Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN330
2009-03-20 12:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMANY AGREES ON NEED TO MAINTAIN "IN TOGETHER,
how-toVZCZCXRO5445 OO RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #0330 0791213 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 201213Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3630 INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0009 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0810 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0208 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0293 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0059 RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0208 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0099 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0431 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0957 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0076 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0794 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000330
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - CHRIS DAVY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO KPKO KV GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AGREES ON NEED TO MAINTAIN "IN TOGETHER,
OUT TOGETHER" PRINCIPLE IN KOSOVO
REF: STATE 26179
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000330
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - CHRIS DAVY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO KPKO KV GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AGREES ON NEED TO MAINTAIN "IN TOGETHER,
OUT TOGETHER" PRINCIPLE IN KOSOVO
REF: STATE 26179
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) Post delivered reftel points to MFA NATO Office
Director Bernhard Schlagheck and MOD Political Military
Affairs Branch Chief Col. Bernd Schuett on March 20,
emphasizing the U.S. concern about the apparent intentions of
several Allies to draw down their forces in Kosovo
unilaterally in the coming months.
2. (C) Both Schlagheck and Schuett confirmed that Germany was
in "complete agreement" on the need to establish benchmarks
for moving to a deterrent presence. They also agreed that
KFOR should not be drawn down before it is clear that both
EULEX and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) are capable of
fully performing all of their roles and responsibilities
throughout Kosovo. Schlagheck noted that Germany was
actively resisting French and UK attempts to highlight the
potential draw-down of KFOR in the NATO Summit communique,
believe that it was premature to do so.
3. (C) Schuett indicated that the German delegation at NATO
HQ was actively pressing other Allies to refrain from any
unilateral decisions or announcements regarding the
withdrawal of their national contingents from KFOR. He
pointed out that while the military side of the Alliance was
doing "prudent military planning" on a possible three-stage
draw-down of KFOR from 15,000 to 10,000 to 5,000 and finally
to 2,500 over the course of a year, this concept had not yet
been presented to the NAC, much less approved by it.
Therefore, the status quo remained in place and there was no
basis for any unilateral national draw-downs.
4. (C) With regard to supporting the stand-up and equipping
of the KSF, Schlagheck and Schuett noted that budgetary and
legal issues had prevented Germany from making a financial
donation to the KSF Trust Fund. However, Germany had made an
in-kind contribution of some 200 slightly used military
vehicles, which SHAPE had valued at 12 million Euros. This
made Germany one of the largest contributors to the KSF Trust
Fund. They also noted that Germany had contributed 1.5
million Euros to assist with the dissolution of the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) and the transition of KPC members to
other occupations.
Koenig
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RPM - CHRIS DAVY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO KPKO KV GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AGREES ON NEED TO MAINTAIN "IN TOGETHER,
OUT TOGETHER" PRINCIPLE IN KOSOVO
REF: STATE 26179
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) Post delivered reftel points to MFA NATO Office
Director Bernhard Schlagheck and MOD Political Military
Affairs Branch Chief Col. Bernd Schuett on March 20,
emphasizing the U.S. concern about the apparent intentions of
several Allies to draw down their forces in Kosovo
unilaterally in the coming months.
2. (C) Both Schlagheck and Schuett confirmed that Germany was
in "complete agreement" on the need to establish benchmarks
for moving to a deterrent presence. They also agreed that
KFOR should not be drawn down before it is clear that both
EULEX and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) are capable of
fully performing all of their roles and responsibilities
throughout Kosovo. Schlagheck noted that Germany was
actively resisting French and UK attempts to highlight the
potential draw-down of KFOR in the NATO Summit communique,
believe that it was premature to do so.
3. (C) Schuett indicated that the German delegation at NATO
HQ was actively pressing other Allies to refrain from any
unilateral decisions or announcements regarding the
withdrawal of their national contingents from KFOR. He
pointed out that while the military side of the Alliance was
doing "prudent military planning" on a possible three-stage
draw-down of KFOR from 15,000 to 10,000 to 5,000 and finally
to 2,500 over the course of a year, this concept had not yet
been presented to the NAC, much less approved by it.
Therefore, the status quo remained in place and there was no
basis for any unilateral national draw-downs.
4. (C) With regard to supporting the stand-up and equipping
of the KSF, Schlagheck and Schuett noted that budgetary and
legal issues had prevented Germany from making a financial
donation to the KSF Trust Fund. However, Germany had made an
in-kind contribution of some 200 slightly used military
vehicles, which SHAPE had valued at 12 million Euros. This
made Germany one of the largest contributors to the KSF Trust
Fund. They also noted that Germany had contributed 1.5
million Euros to assist with the dissolution of the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) and the transition of KPC members to
other occupations.
Koenig