Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN470
2009-04-22 16:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMAN VIEWS ON THE APRIL 27-28 EU GAERC MEETING
VZCZCXRO6367 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #0470/01 1121653 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221653Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3898 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0684 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0813 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0168 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0065 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2040 RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0037 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0709 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0893 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000470
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV RU BM MD UP XF EZ IR TU GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE APRIL 27-28 EU GAERC MEETING
REF: APRIL 17 GIAUQUE E-MAIL
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000470
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV RU BM MD UP XF EZ IR TU GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE APRIL 27-28 EU GAERC MEETING
REF: APRIL 17 GIAUQUE E-MAIL
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany regrets the confusion that the Czech
EU Presidency has caused over the status of Belarus President
Lukashenka's invitation to the May 7 Eastern Partnership
Summit, and agrees that it is important to ensure that he
does not attend. The German MFA says it favors inviting
Russia as an observer to the May 8 Southern Corridor Energy
Summit; the Czech embassy confirms that there has been
"strong pressure" from Germany to extend an invitation. The
MFA would have also supported inviting Russia as an observer
to the Eastern Partnership Summit to demonstrate that the EU
is not trying to marginalize Russia in pursuing these
initiatives, but the Chancellery was dead set against that
idea from the very start. The GAERC will issue conclusions
calling on Iran to "seize the opportunity" for dialogue
offered by the new U.S. Administration, but will not decide
on or even mention the possibility of a tightening of EU
sanctions. Germany supports preparations for the designation
of additional Iranian entities, but says other EU members
feel such a move would undermine efforts to establish a
dialogue with Tehran. Germany is seeking to add Ukraine to
the GAERC agenda, believing that the EU must be "vigilant" in
following developments there closely. The ministers will
have a general discussion of the Middle East peace process,
but are not expected to make any decisions or issue any
conclusions. The EU Common Position on Burma will be rolled
over unchanged. Romania is expected to raise Moldova under
any other business. END SUMMARY.
DEMARCHE
2. (U) Post delivered reftel points on the April 27-28 EU
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) to MFA
Deputy EU Correspondent Thomas Schieb on April 20 and
followed up with him on April 22 to get his reaction.
GAERC AGENDA
3. (SBU) Schieb noted that the draft agenda for the GAERC had
just been published by the Czech EU Presidency and included
the following topics:
-- EU Neighborhood policy
-- Burma
-- Follow-up to the April 5 U.S.-EU Summit
-- Middle East peace process
-- May 7 Eastern Partnership Summit
IRAN
4. (C) Schieb said that while Iran is not a separate item on
the GAERC agenda, it is supposed to be one of two issues
discussed as part of the follow-up to the April 5 U.S.-EU
Summit (the other issue being Afghanistan). Schieb noted
that there will also be Council conclusions on Iran. The
Czech EU presidency distributed a draft of the conclusions on
April 21 and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) is
scheduled to discuss them today (April 22). Schieb allowed
us to read the Czech EU presidency draft, which welcomes U.S.
willingness to engage directly with Iran and calls on Tehran
to "seize this opportunity" to "engage seriously with the
international community" to find "a negotiated solution" to
the dispute over Iran's nuclear program.
5. (C) The draft mentions nothing about a possible tightening
of EU sanctions through the designation of additional Iranian
individuals and entities associated with proliferation.
Schieb confirmed that there were currently no moves within
the EU to tighten sanctions. He said that while Germany
would have supported going forward with the preparation of
such steps, a number of other countries -- he specifically
named Spain, Austria and Sweden -- were reluctant because
they thought it would be counterproductive and undermine
efforts to establish a dialogue. Schieb added that there
might also be "economic considerations" behind their
reluctance.
MAY 7 EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT
BERLIN 00000470 002 OF 003
6. (C) Schieb expressed irritation at how the Czech EU
Presidency had handled the public diplomacy aspects of
Belarus President Lukashenka's invitation to the May 7
Eastern Partnership Summit. At first, the Czechs had
announced that Lukashenka had been invited, then issued a
correction that no formal invitation had been sent, before
finally saying that an invitation had been sent, but not to
Lukashenka personally. Schieb said MFA was in the
embarrassing position of having to answer Bundestag inquiries
without really knowing the situation. He claimed that they
had not yet seen a copy of the actual invitation to Belarus,
so they could not verify to whom it was addressed. Schieb
said the bottom line, however, was to ensure that "Lukashenka
doesn't show up" at the May 7 Summit.
MAY 8 SOUTHERN CORRIDOR ENERGY SUMMIT
7. (C) Schieb said that Germany favored inviting Russia as an
observer to the May 8 EU Troika Southern Corridor Energy
Summit with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Georgia. Schieb argued that excluding the Russians would
give credence to their claims that the EU was seeking to
conspire against them. For the same reason, Schieb said the
MFA would have also favored inviting Russia to the Eastern
Partnership Summit as an observer, but acknowledged that this
was not likely at this point. (Comment: We are skeptical that
the Chancellery, in fact, would have agreed to invite Russia
to the May 7 Eastern Partnership Summit, even as an observer.
Our contacts there have consistently and adamantly opposed
the idea. End Comment.)
8. (C) A colleague at the Czech embassy confirmed that
Germany, Italy and others were putting "strong pressure" on
the Czech EU presidency to agree to invite Russia as an
observer to the Southern Corridor Energy Summit, but claimed
that this was "not yet 100% decided." He said that the Czech
preference was not to invite the Russians since the whole
point of the meeting was to discuss diversification of energy
sources and suppliers. He also revealed that Turkey had
refused to attend the Southern Corridor Summit unless it was
also invited to the Eastern Partnership Summit. To avoid
spurring a demand from Russia that it also be invited to the
Eastern Partnership Summit, the Czechs decided to invite
Turkey in its capacity as an EU candidate country, along with
Macedonia and Croatia.
BURMA
9. (C) Schieb confirmed that the Council would agree to a
rollover of its Common Position on Burma without any changes.
He said that foreign ministers would use the occasion,
however, to reiterate their concerns about the situation
there.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
10. (C) Schieb said there would only be a general exchange of
views and that no Council conclusions or decisions were
expected. He noted there had been some dispute about whether
it was even worthwhile including the MEPP on the agenda,
given that there was "nothing new" at this point to discuss.
MOLDOVA
11. (C) Schieb said that Romania was likely to raise Moldova
at the GAERC under any other business. He noted that the EU
Special Representative for Moldova had briefed the PSC at its
April 21 meeting on the riots following the recent election
and the government's response. According to Schieb, the EUSR
confirmed allegations of human rights abuses by the Chisinau
government, and said this reflected "the deficits" in the
country's political culture.
UKRAINE
12. (C) Schieb said that the Czech EU presidency had agreed
with Germany's proposal that Ukraine be added to the GAERC
agenda, so he was surprised that it was not included in the
draft just published. Schieb said that while Germany did not
have any concrete prescriptions for how the EU should help
Ukraine, it was important for the EU to be "vigilant" and to
follow developments there closely. He revealed that Germany
may propose sending the EU Troika to Kyiv to consult with
BERLIN 00000470 003 OF 003
Ukrainian authorities and to encourage President Yushchenko
and PM Tymoshenko to "call a truce" in their self-destructive
political battle.
Anania
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV RU BM MD UP XF EZ IR TU GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE APRIL 27-28 EU GAERC MEETING
REF: APRIL 17 GIAUQUE E-MAIL
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany regrets the confusion that the Czech
EU Presidency has caused over the status of Belarus President
Lukashenka's invitation to the May 7 Eastern Partnership
Summit, and agrees that it is important to ensure that he
does not attend. The German MFA says it favors inviting
Russia as an observer to the May 8 Southern Corridor Energy
Summit; the Czech embassy confirms that there has been
"strong pressure" from Germany to extend an invitation. The
MFA would have also supported inviting Russia as an observer
to the Eastern Partnership Summit to demonstrate that the EU
is not trying to marginalize Russia in pursuing these
initiatives, but the Chancellery was dead set against that
idea from the very start. The GAERC will issue conclusions
calling on Iran to "seize the opportunity" for dialogue
offered by the new U.S. Administration, but will not decide
on or even mention the possibility of a tightening of EU
sanctions. Germany supports preparations for the designation
of additional Iranian entities, but says other EU members
feel such a move would undermine efforts to establish a
dialogue with Tehran. Germany is seeking to add Ukraine to
the GAERC agenda, believing that the EU must be "vigilant" in
following developments there closely. The ministers will
have a general discussion of the Middle East peace process,
but are not expected to make any decisions or issue any
conclusions. The EU Common Position on Burma will be rolled
over unchanged. Romania is expected to raise Moldova under
any other business. END SUMMARY.
DEMARCHE
2. (U) Post delivered reftel points on the April 27-28 EU
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) to MFA
Deputy EU Correspondent Thomas Schieb on April 20 and
followed up with him on April 22 to get his reaction.
GAERC AGENDA
3. (SBU) Schieb noted that the draft agenda for the GAERC had
just been published by the Czech EU Presidency and included
the following topics:
-- EU Neighborhood policy
-- Burma
-- Follow-up to the April 5 U.S.-EU Summit
-- Middle East peace process
-- May 7 Eastern Partnership Summit
IRAN
4. (C) Schieb said that while Iran is not a separate item on
the GAERC agenda, it is supposed to be one of two issues
discussed as part of the follow-up to the April 5 U.S.-EU
Summit (the other issue being Afghanistan). Schieb noted
that there will also be Council conclusions on Iran. The
Czech EU presidency distributed a draft of the conclusions on
April 21 and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) is
scheduled to discuss them today (April 22). Schieb allowed
us to read the Czech EU presidency draft, which welcomes U.S.
willingness to engage directly with Iran and calls on Tehran
to "seize this opportunity" to "engage seriously with the
international community" to find "a negotiated solution" to
the dispute over Iran's nuclear program.
5. (C) The draft mentions nothing about a possible tightening
of EU sanctions through the designation of additional Iranian
individuals and entities associated with proliferation.
Schieb confirmed that there were currently no moves within
the EU to tighten sanctions. He said that while Germany
would have supported going forward with the preparation of
such steps, a number of other countries -- he specifically
named Spain, Austria and Sweden -- were reluctant because
they thought it would be counterproductive and undermine
efforts to establish a dialogue. Schieb added that there
might also be "economic considerations" behind their
reluctance.
MAY 7 EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT
BERLIN 00000470 002 OF 003
6. (C) Schieb expressed irritation at how the Czech EU
Presidency had handled the public diplomacy aspects of
Belarus President Lukashenka's invitation to the May 7
Eastern Partnership Summit. At first, the Czechs had
announced that Lukashenka had been invited, then issued a
correction that no formal invitation had been sent, before
finally saying that an invitation had been sent, but not to
Lukashenka personally. Schieb said MFA was in the
embarrassing position of having to answer Bundestag inquiries
without really knowing the situation. He claimed that they
had not yet seen a copy of the actual invitation to Belarus,
so they could not verify to whom it was addressed. Schieb
said the bottom line, however, was to ensure that "Lukashenka
doesn't show up" at the May 7 Summit.
MAY 8 SOUTHERN CORRIDOR ENERGY SUMMIT
7. (C) Schieb said that Germany favored inviting Russia as an
observer to the May 8 EU Troika Southern Corridor Energy
Summit with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Georgia. Schieb argued that excluding the Russians would
give credence to their claims that the EU was seeking to
conspire against them. For the same reason, Schieb said the
MFA would have also favored inviting Russia to the Eastern
Partnership Summit as an observer, but acknowledged that this
was not likely at this point. (Comment: We are skeptical that
the Chancellery, in fact, would have agreed to invite Russia
to the May 7 Eastern Partnership Summit, even as an observer.
Our contacts there have consistently and adamantly opposed
the idea. End Comment.)
8. (C) A colleague at the Czech embassy confirmed that
Germany, Italy and others were putting "strong pressure" on
the Czech EU presidency to agree to invite Russia as an
observer to the Southern Corridor Energy Summit, but claimed
that this was "not yet 100% decided." He said that the Czech
preference was not to invite the Russians since the whole
point of the meeting was to discuss diversification of energy
sources and suppliers. He also revealed that Turkey had
refused to attend the Southern Corridor Summit unless it was
also invited to the Eastern Partnership Summit. To avoid
spurring a demand from Russia that it also be invited to the
Eastern Partnership Summit, the Czechs decided to invite
Turkey in its capacity as an EU candidate country, along with
Macedonia and Croatia.
BURMA
9. (C) Schieb confirmed that the Council would agree to a
rollover of its Common Position on Burma without any changes.
He said that foreign ministers would use the occasion,
however, to reiterate their concerns about the situation
there.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
10. (C) Schieb said there would only be a general exchange of
views and that no Council conclusions or decisions were
expected. He noted there had been some dispute about whether
it was even worthwhile including the MEPP on the agenda,
given that there was "nothing new" at this point to discuss.
MOLDOVA
11. (C) Schieb said that Romania was likely to raise Moldova
at the GAERC under any other business. He noted that the EU
Special Representative for Moldova had briefed the PSC at its
April 21 meeting on the riots following the recent election
and the government's response. According to Schieb, the EUSR
confirmed allegations of human rights abuses by the Chisinau
government, and said this reflected "the deficits" in the
country's political culture.
UKRAINE
12. (C) Schieb said that the Czech EU presidency had agreed
with Germany's proposal that Ukraine be added to the GAERC
agenda, so he was surprised that it was not included in the
draft just published. Schieb said that while Germany did not
have any concrete prescriptions for how the EU should help
Ukraine, it was important for the EU to be "vigilant" and to
follow developments there closely. He revealed that Germany
may propose sending the EU Troika to Kyiv to consult with
BERLIN 00000470 003 OF 003
Ukrainian authorities and to encourage President Yushchenko
and PM Tymoshenko to "call a truce" in their self-destructive
political battle.
Anania