GERMANY/RUSSIA: LOST THAT LOVING FEELING?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001604

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: GM NATO OSCE PGOV PREL RS ECON
SUBJECT: GERMANY/RUSSIA: LOST THAT LOVING FEELING?

REF: USNATO 00585

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4. (b
) and (c).


1. (C) Summary. German political decision- and
opinion-makers are making a more sober assessment of Russia
writ large, including its partnership with Germany and its
trajectory. German officials describe themselves as the most
avid supporters in Europe of the U.S. reset policy, but
nearly a year after the Vice President's February Munich
Security Conference speech, they still are asking how Germany
can help improve relations with Russia. This lack of policy
vision is reflected in a broader questioning of what type of
partnership Germany has and wants with Russia, perhaps best
exemplified by the decision to recall Berlin's ambassador to
Moscow. Although traditionalists -- even in the MFA and
Chancellery -- continue to stress Germany's historical,
cultural, and economic ties with Russia, the overall
political tone is "less romantic" toward Russia, in the words
of one parliamentarian. This is largely due to Russian
efforts to divide NATO and block movement on key treaties, to
say nothing of the "overall stagnation" of Russian society
and development. During a private roundtable hosted by
Ambassador Murphy, members of Germany's Russia "brain trust"
from the German Parliament, MFA, MOD, Chancellery, and
think-tank community displayed little belief that they could
influence Russian actions and saw assisting Russia's economic
modernization as the only hope for one day seeing a "reliable
international partner" in Russia. End Summary.

DEALING WITH RUSSIAN SECURITY PROPOSALS


2. (C) While recognizing that the Russian-proposed European
Security Treaty (EST) and the related proposal in the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) are a joint assault to divide and
weaken the West in the OSCE and NATO, Germany is reluctant to
disregard either proposal for fear of alienating Russia
further from European security structures (see reftel).
According to MFA Deputy Political Director Pohl, both Russian
proposals represent an attempt to "come to terms with the
past 20 years," and freeze the current dynamics in Europe,
specifically by "preventing further NATO enlargement and
ensuring that whatever NATO does will not impinge on Russian
security." The German government hopes that the Alliance and
OSCE will engage with Russia on the key issues within the
framework of existing albeit often not functioning agreements
(such as CFE). Rather than creating new arrangements, we
should attempt to make full use of existing agreements,
according to the Chancellery Division Head for the Former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Schulz.


3. (C) Germany agrees that the main forum for discussing the
EST should remain the OSCE but sees value in discussing the
two proposals in other forums. However, MFA officials admit
they are scratching their heads on how to keep Russia engaged
in the Corfu Process given the intense Russian dislike for
the OSCE, according to the MFA Division Head for OSCE Affairs
Freischlader. Moreover, Berlin is questioning Moscow's
interest in advancing cooperation in either multilateral
forum following the Russian antics leading up to the NATO
Foreign Ministerial and at the OSCE Ministerial. Put more
bluntly, MFA Deputy Division Head for NATO Denecke declared
that we often "have the misperception that Russia likes the
idea of cooperation." Recognizing this very real Russian
reluctance makes Berlin even more hesitant to disregard
either proposal, and the MFA already has confirmed the
Russian FM Lavrov will speak at the 2010 Munich Security
Conference -- likely as the head of delegation and about the
EST.

MOVING FORWARD WITH RUSSIA


4. (C) Berlin remains uncertain of how it can help the U.S.
improve relations with Russia beyond reiterating time and
again to Russian counterparts that Moscow should accept the
U.S. reset policy. Moving beyond this message, German
officials encourage the U.S. to continue engagement with
human rights activists, focus on economic engagement, offer
protocol tokens of goodwill, and redirect some aspects of the
Russian proposals (the EST and the proposal delvered in the
NRC) to CFE negotiations. Although Embassy contacts across
the board encourage the U.S. to engage in Russia with human
rights activists, small businesses, journalists, and so forth
in addition to officials, they see little hope in Russia's
domestic scene today, arguing that the situation has
deteriorated over the past decade.


5. (C) The Russian society as a whole (economically,
politically, and culturally) has entered a period of

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stagnation similar to the Brezhnev years, according to SPD
Deputy Caucus Chairman Erler. Widespread agreement exists
across the German policy community that the West only can
hope to help Russia out of this quandary through economic
engagement with the long-term goal that encouraging good
governance, the rule of law, and so forth eventually will
lead to broader developments. Although CDU Bundestag Member
and MFA German-Russian Coordinator Schockenhoff remains
upbeat that President Medvedev is reaching the future leaders
of Russia, the German policy community overall appears
pessimistic regarding Russia's domestic trajectory, and the
MFA is "preparing for" the possible return of Putin to the
presidency in 2012, something MFA contacts responsible for
Russia view as highly likely.


6. (C) Moreover, Berlin has become increasingly frustrated
with the lack of a positive Russian response to Washington's
overtures. FDP Foreign Policy Spokesman Stinner openly
voices his frustration, and MFA officials privately share
that they too are dismayed by Moscow's lack of movement on
key efforts to improve relations. Contacts are nearly
unanimous in their view that the U.S. throwing a few protocol
bones Russia's way would make Moscow a more tractable
partner. While referring to it as emotional blackmail,
Bundestag members stressed their belief that if Moscow saw it
was viewed as an equal in DC, cooperation likely would
improve. Specifically, Berlin awaits eagerly a follow-on
treaty to START as they hope it will provide the impetus for
moving forward on CFE negotiations. Parts of the Russian
proposal in the NRC can be addressed through the CFE
negotiations, according to Pohl.

GERMAN INTROSPECTION ON RUSSIA


7. (C) The MFA still appears uncertain of where their new
FM will lead relations with Russia. Although FM Westerwelle
has stressed continuity in the overall relationship, the MFA
and other government organs are questioning how "special" or
"strategic" the German-Russian partnership really is.
Bundestag members such as CDU Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Polenz and Greens Foreign Policy Spokeswoman Beck
openly mock the idea, and argue that the relationship is
predominately economic. However, the West needs Russia on
key policy issues (Iran, CFE, Afghanistan, etc.),so although
Russia is worse off domestically, we need Moscow, according
to many Bundestag members, the Chancellery, and MFA
functional and regional offices. The more traditional
approach to Russia remains strongly represented in the new
MFA policy planning staff covering Russia, who stress how
special Russia is and how special the Berlin-Moscow
connection is. Although this camp appears to be in the
minority, the policy planning staff normally has direct
access to the highest levels of the ministry.


8. (C) The debate within official German circles already has
taken an ugly turn with the policy planning staff openly
criticizing the MFA functional and regional offices for "not
getting Russia." For instance, the NATO, OSCE, and Russia
offices argue that the West should not "do Moscow's work" by
providing detailed counter-proposals on the EST or NRC
proposal. Instead, Moscow should provide a workable and
solid proposal in each forum. The MFA policy planning staff
argues that such an approach is exactly the wrong tactic
because Moscow wants to develop specific agreements jointly
with partner countries. Of utmost importance, Russia should
not feel like the Alliance or other OSCE members are ganging
up against Moscow. Beyond sharply criticizing this
viewpoint, Bundestag members including Schockenhoff argue
that it may be best for the Alliance to come to terms before
we enter negotiations with Russia. Perhaps the most
interesting development in this internal struggle was the
decision to recall German Ambassador to Moscow Schmidt for
his "soft approach" on Russia, according to press reports.
Although a replacement has not been named, MFA contacts
confirm that current German NATO PermRep Brandenburg is under
serious consideration.

COMMENT


9. (C) Recent negative Russian actions on human rights and
frustration with developing the relationship beyond economic
ties are causing officials to engage in a sober assessment of
the relationship. Thus far, the conclusion appears to be
that while Germany has a good rolodex of Russian contacts,
Berlin has little ability to influence policy, and therefore
lacks a truly strategic partnership in anything outside of
trade and investment. Moreover, the traditional and more
pessimistic or realistic approach currently under debate in
official circles -- while interesting -- may have little real
impact on overall policy but rather influence tactics. Both

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approaches recognize that cooperation with Russia is
necessary on numerous fronts but disagree on whether the West
should pre-coordinate. END COMMENT.
MURPHY