GERMANY'S THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO RETURNING HEU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000264 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/NESS DAN FENSTERMACHER STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2034 TAGS: KNNP TRGY IAEA RS GM SUBJECT: GERMANY'S THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO RETURNING HEU TO RUSSIA REF: A. 07 BERLIN 1629 ¶B. 07 STATE 126518 Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) This is an action request, please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Germany is exploring the mechanics of returning Russian-origin Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that is currently stored at the Rossendorf Research Reactor in the German state of Saxony to Russia. German Foreign Ministry (MFA) staff floated with us a three-point plan to expedite the transfer that specifically envisions USG financial support, per an existing nuclear material agreement with Russia. MFA staff wants to gather interagency support from those with equities in the transfer, draft an official letter from the MFA to the Russian Embassy detailing their intentions, and quietly execute the transfer during a lame duck period following the German 2009 September elections. END SUMMARY BOTTOM LINE - THIS IS ABOUT MONEY, NOT NONPROLIFERATION -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On February 25, Dr. Joerg Polster, MFA Nuclear Energy Policy Officer, outlined to EconOff this three-point plan for transferring the HEU to Russia. In explaining the plan, Polster said the HEU is very secure at the Rossendorf Research Reactor and is not a proliferation threat. Rather, Polster said that Germany's real concern is the expense of safeguarding, securing, and storing the HEU indefinitely in Saxony, as it is no longer useful as fuel. He explained that Rossendorf staff "crunched the numbers" and concluded that it would make sense simply to pay the Russians to "process" the HEU, rather than continue storing it at Rossendorf. Polster also said that he hoped the USG would be willing to pay for the transportation cost, per the 2004 assistance agreement between the USG and Russia for the transfer of Russian-produced research reactor fuel to Russia. (Comment: This agreement refers to the 2004 US/Russia Agreement on Transferring Russian-Produced Research Reactor Nuclear Fuel to the Russian Federation, signed in Moscow on May 27, 2004. It appears that this agreement does not explicitly detail a cost-sharing arrangement between Germany and the U.S, but contemplated that the Department of Energy and its Russian counterpart, the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, would formalize this after the parties signed the agreement. End Comment.) STEP ONE - GET THE SUPPORT OF MINISTRIES INVOLVED AND SAXONY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) To make this transfer happen, the Ministries of Environment (BMU),Economics (BMWi),Transportation (BMV), Foreign Affairs (MFA),as well as the Saxony State Minster for Environment and Agriculture must all agree to it in writing. Polster's plan is to convene a meeting of all the German elements involved, and representatives of Russia and the USG over the next 4-6 weeks to attempt to establish consensus for the transfer. Polster said that of all the domestic elements involved, the BMU would take the most convincing. (COMMENT: Polster said that the sales pitch to the BMU would be on nonproliferation grounds, given that the BMU's anti-nuclear political convictions would likely cause them to "drag their feet" on any HEU transfer decisions. END COMMENT) STEP TWO - SEND OFFICIAL LETTER FROM MFA TO RUSSIAN EMBASSY -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Polster said that once all the necessary political support is obtained, the MFA would draft a letter to the Russians stating Germany's intent to transfer the HEU to Russia and asking for Russia's official support. This letter would detail the financing of the HEU physical transfer (possibly from the USG) and HEU processing once in Russia (from Germany),as well as the transfer date and means of transportation. STEP THREE - COMPLETE HEU TRANSFER IN 60 DAYS POST-ELECTION -------------- -------------- BERLIN 00000264 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) To complete the plan, Polster envisions the transfer taking place within the first two months after Germany's September elections. Polster said that due to political sensitivities associated with the transfer, particularly in an election year, it would be "impossible" for this shipment to take place before the elections. By waiting until after the elections, Polster said that this governmental transition period would allow for the transfer to take place while minimizing political backlash - in other words, under the political radar. Polster said that the most likely means of transfer would be by land through Germany to the Baltic Sea and then by ship to Russia. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Nuclear material transfer in Germany remains technically complicated and politically delicate; consensus on transshipments is very difficult to obtain. It appears to us that Polster has a close professional relationship with Mr. Udo Helwig, Director at Rossendorf Nuclear Engineering and Analytic Inc., which is likely influencing Polster's motivation. We note that Polster anticipates an MFA argument to the BMU on nonproliferation grounds, while at the same time clearly telling us that security threats to the HEU at Rossendorf "has never been and will never be a problem." Polster said he is banking on USG support not only to help with the financing of the shipment, but also to support the nonproliferation argument to the BMU. ¶8. (U) Action Request: We would welcome Department guidance regarding US policy on such a transfer, particularly on any US financial obligations related to the agreement in para 2. Koenig