MERKEL'S G-20 SUMMIT AGENDA: A CLOSER LOOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000354 NOFORN STATE FOR EEB/OMA (WHITTINGTON),DRL/ILCSR AND EUR/AGS (SCHROEDER) LABOR FOR ILAB (BRUMFIELD) TREASURY FOR ICN (KOHLER),IMB (MURDEN, MONROE, BEASLEY) AND OASIA SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: EFIN PREL GM SUBJECT: MERKEL'S G-20 SUMMIT AGENDA: A CLOSER LOOK REF: A. BERLIN 00254 ¶B. BERLIN 00312 Classified By: CDA JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Partly out of conviction, and partly out of political expediency, Chancellor Merkel has positioned herself as champion of fiscal restraint and financial reform in the G-20. She is firmly convinced that lax financial oversight and regulation were root causes of the current crisis, and that without a new and improved financial architecture, recovery will be ephemeral. At the same time, Merkel lambasts those who would turn the G-20 Summit into an "artificial" contest over whose stimulus package is biggest. Germany is facing a recession of historic proportions, with projections of up to a seven percent contraction. Yet the downturn hit the real economy later in Germany than in the United States, and generous social welfare and labor systems have muted the impact of unemployment, obviating the need for immediate pump-priming. Merkel's views are shared across the political spectrum here; Germans of all stripes expect the government to hold down spending and control the banks because of historical fears of inflation and financial ruin. ¶2. (C) There is a European dimension to Merkel's agenda as well. The financial turmoil in central and eastern European economies is hammering German exporters and could hit German banks, but the government does not want to get stuck with the bill for rescuing one country after another; hence, Germany supports a multilateral approach over bilateral assistance. Meanwhile, a number of highly publicized tax-cheating scandals involving prominent (rich) Germans have generated popular outrage over tax havens (not unlike anger in the U.S. over the AIG bonuses),compelling Berlin to raise the profile of the issue in the G-20. In sum, Chancellor Merkel is unlikely to commit to new stimulus measures at the Summit, but circumstances may still force her to consider a third stimulus package before the September national elections. END SUMMARY. G-20 PRIORITIES: REGULATION VS. STIMULUS -------------- ¶3. (C) The list of German priorities for the April 2 G-20 Summit in London includes tightening international 
regulations and supervision, renouncing protectionism, buttressing the International Monetary Fund (IMF),and cracking down on tax havens, among others (Ref A). Nowhere on the list, however, is there any mention of stimulus measures. In recent weeks, the Chancellor has publicly rebuffed suggestions by U.S. officials that G-20 leaders focus on coordinated stimulus measures when they meet on April 2. Regulation is top of the German list. FINANCIAL REGULATION: TOLD YOU SO -------------- ¶4. (C) Financial reform is more than an academic matter for Merkel and her advisers; it is a gut issue. German officials are fond of recalling that during the German G-8 and EU Presidencies of 2005, the previous U.S. administration had rejected their proposals to regulate "hedge funds" (shorthand for all sorts of non-bank institutions and off-balance sheet activities not fully subject to government supervision). To many Germans, it was the collapse of the unregulated, free-wheeling U.S. financial sector that has led to Germany's worst recession since the 1930s. Finance Ministry State Secretary Joerg Asmussen recently decried the current situation as "not a crisis in the system but a crisis of the system." The solution, championed most notably by Asmussen's boss, Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck (Social Democratic Party -- SPD),is to tame financial markets through an international regulatory and macro-prudential framework, in some ways reflecting the logic of Germany's touted "social-market economy." ¶5. (C/NF) It is also a winner politically for the Chancellor to take on the Anglo-Saxon economic model. Merkel privately told representatives of the German banking association on March 24 that she had no intention of accepting any responsibility for the crisis, and would instead pin the BERLIN 00000354 002 OF 003 blame squarely on the financial community in the months leading up to the national election. STIMULUS: NOT YET -------------- ¶6. (C) Why is Chancellor Merkel so averse to further stimulus measures? Germany's inter-war experience with hyperinflation still looms large in the national consciousness. Merkel is highly sensitive to what the German public perceives as "excessive public spending," according to contacts at the Finance Ministry. Another reason for German parsimony is that the huge stimulus package (over a trillion dollars) in the former eastern states after reunification saddled Germany with a massive national debt. The recession also hit the real economy in Germany later than in the United States, and its generous social welfare and unemployment insurance system has cushioned the impact of downturn, making the need for fiscal remedies seem less acute. As a result, almost everyone across the political spectrum, even rivals in the SPD and Free Democratic Party (FDP),agrees with the Chancellor on holding down public spending. ¶7. (C) Sentiment from within the Chancellor's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to minimize deficits is especially strong. Polls show support for the CDU (though not so far for Merkel herself) is slipping because of a sense that the party has lost its way. The market-friendly FDP appears to be the main beneficiary. This has set off alarm bells among CDU stalwarts. "I don't want to blame it all on Ms. Merkel," Josef Schlarmann, head of the CDU's Small-Business Federation, said recently. "But a leftwards drift of the CDU will damage the party more than it will benefit it." Merkel's support for a bill allowing the expropriation of stricken lender Hypo Real Estate has added to the impression she is deviating from core party values. Many entrepreneurs are openly dismissive of Merkel for failing to institute corporate tax reform and other pro-business measures that she had promised before the last election in 2005. Opposition to fiscal measures over and above the two packages already approved -- totaling 81 billion euros over two years -- could change as the employment outlook darkens, as expected later in the year. THE SPECTER OF PROTECTIONISM -------------- 8.(C) Another constituency that Merkel cannot ignore is the country's exporters. Hence, Chancellor Merkel is eager that G-20 leaders reaffirm a commitment against protectionism, and is sensitive to developments such as the "Buy America" provision in the U.S. stimulus plan. Exports, which make up half of German GDP, plunged 21 percent in January 2009 compared with the previous month. Commerzbank Senior Economist Bernd Weidensteiner told us the economic situation is so dire, economists are at a loss to find the appropriate predictive models; the bank is predicting GDP will drop by up to 7 percent this year. Given the muted role of consumption, the German economic engine will continue to sputter until global demand for its exports picks up. TROUBLE TO THE EAST -------------- ¶9. (C) Merkel's support for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- and in particular beefing up its resources -- is likewise based on powerful economic interests (Ref B). Austrian, Italian, German and other western European banks have over 1 trillion euros of exposure in central and eastern European (CEE) countries, several of which are facing external financing gaps and impaired market access. Beyond the impact on exporters and banks, the German government is also concerned about possible political destabilization in the region as a consequence of the financial turmoil. In part to burnish his economic credentials before the election, SDP Chancellor Candidate and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier is setting up in his ministry a "Working Group on the Economic and Financial Crisis" to deal with the issue. Germany joined EU consensus to double funds available to the EU's balance of payment facility to support non-euro EU members. Boosting the IMF's war chest is another way the German government can contribute to the rescue of fragile emerging economies without providing a bilateral bailout -- a BERLIN 00000354 003 OF 003 prospect that would not go down well with most Germans. AND TAX HAVENS TO THE SOUTH -------------- ¶10. (C) It may not loom large among financial experts, but cracking down on tax dodgers is enormously popular in Germany at the moment. With relish, Finance Minister Steinbrueck has likened the Swiss to Indians running scared from a cavalry ready to enforce international banking laws. Steinbrueck and Merkel do not expect the G-20 to draw up a black list of tax havens at the London meeting, but want to bring countries like Liechtenstein into compliance with rules on the exchange of tax information as set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD). THE EU DIMENSION -------------- ¶11. (C) There is likewise an EU dynamic to German maneuverings in the G-20. According to an Economic Ministry official, Merkel had hoped to "block additional calls on the EU level which would require Germany to co-fund programs that do not make sense, such as the 5 billion euro EU stimulus plan." (NOTE: In the end, Germany reluctantly accepted the plan, with strings attached.) The Germans also hope to preserve the European Stability and Growth Pact's Maastricht deficit criteria (no more than three percent of GDP) and have worked hard in recent weeks to get the French on board. "Germany has always seen itself as one of the guardians of a stable European currency," our contact said, "and keeping state budgets in check is an important element in that endeavor." Thus, Merkel's insistence on fiscal austerity at the G-20 is partly designed to hold the line on EU spending. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) Merkel clearly believes stronger financial regulation and oversight will instill much needed confidence in the global financial system, and thus spur recovery. Calling attention to transatlantic differences over G-20 priorities, however, is probably intended more for European and German audiences than for U.S. officials. Privately, German officials involved in G-20 preparations acknowledge that the Obama Administration has indeed made a strong commitment to strengthening regulation and oversight, as well as to assisting emerging economies. Moreover, Germany's export-dependent economy stands to benefit disproportionately from expansionary policies in other countries, such as the United States. The German electoral timetable, however, will make it difficult for the Chancellor to commit to additional stimulus measures at the G-20 Summit in London. The dynamic will change as the full impact of the recession hits Germany and joblessness mounts in the run-up to the September elections. At that point, a third stimulus initiative becomes much more likely. Koenig