Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN406
2009-04-03 17:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
(S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF SIEMENS COMPUTERS TO UNSCR LISTED IRANIAN ENTITY
how-toVZCZCXRO9339 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHRL #0406/01 0931755 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 031755Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3772 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0167 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1004 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9721 RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000406
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF SIEMENS
COMPUTERS TO UNSCR LISTED IRANIAN ENTITY
REF: A. STATE 31434
B. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/02/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000406
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF SIEMENS
COMPUTERS TO UNSCR LISTED IRANIAN ENTITY
REF: A. STATE 31434
B. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/02/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 13.
2. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Germany delivered two non-papers on
April 1 to United Arab Emirates (UAE) MFA Deputy Director
General Al-Absi, and UAE MFA Director General (for European
Issues) Kazim, expressing Germany,s request for the UAE to
interdict the IRISL vessel M/V Sabalan. The papers also
asked the UAE to inspect its cargo for Siemens computers and
accessories - possibly intended for use with Iranian
centrifuge cascades. Germany informed us that the M/V
Sabalan has been identified and secured and that they expect
that the crate contents will be inspected on Sunday, April
4, likely in Jabel Ali. Germany did not indicate if a German
official would be present, supervising the inspection.
Germany gave no further details about the inspection other
than to say "this is a positive development" and "we'll wait
and see what we find out." END SUMMARY
3. (S//NF) On April 1, EconOff delivered the reftel demarche
to German MFA officers, Markus Klinger, Deputy Office
Director for Export Controls, and Nancy Reck, Desk Officer
for MTCR Export Controls. Both Reck and Klinger gave EconOff
a comprehensive readout of Germany's views about this case
and the action they are taking. On April 2, EconOff received
a readout from Alexandra McKenzie, a First Secretary from the
British Embassy in Berlin who is responsible for
Nonproliferation issues. Also on April 3, EconOff received a
phone call from Reck, during which Reck described the plans
to inspect the cargo for the suspected Siemens computers on
April 4. In addition to the MFA, Reck and Klinger indicated
that the BND (the German intelligence service) was intimately
involved in this case and that German Economics Ministry Head
of Division for International Export Regimes, Claus Warnken
(Bonn),is also very active in this case.
GERMANY IS TAKING ACTION BASED ON UK INTELLIGENCE
-------------- --------------
4. (S//NF) According to Klinger and McKenzie, beginning
Sunday, March 29, the BND was given "detailed information" by
British intelligence sources about an imminent shipment of
Siemens computers from China to Iran with the likely
end-recipient of the goods being the Iranian firm Kalaye
Electric Company (KEC),a firm listed under UNSCR 1737 for
its involvement in Iran's nuclear program. The German MFA
said that the BND informed them of the case on Monday, March
30 to start working with the German Export Control Authority
(BAFA) to find out from Siemens if they knew anything about
computer shipments to Iran. According to Reck, Siemens
claimed no knowledge of this shipment and requested more
details in order to be more helpful. Klinger and Reck said
that, based on the UK information, the German Embassy in the
UAE delivered two nonpapers on April 1 to the UAE MFA,
requesting the goods inspection.
THE UK TACTICALLY WANTED ACTION TO COME FROM GERMANY
-------------- --------------
5. (S//NF) McKenzie said that it is a priority to the UK
that this shipment is stopped before reaching Iran and that
the UK feels that getting the UAE to take action will be much
more effective if the request comes from the Germans.
McKenzie stated that the optics of this situation should be
straight-forward, given that the goods are believed to be of
German origin. Elaborating, she hinted that the Germans
simply have more credibility with the UAE on these matters
and if the request were to come directly from the UK, it may
appear politically-motivated to the Emiratis.
GERMANY FEELS UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE MESSENGER ROLE
-------------- --------------
6. (S//NF) Germany feels uncomfortable in the messenger
role, but sees the urgency to take action now and wants to be
BERLIN 00000406 002 OF 003
a good partner. Reck and Klinger strongly stated that, given
the circumstances surrounding this case, Germany is not/not
legally obligated to take action. Reck insisted that the
fact that there is information indicating that the items were
headed to KEC in Iran automatically obligates the UAE to
inspect the shipment, based on their international
responsibility. (COMMENT: Germany feels like they are doing
the right thing but are crossing their fingers that they do
not get burned. As a historical note, Germany has bad
memories of a case involving Mercedes Benz trucks sent to
Syria, in which the German government was taken to court by a
Polish ship captain for over 30,000 euro worth of damages.
Germany's nightmare scenario would be that nothing of concern
is found after the inspections are completed and that they
are left in the shadow of blame. END COMMENT)
THE USG WAS BROUGHT INTO THE MIX TO ADD PRESSURE ON THE UAE
-------------- --------------
7. (S//NF) McKenzie suggested that the USG was brought into
the loop in order to add pressure to the Germans to act
quickly. She suggested that this was first communicated via
intelligence channels and later in diplomatic channels.
According to Reck, the fact that the USG was pressing for
action definitely had an effect on Germany and may have been
the "decisive factor" on the UAE getting them to respond
positively to the German nonpaper request. Reck said that
the UAE "promised" to take action on this case in response to
the April 1 German nonpaper.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BROUGHT ONLINE BASED ON BND REQUEST
-------------- --------------
8. (S//NF) According to McKenzie, the decision to bring this
case into diplomatic channels was based on reluctance from
the BND to take further action unless specifically directed
by Berlin. McKenzie indicated that the UK preference was for
this case to stay in intelligence channels. As a result, the
UK coordinated with the USG to demarche the Germans on April
1 and press for action when the M/V Sabalan docked in Jabel
Ali on April 2. Reck said that from UK intelligence, Germany
was already familiar with most of the information included in
the USG nonpaper. She said that the container number,
IRSU2424458, and bill of lading number, PCL0621N/ISH/9456,
was information that she had not seen before.
SOME CONFUSION AS TO WHO WILL BE PRESENT AT INSPECTION
-------------- --------------
9. (S//NF) Reck and Klinger said that when the inspection
takes place, their expectation is that USG and UK authorities
will be present in a supervisory capacity with German
personnel (BND) in the area. However, according to McKenzie,
the UK is under the assumption that only German officials
will be present. McKenzie emphasized the UK's preference to
stay out of the limelight for optical reasons and want the
Germans to carry the torch.
AFTER INSPECTION, GERMANY WANTS FULL READOUT FROM THE USG
-------------- --------------
10. (S//NF) Germany wants as detailed information as
possible as quickly as possible from the USG after the ship
is inspected. Specifically, Reck mentioned pictures,
quantities of items (computers),models, serial numbers,
estimated value, etc. Reck said that this information should
be presented to the BND by USG entities first and soon
afterwards to the MFA. Germany insisted that this
information is critical for them and that Germany would use
this to follow-up on their inquiry with Siemens.
COMMENT
--------------
11. (S//NF) Germany wants to remain as distant as possible
from any legal or financial liabilities if it turns out that
there is nothing on the ship of proliferation concern and the
ship owner seeks damages. Klinger emphasized that Germany,
BERLIN 00000406 003 OF 003
even now, does not have any knowledge of the precise identity
of the goods and that they are really basing their actions on
trust in the UK information. This has Germany feeling a
little bit nervous. They want to be good partners and take
action on this time-sensitive case (and they have) but are
worried about getting egg in their face if this information
is flawed.
12. (S//NF) During the conversation, Reck and Klinger sought
every opportunity to distance Germany from any responsibility
in this case if things go amok. For example, Reck observed
that Siemens has factories in China and noted that it is
entirely possible that these computers were manufactured
there, making this China,s export control problem, not
theirs. Reck also pointed out the frequent Chinese forgeries
of German products and that this also should be taken into
consideration.
13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance
in responding to the German information request posed in
paragraph 10.
Koenig
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, UK, GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY TAKING ACTION ON SHIPMENT OF SIEMENS
COMPUTERS TO UNSCR LISTED IRANIAN ENTITY
REF: A. STATE 31434
B. EMAILS PETERSEN-HARDIMAN 04/01/09 - 04/02/09
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for
reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 13.
2. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Germany delivered two non-papers on
April 1 to United Arab Emirates (UAE) MFA Deputy Director
General Al-Absi, and UAE MFA Director General (for European
Issues) Kazim, expressing Germany,s request for the UAE to
interdict the IRISL vessel M/V Sabalan. The papers also
asked the UAE to inspect its cargo for Siemens computers and
accessories - possibly intended for use with Iranian
centrifuge cascades. Germany informed us that the M/V
Sabalan has been identified and secured and that they expect
that the crate contents will be inspected on Sunday, April
4, likely in Jabel Ali. Germany did not indicate if a German
official would be present, supervising the inspection.
Germany gave no further details about the inspection other
than to say "this is a positive development" and "we'll wait
and see what we find out." END SUMMARY
3. (S//NF) On April 1, EconOff delivered the reftel demarche
to German MFA officers, Markus Klinger, Deputy Office
Director for Export Controls, and Nancy Reck, Desk Officer
for MTCR Export Controls. Both Reck and Klinger gave EconOff
a comprehensive readout of Germany's views about this case
and the action they are taking. On April 2, EconOff received
a readout from Alexandra McKenzie, a First Secretary from the
British Embassy in Berlin who is responsible for
Nonproliferation issues. Also on April 3, EconOff received a
phone call from Reck, during which Reck described the plans
to inspect the cargo for the suspected Siemens computers on
April 4. In addition to the MFA, Reck and Klinger indicated
that the BND (the German intelligence service) was intimately
involved in this case and that German Economics Ministry Head
of Division for International Export Regimes, Claus Warnken
(Bonn),is also very active in this case.
GERMANY IS TAKING ACTION BASED ON UK INTELLIGENCE
-------------- --------------
4. (S//NF) According to Klinger and McKenzie, beginning
Sunday, March 29, the BND was given "detailed information" by
British intelligence sources about an imminent shipment of
Siemens computers from China to Iran with the likely
end-recipient of the goods being the Iranian firm Kalaye
Electric Company (KEC),a firm listed under UNSCR 1737 for
its involvement in Iran's nuclear program. The German MFA
said that the BND informed them of the case on Monday, March
30 to start working with the German Export Control Authority
(BAFA) to find out from Siemens if they knew anything about
computer shipments to Iran. According to Reck, Siemens
claimed no knowledge of this shipment and requested more
details in order to be more helpful. Klinger and Reck said
that, based on the UK information, the German Embassy in the
UAE delivered two nonpapers on April 1 to the UAE MFA,
requesting the goods inspection.
THE UK TACTICALLY WANTED ACTION TO COME FROM GERMANY
-------------- --------------
5. (S//NF) McKenzie said that it is a priority to the UK
that this shipment is stopped before reaching Iran and that
the UK feels that getting the UAE to take action will be much
more effective if the request comes from the Germans.
McKenzie stated that the optics of this situation should be
straight-forward, given that the goods are believed to be of
German origin. Elaborating, she hinted that the Germans
simply have more credibility with the UAE on these matters
and if the request were to come directly from the UK, it may
appear politically-motivated to the Emiratis.
GERMANY FEELS UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE MESSENGER ROLE
-------------- --------------
6. (S//NF) Germany feels uncomfortable in the messenger
role, but sees the urgency to take action now and wants to be
BERLIN 00000406 002 OF 003
a good partner. Reck and Klinger strongly stated that, given
the circumstances surrounding this case, Germany is not/not
legally obligated to take action. Reck insisted that the
fact that there is information indicating that the items were
headed to KEC in Iran automatically obligates the UAE to
inspect the shipment, based on their international
responsibility. (COMMENT: Germany feels like they are doing
the right thing but are crossing their fingers that they do
not get burned. As a historical note, Germany has bad
memories of a case involving Mercedes Benz trucks sent to
Syria, in which the German government was taken to court by a
Polish ship captain for over 30,000 euro worth of damages.
Germany's nightmare scenario would be that nothing of concern
is found after the inspections are completed and that they
are left in the shadow of blame. END COMMENT)
THE USG WAS BROUGHT INTO THE MIX TO ADD PRESSURE ON THE UAE
-------------- --------------
7. (S//NF) McKenzie suggested that the USG was brought into
the loop in order to add pressure to the Germans to act
quickly. She suggested that this was first communicated via
intelligence channels and later in diplomatic channels.
According to Reck, the fact that the USG was pressing for
action definitely had an effect on Germany and may have been
the "decisive factor" on the UAE getting them to respond
positively to the German nonpaper request. Reck said that
the UAE "promised" to take action on this case in response to
the April 1 German nonpaper.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BROUGHT ONLINE BASED ON BND REQUEST
-------------- --------------
8. (S//NF) According to McKenzie, the decision to bring this
case into diplomatic channels was based on reluctance from
the BND to take further action unless specifically directed
by Berlin. McKenzie indicated that the UK preference was for
this case to stay in intelligence channels. As a result, the
UK coordinated with the USG to demarche the Germans on April
1 and press for action when the M/V Sabalan docked in Jabel
Ali on April 2. Reck said that from UK intelligence, Germany
was already familiar with most of the information included in
the USG nonpaper. She said that the container number,
IRSU2424458, and bill of lading number, PCL0621N/ISH/9456,
was information that she had not seen before.
SOME CONFUSION AS TO WHO WILL BE PRESENT AT INSPECTION
-------------- --------------
9. (S//NF) Reck and Klinger said that when the inspection
takes place, their expectation is that USG and UK authorities
will be present in a supervisory capacity with German
personnel (BND) in the area. However, according to McKenzie,
the UK is under the assumption that only German officials
will be present. McKenzie emphasized the UK's preference to
stay out of the limelight for optical reasons and want the
Germans to carry the torch.
AFTER INSPECTION, GERMANY WANTS FULL READOUT FROM THE USG
-------------- --------------
10. (S//NF) Germany wants as detailed information as
possible as quickly as possible from the USG after the ship
is inspected. Specifically, Reck mentioned pictures,
quantities of items (computers),models, serial numbers,
estimated value, etc. Reck said that this information should
be presented to the BND by USG entities first and soon
afterwards to the MFA. Germany insisted that this
information is critical for them and that Germany would use
this to follow-up on their inquiry with Siemens.
COMMENT
--------------
11. (S//NF) Germany wants to remain as distant as possible
from any legal or financial liabilities if it turns out that
there is nothing on the ship of proliferation concern and the
ship owner seeks damages. Klinger emphasized that Germany,
BERLIN 00000406 003 OF 003
even now, does not have any knowledge of the precise identity
of the goods and that they are really basing their actions on
trust in the UK information. This has Germany feeling a
little bit nervous. They want to be good partners and take
action on this time-sensitive case (and they have) but are
worried about getting egg in their face if this information
is flawed.
12. (S//NF) During the conversation, Reck and Klinger sought
every opportunity to distance Germany from any responsibility
in this case if things go amok. For example, Reck observed
that Siemens has factories in China and noted that it is
entirely possible that these computers were manufactured
there, making this China,s export control problem, not
theirs. Reck also pointed out the frequent Chinese forgeries
of German products and that this also should be taken into
consideration.
13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance
in responding to the German information request posed in
paragraph 10.
Koenig