially.

MARGINALIZATION OF GERMAN INFLUENCE WITHIN NATO?


9. (C) German officials denied that they had any concerns
about being marginalized and claimed that they did not view
reintegration as a zero-sum game. They told us the German
government welcomes increased French influence in NATO
because they share a similar outlook on most issues and thus
will find it generally beneficial. They were also relatively
happy that, in the end, they were not required to sacrifice a
lot of their own command billets to accommodate the French.

COMMENT


10. (C) It is a standard German talking point to express
strong support for French reintegration into the NATO
military command and to voice the expectation that this will
lead to improved NATO-EU cooperation. There was a concerted
attempted by all our German interlocutors to put a happy face
on this development. However, when pressed, most German
officials assessed that reintegration into the military
command by itself is unlikely to change French views of NATO
or diminish their desire to promote ESDP -- if necessary,
even at the expense of the Alliance. In fact, to the degree
that French positions on NATO issues continue on a
constructive trajectory, Germany,s own cautious and at times
obstructive views may draw more criticism from Allies. This
is still just dawning on German policy circles.
Koenig