NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT

201836 2009-04-10 09BERLIN431 Embassy Berlin SECRET 09BERLIN369|09BERLIN382|09STATE31102 S E C R E T BERLIN 000431 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR ECON EAID NATO EU AF PK UN GM SUBJECT: NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT NOT MANY NEW GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS REF: A. STATE 31102 ¶B. BERLIN 382 ¶C. BERLIN 369 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. The new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan has been warmly received in Germany and has engendered considerable good will, but it has thus far yielded only a few additional commitments from Berlin -- the chief of which is a contribution of 50 million Euros to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. While German officials agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on the civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that Germany -- as the third largest troop contributor and fourth largest donor -- is already doing more in Afghanistan. Chancellor Merkel has made clear in a number of public speeches and comments recently that Germany feels no compunction to significantly expand its effort in Afghanistan in the near term, beyond what it was already planning to do. While the German effort -- especially in terms of ground troops -- is likely to remain concentrated in the north for the foreseeable future, there are ongoing discussions in the German government about what impact the eventual transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghans in the north should have on the current disposition of German forces. While MOD reportedly argues that TLSR should have no impact, German Special Envoy Muetzelburg believes it should allow some German forces to be shifted to the west of the country. Other German officials think that in the longer term, Germany should consider teaming up with the Netherlands in Uruzgan Province, since the two countries share the same philosophical approach in Afghanistan. But none of these bolder ideas for increased German engagement are likely to be considered or debated seriously until after the September Bundestag election. END SUMMARY. DEMARCHE ¶2. (C) Post delivered the talking points, civilian assistance non-paper and requests for specific German contributions contained in ref A to the MOD, MFA, Interior Ministry (MOI), Chancellery and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in separate meetings on April 2, 3 and 6. GENERAL REACTION ¶3. (C) All the German officials with whom we spoke warmly welcomed the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with several viewing it as an affirmation of Germany's own networked security or comprehensive approach. Chancellery Afghanistan Desk Officer Irina Speck noted that the new U.S. strategy had not only been well-received in Europe, but also in the Muslim world, including Afghanistan. She said the new tone and the willingness to be self-critical were very much appreciated. Only a few concerns were raised. BMZ Afghanistan Desk Officer Martin Kipping wondered, for example, if the President's emphasis on counterterrorism action meant that the U.S. was scaling down its ambitions to help Afghans build a fully democratic state. He seemed relieved to hear that the U.S. was not abandoning its long-term goals for Afghanistan, but simply establishing short- and medium-term goals to better focus its engagement over the next three to five years. Regarding the planned deployment of more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops to the south, Chancellery Military Affairs Chief Col. Erich Vad thought one likely result would be an influx of insurgents northward into the German area responsibility. He said the Bundeswehr would have to expect more attacks and security incidents in the north as a result of this squeezing effect in the south. ¶4. (C) The reaction to the U.S requests for specific German contribution was also largely positive. German officials were clearly relieved, for example, that we had taken German domestic political realities into account and were not asking for German combat forces to be deployed outside the north. At the same time, our requests have yielded only a few additional commitments thus far. While German officials agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on the civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that Germany is already doing its fair share in Afghanistan. They point out that Germany is not only the third largest troop contributor (with 3,900 troops currently deployed, a few hundred more on the way and authorization to go up to 4,500), it is also the fourth largest donor (with a total of 170.7 million Euros committed to civilian reconstruction, economic development and humanitarian assistance in 2009 -- 80 million Euros from BMZ and 90.7 million from the MFA). ¶5. (C) The problem, as German officials see it, is not that they need to do more, but that they need to do a better job of publicizing what they are already doing. As Chancellor Merkel has made clear in a number of public speeches and comments recently, Germany feels no compunction to significantly expand its effort in the near term. Her belief is that, in the context of last October's renewal of the parliamentary mandate for the Bundeswehr's participation in ISAF, Germany has already taken a number of measures to boost its military and civilian engagement. She sees no reason to re-examine this issue again until the ISAF mandate comes back up for renewal, which has been deliberately set for December, safely after the Bundestag election in September. ¶6. (C) In private, Germans tell us that they are our most reliable partner because they, unlike the Dutch and Canadians, have committed themselves to staying indefinitely in Afghanistan and have not publicly announced a withdrawal date, notwithstanding the low German public support for the mission. (In a recent German magazine poll, 61 percent answered no to the question: Should the Bundeswehr remain stationed in Afghanistan? This tracks with INR surveys, which show that 58% oppose the Bundeswehr's participation in ISAF and only 39% support it.) When it is pointed out that Germany may never get credit for bearing its full share of the burden in Afghanistan as long as it refuses to send combat troops outside of the relatively peaceful north, the answer is a helpless shrug and the comment: We can live with that. ¶7. (SBU) Detailed German responses to ref A's requests for specific contributions are provided in paras 8-23. RC-NORTH ELECTION SUPPORT FORCE ¶8. (C) MFA ISAF Action officer Lukas Wasielewski noted that Sweden and Norway had just announced that they could not provide the promised forces to augment their PRTs during the upcoming Afghan election. As a result, there is now suddenly a shortfall of four platoons -- or about 120 soldiers -- for election support in the north. (As reported ref B, Wasielewski had highlighted previously that the requirements for election support in the north were completely fulfilled.) Wasielewski could not make any promises, but said that Germany was considering stepping in to fill the gap. FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT ¶9. (C) As reported ref B, Germany only began its participation in the focused district development (FDD) police training program in January, but based on the very positive results so far, it is already considering a significant expansion of its effort, from the currently planned 10 districts to 20. MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director Ruediger Koenig thought Germany's decision to be the first country to join the U.S. on FDD demonstrated its unique reliability as a partner. Helmut Teichmann, MOI Office Director for International Police Affairs, indicated that Germany,s goal of reaching 20 FDD districts by spring 2010 would be facilitated by the opening of a new police training center in Kunduz this July. Teichmann, who just back from a visit to Afghanistan, noted that the building of a border police academy in Kabul was behind schedule and might not be opened until spring 2010. When completed, the academy will train 500 students a year. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ¶10. (SBU) Several of our German interlocutors noted that Germany is already quite active in efforts to improve the Afghan criminal justice system. According to the MFA Afghanistan action officer responsible for civilian reconstruction, Christian Dokter, the MFA spends about 2.5 million Euros a year on a variety of legal training projects and support programs, while BMZ spends about 3 million Euros. The BMZ-funded rule of law programs include support for legal aid offices and a project to improve cooperation between police and state prosecutors in handling criminal cases. ¶11. (SBU) One of the main MFA programs is a legal training program run by the Max Planck Institute at the University of Heidelberg, which conducts workshops in Afghanistan for lawyers and judges and which also prepares legal texts and commentaries in Dari and Pashtu on the Afghan constitution and Afghan laws. Doktor said the program had been primarily focused in the north and Kabul up to now, but that courses in 2009 would be extended for the first time to Afghans who live in the south and east. He estimated that more than 2,000 Afghan jurists had been trained since the start of this program in 2005. ANA TRUST FUND ¶12. (C) FM Steinmeier announced at the May 31 Afghanistan Conference in The Hague that Germany would contribute 50 million Euros to the ANA Trust Fund in 2009. Both MFA and Chancellery officials heralded the contribution as the biggest one to date and especially significant for a country that is also the third largest troop contributor. MFA ISAF Action Officer Wasielewski emphasized, however, that the commitment was for 2009 only. With Bundestag elections in September, a decision on future contributions to the Trust Fund in 2010 and beyond will be left to the next government. That said, Wasielewski thought it likely that Germany would continue to contribute to the Trust Fund at the current level, if not higher. He noted that the 2009 contribution had come out of the government's general finance fund, rather than out of any particular ministry's budget. ELECTRICAL POWER ¶13. (SBU) BMZ Afghanistan Desk Officer Kipping noted that renewable energy is one of BMZ's four priority areas in Afghanistan, and that it has already budgeted 27 million Euros to build one hydropower station in Kunduz (Khanabad) and two in Badakhshan (Keshem and Feyzabad). Kipping also noted that the BMZ has made some 5 million Euros available to support micro hydropower projects for small, isolated communities that would not be able to connect to a central grid, as is the case in much of Badakhshan. As far as the Northern Electric Power System is concerned, BMZ has committed some 24.4 million Euros to the construction of power stations and transmission lines. OMLTS ¶14. (SBU) As reported ref B, Germany, in cooperation with its northern partners, has committed to fulfill by the end of the year all of the OMLT requirements for the two brigades of the 209th Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps based in the north. ¶15. (C) Regarding the possibility of allowing German OMLTs to deploy outside the north, at least into RC-West, both MOD and MFA claimed that they saw little practical necessity for German OMLTs to do this. MOD Political-Military Affairs Director Col. Bernd Schuett said that the 209h ANA Corps was responsible for the northern region, and the Afghan MOD had indicated no interest in re-deploying it or its subordinate units to other areas of the country. The 209th Corps was supposed to stay and operate in the north. ¶16. (C) MFA ISAF Action Officer Wasielewski claimed that apart from a single instance in 2006, there had been no concrete proposals by the Afghan MOD to send ANA Kandaks based in the north to other regions of the country -- even temporarily. Schuett emphasized that while German OMLTs (like any German unit) could, in theory, be deployed outside the north under an exception in the Bundeswehr's parliamentary mandate, such deployments had to be limited both in time and scope, and judged to be absolutely indispensable to the success of the ISAF mission. The German minister of defense himself had to make this determination. Both Schuett and Wasielewski agreed that there was little likelihood that German OMLTs would be deployed outside the north on this basis. ¶17. (C) With regard to the district of Gormach, which was provisionally transferred from the RC-West province of Badghis to the RC-North province of Faryab last November based on a presidential decree, Schuett and Wasielewski emphasized that Germany still considered the district to be part of RC-West, even though ISAF HQ has given RC-North operational responsibility for it. Therefore, German forces -- including OMLTs -- can only operate in Gormach under the exception in the parliamentary mandate. GERMANS TO THE WEST AFTER TSLR IN THE NORTH? ¶18. (S) In the context of the discussion about German OMLTs operating in RC-West, Wasielewski revealed that there are ongoing discussions in the German government about what impact the eventual transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghans will or should have on the disposition of German forces in the north. Wasielewski said the MOD position -- especially that of Bundeswehr CHOD Gen. Schneiderhan -- is that TLSR should have no impact. MOD argues that German forces are already at minimal levels in the north, given the size of the area of responsibility, and that they need to remain in place to support/mentor Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). ¶19. (S) Wasielewski said that Special MFA Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Bernd Muetzelburg sees it differently, believing that TLSR should open the opportunity to shift some of Germany's forces to the west, especially to the neglected northern portion of the region. Wasielewski noted that RC-West is largely preoccupied with the difficult security situation in Farah, and does not have the troops to provide a sufficient presence elsewhere. Wasielewski pointed out that one could argue that such a shift in Bundeswehr forces would be in Germany's own self-interest, since this area is believed to be one of main infiltration routes for insurgents moving north. Wasielewski cautioned, however, that any such consideration will only be seriously entertained after the September Bundestag election. TEAMING UP WITH THE DUTCH IN URUZGAN? ¶20. (S) Another longer-term possibility for Germany's engagement in Afghanistan, according to Chancellery Chief of Military Affairs Col. Erich Vad, is teaming with the Dutch in Uruzgan Province. Vad noted that Germany and the Netherlands already have a close military relationship, as reflected in the joint German-Dutch Corps based in Muenster, and share the same military-civilian approach in Afghanistan. But he ruled out any concrete steps in this direction before the Bundestag election. PRT CIVILIAN EXPERTS AND PROGRAMS ¶21. (C) German officials have long expressed skepticism about the efficacy of trying to create a strong central government in a country that has never had one, so they are very open to the new emphasis in the U.S. strategy on engaging more at the provincial level. During her April 5-6 visit to Afghanistan, Chancellor Merkel met with Balkh Governor Atta and reportedly emphasized to him that more and more German development projects would be agreed and carried out directly at the provincial level, because routing everything through Kabul took too long. ¶22. (C) MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director Ruediger Koenig told us noted that while BMZ controls the bulk of German development funds and operates largely independently, the MFA civilian leader at each PRT has access to his or her own funds, which can be rapidly disbursed in support of hearts and minds projects of their choosing (subject to approval in Berlin). He noted, for example, that the civilian leader in Feyzabad had a budget of about 500,000 Euros per year. ¶23. (C) Koenig also agreed on the need for more specialists at PRTs, especially agricultural specialists, noting that he was already fighting for that with German development agency GTZ. He said MFA was also pushing BMZ to put more emphasis on supporting agriculture. Currently, agriculture is only addressed indirectly in the BMZ plan for Afghanistan, which focuses on three other priority areas, in addition to renewable energy: drinking water, education and economic development. Koenig