Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN382
2009-03-31 19:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY: SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSED AF/PAK

Tags:  PREL NATO EU AF PK UN GM 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0382/01 0901911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311911Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3723
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0497
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0621
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0703
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0824
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000382 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A-TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM-AARON COPE,
EUR/ERA-DANIEL WEISFELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO EU AF PK UN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSED AF/PAK
DELIVERA...

199909
2009-03-31
09BERLIN382
Embassy Berlin
CONFIDENTIAL
09BERLIN369|09STATE28929|09STATE29482
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000382
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A-TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM-AARON COPE,
EUR/ERA-DANIEL WEISFELD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO EU AF PK UN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSED AF/PAK
DELIVERABLES FOR NATO AND U.S.-EU SUMMITS
REF: A. BERLIN 369

B. STATE 29482

C. STATE 28929
Classified By: POL-MIL/EXTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT CHIEF BILL MOELLER. REASON
S: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000382 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/A-TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM-AARON COPE, EUR/ERA-DANIEL WEISFELD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO EU AF PK UN GM SUBJECT: GERMANY: SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSED AF/PAK DELIVERA... 199909 2009-03-31 09BERLIN382 Embassy Berlin CONFIDENTIAL 09BERLIN369|09STATE28929|09STATE29482 C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000382 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/A-TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM-AARON COPE, EUR/ERA-DANIEL WEISFELD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO EU AF PK UN GM SUBJECT: GERMANY: SUPPORTIVE OF PROPOSED AF/PAK DELIVERABLES FOR NATO AND U.S.-EU SUMMITS REF: A. BERLIN 369 ¶B. STATE 29482 ¶C. STATE 28929 Classified By: POL-MIL/EXTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT CHIEF BILL MOELLER. REASON S: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. German officials have been uniformly positive about the new U.S. Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy and largely supportive of our proposed deliverables for the NATO and U.S.-EU summits. The Germans are committed to covering almost all of the outstanding requirements in the north of Afghanistan, including election support forces, OMLTs, ANA infrastructure, and police trainer/mentors. Germany's contribution to the ANA Trust Fund remains under internal discussion, but Chancellor Merkel is expected to make an announcement on this at the NATO Summit. Germany stands by a previous commitment to double its contribution of police trainers/mentors to EUPOL, but it is becoming increasingly convinced that the Focused District Development (FDD) police training program has greater potential for success. END SUMMARY. FOLLOW-UP ¶2. (C) As reported ref A, Post delivered points from refs B and C to officials in the MFA, MOD and Chancellery on March 26, outlining the results of the U.S. Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review and our desired deliverables for the NATO and U.S.-EU summits. Post followed up with officials on March 30-31 to get a further read-out of German views. ELECTION SUPPORT FORCES AND OMLTs ¶3. (C) MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski said Germany agreed that at the NATO Summit, Allies should demonstrate that they are committed to fully staffing the election support forces and deploying the necessary additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLTs). He noted that Germany would deploy some 620 additional soldiers in the north by June -- 220 for temporary election support and 400 for permanent augmentation of the German presence (to increase the RC-North QRF to battalion size and beef up force protection at
the PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad). He claimed that with the German contribution, the entire Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for election support in the north would be fulfilled. He also noted that Germany would help partners suffering budgetary problems because of the economic crisis make their election support contributions. For example, Germany is providing airlift to move a company of Hungarian infantry from Budapest to the Hungarian PRT in Baghlan Province. ¶4. (C) Wasielewski claimed that by the end of the year, Germany and other northern partners would also fulfill all of the OMLT requirements for the two Afghan National Army (ANA) brigades currently based in the north. He noted that the U.S. is proposing to move forward the establishment of the 3rd Brigade in the north from 2013 to 2011. Wasielewski volunteered that Germany was not against this idea and would be ready, in cooperation with northern partners, to provide the OMLTs for that brigade as well. He noted that Germany had just recently built a garrison in Feyzabad for a company of ANA troops of the 2nd Brigade, and was prepared to consider building the infrastructure needed for the 3rd Brigade as well. ¶5. (C) Wasielewski emphasized that Germany was committed to helping Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A) carry out its initiative to establish a series of branch schools for the ANA, including expanding the logistics school in Kabul into a combat support school and building the proposed engineer school in Mazar-e Sharif. He acknowledged that there was wrangling within the German government about how to fund these projects, especially the engineer school, but gave assurances that we will do it. ANA TRUST FUND ¶6. (C) Wasielewski said that Germany welcomed the decision to expand the ANA Trust Fund to cover sustainment costs and agreed it was important that it be adequately financed. However, confirming what we were told last week by the MOD (ref A),he said it was still not clear how much Germany would contribute. He acknowledged that no single ministry had sufficient resources to cover the entire $100 million annual contribution requested by the U.S. Therefore, the decision would have to be taken at the highest levels of the government, i.e., the Chancellor herself. He thought the Chancellery was well aware that the Chancellor had to be ready to say something about this at the NATO Summit. ¶7. (C) We followed up with Ina Schuett, an action officer in the Security Affairs Office at the Chancellery, who confirmed that the issue was still under discussion. While she could not name a figure at this point for how much Germany would contribute, she too thought that the Chancellor would make an announcement on this at the Summit. NTM-A ¶8. (C) Wasielewski reiterated that Germany supported the establishment of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and hoped that the French and the other European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) members would, in the end, decide to deploy their paramilitaries through NTM-A. He noted that French FM Kouchner's proposal at the informal EU Gymnich meeting this past weekend to deploy the EGF as an independent European contribution, and to seek ad hoc logistical and force protection from NATO, had fallen flat. He said even High Rep Solana, who presumably would tend to favor this approach, saw problems with the French proposal. Wasielewski noted that the Italians favor deploying the EGF via NTM-A, but he conceded it was unclear whether France would accept having the EGF subordinated to the dual-hatted U.S. CSTC-A commander. ¶9. (C) MFA Deputy European Correspondent Thomas Schieb confirmed that Solana voiced caution when Kouchner made his EGF proposal at the Gymnich meeting. He noted that the French were also looking to share the costs of the EGF deployment, presumably through EU common funding. Schieb said Germany's position was that costs should lie where they fall, with each EGF country paying its own way. POLICE MENTORS: FDD VS. EUPOL ¶10. (C) Wasielewski revealed that while Germany would stand by its commitment to double its contribution of police mentors/trainers to EUPOL to 120 as part of the doubling of the entire EUPOL mission to 400, it saw greater potential for success with the Focused District Development (FDD) police training program. He noted that the initial reports from Germany's experience since beginning FDD in January in districts around Mazar-e Sharif were very positive. As a result, there were already internal discussions about possibly doubling the German FDD commitment from 10 districts to 20. He explained that there are now some 50 German civilian police trainer/mentors dedicated to the mission -- 20 who work at the training center in Mazar-e Sharif, where district police forces get their initial training, and 32 more who are (or will soon be) deployed on police mentoring teams (4 per team) that accompany and mentor district police forces when they return to their districts after basic training. Wasielewski pointed out that each police mentoring team (PMT) also includes 4 German military policemen, and that a total of 45 military policemen are dedicated to the mission. ¶11. (C) Wasielewski noted that FDD had a much better reputation among members of parliament than EUPOL and was therefore easier to sell in seeking additional resources and support. He also noted that FDD was proving more attractive than EUPOL in recruiting German policemen to go to Afghanistan, since it offered the opportunity, unlike EUPOL, to get off the compound and do something. The rate of satisfaction was significantly higher among German policemen working on FDD compared to those assigned to EUPOL. Wasielewski conceded that there was already an internal debate brewing about how Germany should allocate its scarce police resources in Afghanistan in the future. Still, he emphasized, there was no question that Germany would stand by its existing commitment of providing 120 police mentors/trainers to EUPOL. ¶12. (C) Wasielewski noted that the current criteria for German participation in FDD required that the district in question be within an hour's drive of a German PRT or other installation. He acknowledged that this restriction would have to be re-examined once the close-in districts around the provincial capitals in the north were taken care of. One idea, he said, was setting up safe houses in the outer districts that are going through FDD, where the PMTs could overnight. These safe houses would be manned by a force of 50 or so soldiers, as the Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) in Takhar Province is. CIVILIAN-MILITARY PLANNING CELLS ¶13. (C) Wasielewski admitted that while Germany saw little need for a civilian-military planning cell in RC-North, the U.S. should not take German rejection of the idea at last week's NATO PermReps coffee as the final word. That reaction was spurred by a sense that this had been suggested as a one-size-fits-all solution, without taking into consideration the different situation in the north. Germany looked forward to receiving more information about the idea and was open to being convinced. ELECTION FINANCING ¶14. (C) Wasielewski reported that Germany would donate $12 million this year on a bilateral basis in support of the upcoming Afghan elections, up from the $10 million it contributed last year. EU-PAKISTAN SUMMIT ¶15. (C) Deputy European Correspondent Schieb agreed that the EU has an important role to play in assisting Pakistan and promoting its stability, and that a EU-Pakistan Summit would be useful in forging a closer relationship. However, he did not think it would be realistic to hold such a summit before some time next year. He stressed it was important that such a summit have a clear agenda and be properly prepared. Koenig

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