Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN52
2009-01-14 16:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

(S) GERMANY REQUESTS USG INFORMATION REGARDING

Tags:  ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY PK CH GM 
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VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0052/01 0141641
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141641Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3042
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0990
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0484
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0376
S E C R E T BERLIN 000052 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR ISN\NESS FOR ROBIN DELABARRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2034
TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY PK CH GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY REQUESTS USG INFORMATION REGARDING
NUCLEAR COOLANT PUMP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO CHINA

Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T BERLIN 000052 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER STATE FOR ISN\NESS FOR ROBIN DELABARRE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2034 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY PK CH GM SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY REQUESTS USG INFORMATION REGARDING NUCLEAR COOLANT PUMP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO CHINA Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 5. ¶2. (S) On January 13, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Nancy Reck provided Global Affairs Officer with a German-language nonpaper requesting quick-turn information from the U.S. regarding the transfer of nuclear technology to China. Reck said that the technology (for reactor primary coolant pumps) in question is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)-listed and that this request coincides with a pending German export license request that their export control authorities must take action on soon. ¶3. (S) Reck said that Germany's primary concern is about NSG-listed primary coolant pumps produced in China (utilizing German technology) ending up in a nuclear reactor not under IAEA safeguards - specifically reactors in Pakistan. Reck also commented that German export control authorities had heard that the U.S. firm Westinghouse had some history of supplying primary coolant pump technical production technology to China, but that this was only for a "Generation II design" from the 1970s or 1980s. Reck declined to comment on the name of the German company involved. ¶4. (S) Begin informal Embassy translation of German-language nonpaper: Germany would be interested to learn more about how the United States formulated their licensing practices in the area of nuclear export controls in connection with the transfer of production technology for NSG-listed primary coolant pumps (INFCIRC 254 Part 1, Annex B 1.7) for nuclear power plants in China. In particular, we would be interested to learn more in view of a pending application: -- Whether U.S. companies have been granted export licenses for technology transfer to China for the production of NSG-listed primary coolant pumps? If yes, was this for the complete production or only partial licenses? -- Whether this has occurred and have there been conditions, if so, under which conditions? -- Whether the decision regarding technology transfers has been differentiated according to "age8 (for example: old technology ) Generation 2; from the 1970s or 1980s ) allowed; new technology ) Generation 2 or 3; present or future technology ) not allowed) In addition, answers to the following questions would also be helpful: -- How does the U.S. evaluate the availability of production technology for primary coolant pumps in the People's Republic of China? -- How does the U.S. judge the danger of &leakage8 of primary coolant pump production technology transfer both within the People's Republic of China and to countries that are not NSG members? Is there information about the leakage of technology for other primary components listed in INFCIRC 254 Part 1. -- How does the U.S. judge the risk of Chinese-origin primary coolant pump technology use in reactors that the Peoples Republic of China has not offered to the IAEA to be placed under safeguards, and thus does not exist in the &eligible list.8 -- How does the U.S. judge the risk of re-exports of Chinese-origin primary coolant pumps to countries that are not NSG-members (in particular Pakistan),and of the installation in nuclear power plants that are not under IAEA safeguards. Because these inquiries relate to an actual pending application and the applicant is urging for a response, we would be very appreciative for an answer by January 23. End text of informal Embassy translation. ¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance in responding to the questions posed in the German nonpaper. Koenig

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