ADAPTED CFE: DRILLING DOWN ON GERMAN'S PROPOSALS

S E C R E T BERLIN 001606

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EUR/RPM FOR JENNIFER LAURENDEAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2034
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO GM
SUBJECT: ADAPTED CFE: DRILLING DOWN ON GERMAN'S PROPOSALS

REF: BERLIN 1569

Classified By: Political Deputy M/C Stan Otto for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (S) Summary. Germany believes allies should de-link the
1999 Istanbul Commitments from Adapted CFE (A/CFE) talks in
order to make headway with Russia. Germany also thinks
allies should formalize NATO's prior assurances of restraint
and begin a discussion on the meaning of "substantial forces"
in order to make flank regime provisions more palatable to
Moscow. In doing so, Germany's hopes to quickly replace CFE
with A/CFE as the governing arms control regime and the new
basis upon with to negotiate any outstanding issues. To that
end, Germany supports temporary implementation of A/CFE by
all parties -- prior to ratification by allies. German
officials have not shared the non-paper, which was given to
U/S Tauscher by German Ambassador Scharioth during a November
30 meeting, with any other party. End Summary.

THREE GOALS
--------------


2. (S) MFA Office Director for Conventional Arms Control
Michael Banzhaf reviewed with poloff the key points in a
November 30 German non-paper on CFE and provided further
background and justification for the proposed way ahead.
According to Banzhaf, Germany hoped to accomplish three goals
using the proposals outlined in its November 30 non-paper: 1)
end Russia's CFE suspension; 2) soften Moscow's opposition to
flank limits; and 3) quickly establish A/CFE as the new
conventional arms control regime. In order to bring Russia
back to the CFE regime, Banzhaf said the allies needed to
offer a significant "ice-breaker" issue such as a discussion
on the definition of "substantial combat forces". This
specific discussion, he added, could take place in parallel
with the ongoing A/CFE talks. Though separate discussions,
Banzhaf noted that the two could be linked, so that any stall
in A/CFE talks could be matched by also stalling talks on
"substantial combat forces". Germany's expectation is that
the beginning of the "substantial combat forces" talks, in
earnest, might move Russia to re-engage on the CFE reporting
and verification provisions that it suspended two years ago.

MAKING FLANKS LIMITS PALATABLE
--------------


3. (S) Banzhaf recognized that Russia had dug in its heels
on the issue of flank limits and pointed to three non-paper
proposals that -- as a package -- were aimed at making limits
more palatable to Moscow. The first component would be the
"ice-breaker" discussion on "substantial combat forces", the
second would be a formalization of NATO's prior declarations
of restraint, and third would be new provisions to prohibit
foreign forces from filling empty treaty-limited "headroom"
in countries referred to in the NATO declarations of
restraint. Banzhaf believed these three offers -- as a group
-- might encourage Russia to give way on flank limits.

DELINKING THE ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS FROM CFE
--------------


4. (S) Banzhaf stressed that -- rather than spurring Russia
along -- the Istanbul Committments had weighted down A/CFE
talks. Germany saw little chance for progress on these
committments within the context of A/CFE and, as a result,
suggested de-linking the two. Banzhaf did not suggest easing
pressure on Russia, but, instead, said that the allies might
find other venues in which to tackle these issues. Banzhaf
also underscored Germany's doubt that the myriad of
Georgia/Russia problems could be solved via A/CFE and
suggested breaking the "Georgia issue" completely out of the
A/CFE. Acknowleging that Georgia should not feel ignored,
Banzhaf pressed for parties to uphold their parts of the
August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement. In doing so, he
stressed that no party would have to prejudice it's position
on final status. As a result, further discussions on Georgia
could move from A/CFE circles to another forum like the
ongoing talks in Geneva.

TEMPORARY IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


5. (S) Banzhaf emphasized that Germany preferred a rapid move
toward A/CFE ratification -- with the door open for follow-on
discussions between NATO and Russia to iron out remaining
problems. To this end, he repeated the suggestion that
parties settle on an acceptable interpretation of A/CFE and
then agree to "temporary implementation" to bridge the gap
until formal ratification of the treaty. Given the fact that
countries are largely under their A/CFE-allowed limits,
Banzhaf predicted that temporary implementation of A/CFE
would require no changes to the status quo other than renewed
reporting and verification on the part of Russia. However,
Banzhaf noted that Germany would likely not insist on Russian
adherence to flank limits during the temporary implementation
phase -- relying on the hope that Russia would find no
practical reason to boost its forces along the flank.
Banzhaf hoped such an agreement could help build confidence
without ruffling feathers among those national bodies
responsible for ratification.


6. (S) Above all, Banzhaf stressed that Germany had only
shared its November 30 non-paper with the U.S. and had not
consulted with any other countries in developing its
proposals. Moreover, it reflected strictly Germany's
internal assessment on likely reactions from Russia. Only if
the U.S. and Germany agree to move forward based on the
non-paper would German officials try to engage other allies.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (S) Though the November 30 non-paper includes many
proposals, Banzhaf insisted that only three are new,
significant features. First is the de-linking of the
Istanbul Committments from the CFE -- which the Germans have
made noises about for some time. Second is the limit on the
use of national TLE "headroom" by foreign forces. And third
is a call to lower territorial ceilings in flank countries --
whose forces, Germany argues, are already well below those
allowed under current A/CFE provisions. However, Banzhaf
emphasized that the non-paper should be a starting point for
allied discussions and acknowledged that some parts require
further thought -- such as the best way to address new
concessions without forcing a new treaty negotiation.


8. (C) For now, German officials are mostly worried that the
A/CFE is stuck and needs a firm push to get it started again.
For its part, Germany's zeal for the CFE seems motivated by
the belief that it provides for a verification regime that,
itself, builds confidence and promotes engagement with
Russia. However, we should also be mindful that Germany
believes CFE (and A/CFE) will also give Moscow less reason to
balance NATO's conventional forces by deploying Russian
nuclear assets. The desired knock-on effect is that fewer
nuclear forces on the Russian side will diminish the need for
NATO nuclear assets -- such as tactical nuclear weapons in
Germany. End Comment.
MURPHY