GERMAN-RUSSIAN BUSINESS: RIDING THE BEAR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001602 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV PREL GM RS SUBJECT: GERMAN-RUSSIAN BUSINESS: RIDING THE BEAR Ref: A) Moscow 2732 B) 08 Berlin 1208 BERLIN 00001602 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: German firms are riding the Russian bear, but nobody wants to get off. Meanwhile, Russian firms are increasingly investing in Germany to gain access to German technology. Germany accepts this, even in seemingly sensitive sectors, as helpful to economic recovery. Germans see Russian investment as a quid pro quo to facilitate access to Russia's vast market and remain largely committed to Russia's longer term future. To help cushion the economic downturn, German exporters to Russia are benefiting from expanded German government export guarantees, a clear sign that the new government will likely continue to nurture German/Russian trade. On the energy front, a high degree of interdependence remains a core reality, with price stability rather than gas cut-offs being the focus of concern. As 2010 approaches, German business and government are increasingly anxious about Russia's customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and point to a Russian tariff and customs collection regime that seems primarily centered on generating government revenue and bribes. Despite its strong and unwavering commitment to Russia, German industry perceives Russia as anything but a normal business partner. END SUMMARY. German Investment in Russia: Hanging Tough -------------- ¶2. (U) Investing in Russia is difficult even in good times, but German business has no intention to cut and run. Germany estimates its investment stock in Russia at 17 billion euros as of 2008 -- quite small (2 percent) measured against Germany's world-wide FDI of 880 billion euros, but comparable to Germany's FDI to China (also 2% of total FDI). Estimates of the number of German firms operating in Russia vary from four to six thousand, but everyone agrees that few German companies have left the Russian market despite the financial crisis, although some have reduced staff. Volkswagen, Germany's biggest industrial investor in Russia, announced in November that it will expand its production facilities in Kaluga, 170 km southwest of Moscow, despite the economic downturn and major German retailers such as Metro and Media Markt recently expanded into Russia. Regional differences remain, however. Both the Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft (German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations or OA) and the German Economics Ministry say the investment climate in Russia, while improving, is still not satisfactory and varies widely by region. Russian Investment in Germany: Strategic -------------- ¶3. (U) Since the onset of the financial crisis, the German public's fear of foreign investors buying up German companies has given way to a greater willingness to attract foreign investors, including investors from Russia. Only a year ago Germany passed a law, often called the "Gazprom Law." Its aim was to establish a government screening process aimed in part at preventing Russian state-owned enterprises from taking over German companies in strategic sectors. At the time there were persistent worries that Russian firms would exploit intellectual property to create competing products. ¶4. (U) Now, however, Russian firms are making significant investments in strategic German sectors with virtually no signs of public concern. In August of 2009, Russian businessman Igor Yusufov bought the Wadan shipyards in Wismar und Warnemuende in a multi-billion-euro deal. In an October 2009 meeting between German Chancellor Merkel and Russian President Medvedev, both leaders expressed public support for the deal. Russian firms are also considering investment in German microchip producers Infineon and Qimonda. One major Russian investment, however, was thwarted this year when GM rejected plans by a Canadian- Russian consortium led by Magna to buy a majority stake in Opel. GM's decision shocked both the German and Russian governments, not least as both sides wanted to use it as a basis for cementing ties in other sectors (ref A). ¶5. (U) Russian firms' investments tend to be strategic as well as commercial. They already hold significant stakes in the travel company TUI, construction firms Hochtief and Strabag, and in mining firm Kali+Salz. Russian Embassy Commercial Officer Dr. Bondarev points out that Russian firms invest in Germany for many of the same reasons as companies from other countries: diversification, strategic BERLIN 00001602 002.2 OF 002 access to the German and EU market and hopes for a good return. While Germany is regarded by Russian firms as a highly competitive and challenging market, it offers the kind of predictable investment environment many Russians find attractive. Fall in Trade Propped Up by Export Credits -------------- ¶6. (U) Germany's exports to Russia have been sorely affected by the economic crisis. In the first eight months of 2009, two-way trade fell by 60% compared to the same period in 2008. The German government's export credit entity KfW stepped in to support trade flows through loan agreements with six Russian banks to help finance purchase of German exports by small and medium-sized Russian firms. The German government is currently considering further expansion of the export credit program. Russia's exports to Germany mostly consist of oil and gas, and these have been relatively less affected. Russia currently runs a trade surplus with Germany of 3.5 billion euros. Energy Relations: Mutually Dependent -------------- ¶7. (U) Russia is Germany's principal energy supplier and depends heavily on energy revenues from Germany. Germany purchases 34 percent of its oil and 45 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Russia sells 80% of its gas to Europe, its greatest source of income. This is part of an overall pattern of mutual energy dependency, which Dr. Kristin Westphal, an expert on the Russian energy sector at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) characterized as "intervulnerability." Putting it more bluntly, Andreas Metz of the OA said, "we have no energy, but they have no money." ¶8. (U) Dr. Westphal characterized Russia as a "less reliable energy supplier than the Soviet Union." Fear of a gas cut-off has been replaced by worries over possible price extortion, as Russia could be tempted to abuse its dominant position as Germany's chief energy supplier to increase prices. Germany recognizes the need to diversity its energy supply, but few concrete steps have been taken. The planned North Stream pipeline, which would run under the Baltic Sea and deliver gas directly from Russia to Germany, simplifies Germany's receipt of Russian gas, but does nothing to diversity supply and has aroused suspicion among Germany's neighbors. Note: After the January gas crisis, MFA and Chancellery officials talked openly of Gazprom no longer having a "perfect track record" as a reliable business partner. However, as the memory of the gas crisis faded, officials quickly forgot their new criticism of Gazprom. End Note. Tariffs: Cash Cow, Customs Union -------------- ¶9. (U) The Russian Government's tariff policies continue to be a concern for German industry, as is its intention to create a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Late last year, Russia increased import duties for new cars from 25% to 35%, resulting in significantly higher prices for new German cars exported to Russia, while duties on used cars doubled. German interlocutors note that customs duties still constitute a significant source of revenue for the Russian government. Oliver Wieck of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) said 40% of the Russian government's non-energy revenues come from customs duties. A contact at the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) reported that German freight trucks have to pay 2,000 euros just to drive into the inspection bay; no receipt is given for the fee which presumably is pocketed. Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The German-Russian economic relationship is complementary, as each needs what the other has to offer. The consensus in Germany's political and business establishment strongly favors engaging with Russia. All hope that Russia will one day develop into a more "normal" business partner, but for now it remains anything but. End comment. MURPHY