PRELIMINARY GERMAN RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000369 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019 TAGS: MARR PREL NATO MOPS AF PK GM SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY GERMAN RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN DELIVERABLES FOR NATO AND U.S.-EU SUMMITS REF: A. STATE 28929 ¶B. STATE 29482 Classified By: POL-MIL/EXTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT CHIEF BILL MOELLER. REASON S: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. FM Steinmeier has responded positively to the new U.S. Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy, praising it for its emphasis on civilian assistance and development. While German officials had some initial misgivings about the planned creation of a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) -- fearing it would create new structures or require them to get a new parliamentary mandate for their ISAF deployment -- they now fully support the proposal, as outlined in a USNATO non-paper. While German officials agree that putting European gendarmerie under NTM-A would offer a lot of advantages, they think France will choose this option only a last resort, after trying to do this through the EU or "a third way." The Germans realize they have to make a contribution to the ANA Trust Fund, but it is still not clear how much they will give or when this will happen. END SUMMARY. DEMARCHE ¶2. (SBU) Post delivered ref A points to officials in the MFA, MOD and Chancellery on March 26, advising them that the U.S. Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review had been completed and briefing them on our desired deliverables for the NATO and U.S.-EU Summits. We followed up with the same contacts on March 27, delivering the White Paper as well as the ref B talking points that summarize the main conclusions of the Strategic Review. POSITIVE INITIAL REACTION ¶3. (C) Post will follow up early next week to get considered reactions to the new U.S. strategy and proposed deliverables, but preliminary comments by German officials have been favorable. FM Steinmeier, in the Czech Republic for an informal EU foreign ministers Gymnich meeting, has been quoted in press reports as praising the new U.S. strategy for "coming much closer to the European vision for the deployment in Afghanistan" by stressing the importance of civilian assistance and development. At the same time, Steinmeier recognized the need for a robust military component to combat "the forces who are bringing instability and violence to this country." He thought Germany and other European countries would not be asked to send additional troops to Afghanistan -- instead, the emphasis would be on bolstering efforts in the stand-up and training of the Afghan police and army. He agreed that more could be done in this regard. NTM-A ¶4. (C) Initially, German officials raised concerns about the establishment of a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), noting that Germany did not favor creating new structures or doing anything that might require the government to seek a new parliamentary mandate before the September Bundestag elections. However, following the circulation of the U.S. "Food-for-Thought Paper" at NATO on March 26, MOD Afghanistan Officer Lt. Col. Dirk Hamann assured us that, in fact, Germany was on board with the idea of NTM-A. Hamann said that it was now clear that the U.S. is not proposing to create new structures, but rather just suggesting to dual-hat the CSTC-A commander. Hamann viewed the proposed establishment of NTM-A as another welcome step toward the goal of bringing all military operations under one command (ISAF) and thereby improving unity of effort. MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski confirmed German support of NTM-A, on the understanding that German participation in the Focused District Development (FDD) police training program would continue to be conducted on a bilateral basis in cooperation with CSTC-A, and not integrated into NTM-A. Wasielewski said it would cross a red line for German civilian police officers, serving as trainers/mentors, to be put under military command. GENDARMERIE ¶5. (C) Both Hamann and Wasielewski agreed that NTM-A would offer the ideal way for the proposed new gendarmerie forces from France, Italy and others to be deployed in Afghanistan. Putting the gendarmerie under NTM-A, rather than under the EU, would assure them of the necessary logistical and force protection support from NATO, and avoid the NATO-EU cooperation problems that have bedeviled the EUPOL mission from the start. Hamann thought it likely, however, that France would only move to the NTM-A option after trying to make it work through the EU and pushing the Turks to drop their blockage of NATO-EU cooperation. Wasielewski said he understood that France was seeking a "third way," whereby the gendarmerie forces would not come under NTM-A or the EU, but would instead get their logistical and force protection support from ISAF based on a separate, ad hoc arrangement. ANA TRUST FUND ¶6. (C) Hamann noted that there continues to be an "internal German conflict" over how much Germany should commit to contribute to the ANA Trust Fund and which ministry should pay. While there is a recognition that Germany must contribute some amount, all of the ministries involved in Afghanistan -- MFA, MOD, Development and Interior -- claim they cannot afford to contribute the $100 million the U.S. has asked Germany to pay per year. Hamann noted that in her March 26 speech to the Bundestag, previewing the NATO Summit, Chancellor Merkel had made clear that Germany was already "doing more" in Afghanistan, signaling a reluctance to make additional contributions now. Because it was unclear how large the German contribution to the Trust Fund would be -- and when it would come -- Hamann wondered if the U.S. target of $500 million in initial contributions should be revised down accordingly. He expressed concern about the message that would be sent if expectations for initial contributions are not met. Koenig