GERMAN VIEWS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000621 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR NATO EUN FR GM SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Germans say they welcome French reintegration into the NATO military command structure as an historic event and a symbolically important political accomplishment. They also hope it will lead to some concrete benefits, like improved NATO-EU relations. When pressed, however, the Germans are more circumspect about how much it will change French attitudes toward NATO or result in increased contributions to NATO operations, especially in the short run. While the Germans resist cynical interpretations for why France decided to rejoin the integrated military command more than 40 years after leaving, they do not rule out the suggestion that France remains committed to its ambitions for ESDP at the expense of NATO and is following a Trojan Horse strategy to achieve this. Nonetheless, they claim to have no fears that French reintegration could result in marginalization of their own influence in NATO. To the degree that French integration exposes Germany's at times obstructive approaches, Berlin may come to see France's return as offering as many downsides as upsides. Because of a shortage of French officers with English language skills, the Germans have doubts about France's ability to fill and sustain all 1,250 new staff officer positions that come with the 25 "stars" it has been given. END SUMMARY. SUNNY DAYS AHEAD FOR THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP? ¶2. (C) Chancellor Merkel told the German parliament during a speech about NATO just before the April 3-4 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl that she welcomed French reintegration because she felt it would enhance NATO-EU cooperation and help eliminate the perceived rivalry between NATO and ESDP. This point has also been emphasized by many commentators in Germany. But privately, several of our contacts have expressed their doubts. Chancellery Military Affairs Director Col. Erich Siegmann thought any potential improvement in NATO-EU relations due to French reintegration would unfortunately go unrealized until the Turkey-Cyprus dispute was resolved, which represented the biggest obstacle to real cooperation. ¶3. (C) MFA NATO Action Officer Stephan Evers said he was hopeful that with more officers at SHAPE, the French would gain a better understanding of NATO institutions and would come to support further cooperation between NATO and the EU on operational issues, such as integrated software and standardized equipment. MOD NATO Office Director Col. Thomas Hambach told us that originally he had also hoped that reintegration would make the French great promoters of NATO working with the EU, but now he is not sure. He noted that the French had expressed great displeasure at the timing of a recent German food-for-thought paper, which made the innocuous argument that the EU and NATO defense planning processes should be harmonized and synchronized to avoid duplication. NO IMMEDIATE CHANGE EXPECTED IN FRENCH VIEWS OF NATO'S ROLE ¶4. (C) German officials also believe that more generally, French reintegration will lead to little or no change -- especially in the short to medium term -- in France's traditional view of NATO and its role in international security. In the context of the forthcoming review of the NATO Strategic Concept, Evers thought that France would continue to argue for a relatively more restrictive role for NATO, in order to give more space for the EU to assume greater responsibilities in the security realm. Evers expected little change to French policy, since France has already been able to influence these debates through its seat on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee. ¶5. (C) Frank Kupferschmidt, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP),which is closely affiliated with the German government, also expressed skepticism that French integration was necessarily a sign of a fundamental shift in France's approach to NATO. He pointed out that French policy toward NATO is set by civilians in Paris and at NATO headquarters, where the French have always been fully integrated. Thus the addition of French military officers is unlikely to bring about significant change. The hope, however, is that in the longer term, there may be a positive socialization effect among French soldiers who up to now have had little regular contact with peers from other NATO countries and exposure to NATO ideas and concepts. Kupferschmidt argued that the upcoming Strategic Concept negotiations would be an early litmus test on whether France had really shifted its view of NATO. THE GERMAN 'NEIN' REPLACES THE FRENCH 'NON' ¶6. (C) Of course, even before the formal decision to reintegrate, the shift in French attitudes at NATO toward more openness and less gratuitous obstructionism had not escaped German observers. Some of our German interlocutors recognize that this could leave Germany exposed as a primary impediment in opposing certain NATO initiatives. (Comment: As reported by USNATO, German obstructiveness has eclipsed that of France at NATO. The fact that even astute German NATO observers have not picked up on this reflects the long time lag for perceptions to travel from Brussels to national capitals. End Comment.) MORE CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO? PROBABLY NOT ¶7. (C) German officials are also pessimistic that French reintegration into NATO will suddenly lead to an increase in French contribution to NATO operations. For example, none of our interlocutors thought the French would become more willing to lead a PRT or approve the proposed NATO AWACS deployment in Afghanistan as a result of reintegration. Siegmann at the Chancellery thought the French were already contributing what they could to the Afghanistan operation. Hambach echoed this sentiment, although he noted that an incident earlier this year in which several French soldiers were killed might have been prevented with the presence of AWACS. Continued French opposition to the AWACS deployment, in spite of this incident, demonstrated that the French position was based mainly on financial concerns rather than operational or political reasons. Both Hambach and Siegmann thought that changes in French policy in this regard have occurred as a result of Sarkozy's assumption of office and his particular ideas rather than as a result of reintegration. ENOUGH INDIANS TO SUPPORT THE CHIEFS? ¶8. (C) The Germans do not believe that France has the available resources to man and sustain all 1,250 staff officer positions that come with the 25 "stars" worth of general officer positions it has received. It is expected to be a funding and personnel challenge for the French military to find staff that are not only fluent in English, but also have a strong understanding of the NATO institutions and structure. But while expressing doubt about how quickly the French could take the necessary steps to become fully integrated into the military command, Evers at the MFA did not feel that this would take away from the symbolic and political importance of the French decision to reintegrate. Both Siegmann at the Chancellery and Hambach at MOD expect that the French will be able to fill some 800-900 positions initially. MARGINALIZATION OF GERMAN INFLUENCE WITHIN NATO? ¶9. (C) German officials denied that they had any concerns about being marginalized and claimed that they did not view reintegration as a zero-sum game. They told us the German government welcomes increased French influence in NATO because they share a similar outlook on most issues and thus will find it generally beneficial. They were also relatively happy that, in the end, they were not required to sacrifice a lot of their own command billets to accommodate the French. COMMENT ¶10. (C) It is a standard German talking point to express strong support for French reintegration into the NATO military command and to voice the expectation that this will lead to improved NATO-EU cooperation. There was a concerted attempted by all our German interlocutors to put a happy face on this development. However, when pressed, most German officials assessed that reintegration into the military command by itself is unlikely to change French views of NATO or diminish their desire to promote ESDP -- if necessary, even at the expense of the Alliance. In fact, to the degree that French positions on NATO issues continue on a constructive trajectory, Germany,s own cautious and at times obstructive views may draw more criticism from Allies. This is still just dawning on German policy circles. Koenig