IRAN: GERMANY INCREASINGLY FORWARD-LEANING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000298 SIPDIS, P STAFF, NEA/IR, EUR/CE, S/SAGSWA, EEB, ISN, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETRD GM IR SUBJECT: IRAN: GERMANY INCREASINGLY FORWARD-LEANING ON SANCTIONS, BUT QUESTIONS REMAIN REF: A) 07 BERLIN 2037 B) BERLIN 121 C) PAETZOLD-NEA/IR FEB 19 E-MAIL D) BERLIN 289 E) BRUSSELS 1910 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John Koenig for reasons 1.4(b)/(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with key German government officials indicate that the German government, in coordination with its EU-4 partners, continues work to tee up additional EU designations of Iranian entities. The key problem is on the sequencing and breadth of designations, on which German agencies are not in complete agreement. Notably, the Chancellery and MFA assure us that the reluctant Ministry of Economics does not hold veto power over this decision. A clear and consistent USG message to all German interlocutors, especially on timing, will remain essential to keep the Germans on track. On the EU level, the MFA tells us that Germany and its EU-4 partners will lobby recalcitrant Member States bilaterally and as a group, taking the issue to senior levels, and encourage us to do the same. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: All GoG interlocutors view the conclusion of the USG policy review as a key milestone for further operationalization of these proposals and recognize the necessity of having the threat of tough sanctions to maintain pressure on Iran. The MFA appears to be most ready to move quickly, while the Ministry of Economics, and to a lesser extent, the Chancellery have some questions about the sequencing of U.S.-Iranian dialogue and the enactment of EU designations. These differences are due largely to the fractious nature of Germany's interagency process, which is further compounded by a breakdown in interagency communication in the run-up to the September federal elections. A number of tools exist to help close the gap among the MFA, Chancellery, and Ministry of Economics: --seizing on opportunities to convince newly installed Economics Minister zu Guttenberg that the U.S. wants Germany to press ahead on EU sanctions -- at the conclusion of the USG policy review process, communicating our expectations of German action to all key German stakeholder ministries --Ensuring information-sharing reaches German stakeholders across the German government --Continuing public outreach to explain and counter common misperceptions about U.S. policy on Iran. END SUMMARY. GERMAN INTERAGENCY PRESSING AHEAD ON EU DESIGNATIONS DESPITE ECONOMICS MINISTRY QUALMS ¶3. (C) GoG Principals (including Chancellor Merkel) tabled a final decision on how to proceed with the MFA's proposal to take stronger action on Iran sanctions (ref B and C) on March ¶4. According to a press report, Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier support tough sanctions, with newly installed Economics Minister zu Guttenberg failing to present a definitive position. Instead, zu Guttenberg reportedly voiced his Ministry's concerns that further sanctions would impose disproportionately high costs on German companies with unclear political benefits. In private, Chancellery and MFA contacts, however, downplay the amount of influence the Economics Ministry holds in the debate. A Chancellery official told CDA March 9 that the Ministry of Economics "clearly" does not/not have a veto on further sanctions, "regardless of what they believe". A working-level MFA official told PolOff March 9 that the Chancellor had made it clear that FM Steinmeier has the mandate to continue EU discussions. For his part, Economics Minister zu Guttenberg told CDA March 6 that his Ministry is trying to form a strategy that provides "balance." While his Ministry supports specific measures on LNG equipment, they also call for "exercising prudence" on additional EU designations. Zu Guttenberg added that dialogue should be given an opportunity to work. GERMANY AND EU-4 PARTNERS LOBBYING DISSIDENT MEMBER STATES ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, the MFA reports that the EU-4's efforts to forge EU-wide consensus on new designations continues. The MFA official said Germany was very pleased with Treasury Acting A/S Glaser's presentation on Iran to EU Member States in Brussels on March 3, noting those EU Member States not usually privy to EU-4 discussions with the U.S. felt they BERLIN 00000298 002 OF 003 were "finally" getting the information needed to make an informed decision. ¶5. (C) Looking ahead, according to the MFA contact, EU-4 energies will be spent on lobbying Member Countries bilaterally and in joint efforts. The MFA contact noted that, at a March 4 EU-4 experts-level meeting, the participating countries decided to lobby dissident Member States bilaterally and as a group before trying to schedule another COMEM/CONOP experts-level meeting for formal discussion of the proposed designations. This advocacy would include senior-level discussions at fora such as the upcoming GYMNICH, he said. With two key dissenting countries, Sweden and Spain, taking the EU Presidency reins back-to-back starting in July 2009, Germany recognizes the pressing need to bring the dissenting countries on board quickly, he added. GERMANY LOOKS TO USG POLICY REVIEW FOR CUES ON IMPLEMENTING ITS POLICY ¶6. (C) In all conversations, German interlocutors have made clear that while they are currently laying the groundwork for further action against Iran, actual operationalization will depend on the results of the USG's Iran policy review. Among German interlocutors, the MFA currently appears most ready to move forward quickly. The MFA official said that the latest USG GAERC non-paper reinforced Acting A/S Glaser's presentation in Brussels. He added that once the USG's policy review is complete, it is imperative that the USG send a clear message to the EU to help push the message forward. He underscored the importance of Spain, and asked if the USG would consider intervening with Spain bilaterally on the issue. ¶7. (C) On the other hand, the Chancellery and, to a greater extent, Economics Ministry still have some questions. While recognizing the need to have the threat of tough sanctions in hand if Iran does not cooperate, these two agencies still have questions regarding the sequencing of EU sanction implementation and U.S.-Iranian dialogue. Economics Minister zu Guttenberg told CDA that U.S. - Iranian direct talks should certainly be given a chance, and expressed worry that implementing the designations at this critical point in time may be counterproductive to dialogue. He said that movement ahead on both EU designations, as well as on efforts on LNG equipment and technology, would hinge on the results of direct US-Iran contacts. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: While German momentum seems to be headed in the right direction, the German interagency's continued divergence on the details is frustrating, but not surprising. German ministers enjoy a large degree of portfolio autonomy; although the Chancellery can overrule ministries, doing so requires expending a great deal of political capital (ref A). Currently, the ministries' relative autonomy is compounded by the ever-decreasing level of communication among the German interagency in the run-up to the German federal elections. Chancellery contacts, for example, tell us that they did not receive a copy of Treasury Acting A/S Glaser's presentation from the MFA. The situation at the Economics Ministry is also complicated, as newly installed Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, a proponent of the two-track approach in his previous Bundestag foreign policy role, faces new pressures from the German business community and the historically reluctant Economics Ministry's bureaucracy (ref D). ¶9. (C) A number of tools exist for us to use in helping to close this information gap among the German government agencies: --seizing on opportunities to underscore to Economics Minister zu Guttenberg that the U.S. wants Germany to press ahead on Iran sanctions during the USG policy review on Iran. His March 15-17 discussions (ref D) with Treasury Secretary Geithner, Deputy Secretary Steinberg, and other senior officials serve as a key opportunity to reinforce with him directly our expectations of Germany. More broadly, we must also work to neutralize the argument by a variety of European actors (including Germany) that the EU and U.S. could contradict each other in the sequencing of the implementation of EU designations and U.S.-Iranian dialgoue. Given that EU discussions on designations are only in the most initial stage of the EU policymaking process (ref E),the risks of uncoordinated action between the U.S. and EU are very slim. BERLIN 00000298 003 OF 003 -- at the conclusion of USG policy review process, communicating our expectations of Germany to all key German stakeholder ministries. Since President Obama took office, we have witnessed an evolution of most German thinking (due largely to direct engagement with senior USG officials) from a "wait and see approach" to Germany's current forward-leaning approach in the EU arena. Once our policy review has been concluded, it will be vital to restate our expectations to the four key German ministries (Chancellery, MFA, Economics, and Finance) directly involved in Iran sanctions. Clear statements will prevent these ministries from misinterpreting our intentions of serious dialogue and using that as a carte blanche for inaction. --Ensuring information-sharing reaches German stakeholders across the German government. USG officials should not assume that German ministries (or their representatives abroad) are providing their interagency counterparts with meeting readouts or even evidentiary nonpapers or demarches. The Embassy is ready to double-track these efforts. --Continuing to use public outreach to explain and counter common misperceptions about U.S. policy. END COMMENT. Koenig