Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN487
2009-04-27 14:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
(S) M/V SABALAN: GERMANY SAYS COMPUTERS ARE SAFE IN THE UAE FOR NOW
how-toVZCZCXRO9936 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHRL #0487 1171452 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 271452Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3937 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0170 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1014 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9789 RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
S E C R E T BERLIN 000487
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/PRA MATT HARDIMAN
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, CH, GM
SUBJECT: (S) M/V SABALAN: GERMANY SAYS COMPUTERS ARE SAFE
IN THE UAE FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 406
B. STATE 31434
C. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/24/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T BERLIN 000487
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/PRA MATT HARDIMAN
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, CH, GM
SUBJECT: (S) M/V SABALAN: GERMANY SAYS COMPUTERS ARE SAFE
IN THE UAE FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 406
B. STATE 31434
C. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/24/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: The M/V Sabalan Siemens computers
destined for Iran are reportedly safely in storage (111
boxes) in the UAE and the Germans have assured us that there
are no immediate concerns that the items will be shipped to
Iran. On April 23, EconOff and officers from the British
Embassy, Alexandra McKenzie and Jo Simon, received an update
on the M/V Sabalan case from German MFA Export Control Desk
Officer, Nancy Reck. Reck said that Germany has received
from both the UK and the Emirates detailed documentation
regarding the Siemens computers and accessories (including
pictures, part numbers, and quantities) that were aboard the
vessel enroute to Iran and indicated that Germany is very
pleased with this information. However, Reck said that
Germany still needs copies of the shipping paperwork
documenting the Iranian end-user in order to make a concrete
legal argument about why the items should remain out of
Iranian hands. Reck said that the computer equipment is very
likely of German origin and that BAFA (German Export Control
Authority) has been briefed on the situation and given all
relevant documents. Reck indicated that BAFA is already in
the process of contacting Siemens to solicit further
information regarding what Siemens knew about the end-user.
END SUMMARY
2. (S//NF) Reck maintained that it is the legal
responsibility of the UAE to hold the goods until everything
is legally sorted out. Reck emphasized that Siemens likely
legally shipped the items to China (BAFA is checking on proof
of the export license) without any knowledge of any re-export
plans to Iran. This will likely be Siemens, stance and
Germany's legal structure will support this stance unless of
course there is proof otherwise. (Comment: Reck was clearly
pointing at the Chinese as the responsible party, given they
are the ones who took positive action to ship the items to
Iran. It appears to us that Germany is moving into legal
damage control mode and is seeking to distance themselves
from responsibility. End Comment)
3. (S//NF) Reck said that it is still possible that Iran
would have legal rights to these items, since none of them
appear to be listed on any of the four export control regimes
(MTCR, NSG, Wassenaar, or Australia Group). Reck said that
there remain two possibilities for legally preventing Iran
from receiving these items: 1) the items are listed or are
clearly designed to support enrichment activities, or 2) the
end-user is associated with a listed Iranian entity
supporting Iran,s nuclear ambitions. Reck said that the
first point would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
prove, given that the Siemens items in question are for
general purpose industrial use. Reck pointed to the second
point as the best legal avenue to keep these items from
reaching Iran and emphasized "this is why we need
documentation on the supposed end-user."
Koenig
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/PRA MATT HARDIMAN
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, CH, GM
SUBJECT: (S) M/V SABALAN: GERMANY SAYS COMPUTERS ARE SAFE
IN THE UAE FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 406
B. STATE 31434
C. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/24/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: The M/V Sabalan Siemens computers
destined for Iran are reportedly safely in storage (111
boxes) in the UAE and the Germans have assured us that there
are no immediate concerns that the items will be shipped to
Iran. On April 23, EconOff and officers from the British
Embassy, Alexandra McKenzie and Jo Simon, received an update
on the M/V Sabalan case from German MFA Export Control Desk
Officer, Nancy Reck. Reck said that Germany has received
from both the UK and the Emirates detailed documentation
regarding the Siemens computers and accessories (including
pictures, part numbers, and quantities) that were aboard the
vessel enroute to Iran and indicated that Germany is very
pleased with this information. However, Reck said that
Germany still needs copies of the shipping paperwork
documenting the Iranian end-user in order to make a concrete
legal argument about why the items should remain out of
Iranian hands. Reck said that the computer equipment is very
likely of German origin and that BAFA (German Export Control
Authority) has been briefed on the situation and given all
relevant documents. Reck indicated that BAFA is already in
the process of contacting Siemens to solicit further
information regarding what Siemens knew about the end-user.
END SUMMARY
2. (S//NF) Reck maintained that it is the legal
responsibility of the UAE to hold the goods until everything
is legally sorted out. Reck emphasized that Siemens likely
legally shipped the items to China (BAFA is checking on proof
of the export license) without any knowledge of any re-export
plans to Iran. This will likely be Siemens, stance and
Germany's legal structure will support this stance unless of
course there is proof otherwise. (Comment: Reck was clearly
pointing at the Chinese as the responsible party, given they
are the ones who took positive action to ship the items to
Iran. It appears to us that Germany is moving into legal
damage control mode and is seeking to distance themselves
from responsibility. End Comment)
3. (S//NF) Reck said that it is still possible that Iran
would have legal rights to these items, since none of them
appear to be listed on any of the four export control regimes
(MTCR, NSG, Wassenaar, or Australia Group). Reck said that
there remain two possibilities for legally preventing Iran
from receiving these items: 1) the items are listed or are
clearly designed to support enrichment activities, or 2) the
end-user is associated with a listed Iranian entity
supporting Iran,s nuclear ambitions. Reck said that the
first point would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
prove, given that the Siemens items in question are for
general purpose industrial use. Reck pointed to the second
point as the best legal avenue to keep these items from
reaching Iran and emphasized "this is why we need
documentation on the supposed end-user."
Koenig